Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/8951

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)

[Washington,] July 14, 1937.

It is true that we are receiving conflicting and confusing information with regard to the situation and events in north China. However, it is not necessary that we allow ourselves to be confused, by the contradictory aspects of the current reports, as regards the fundamental facts and the outstanding developments.

Reduced to its simplest terms the situation is this: hostilities are taking place on Chinese territory between Chinese and Japanese armed forces. The area involved embraces the city of Peiping and its environs. Here we have the erstwhile capital, a point which is still the nerve center of north China. Peiping is a railway center. From it there goes to the northwest the railway which leads into Mongolia; to the, east, the railway which leads to Tientsin and from Tientsin northward along the coast into Manchuria effecting junction with the South Manchuria Railway main lines which in turn lead to the Trans-Siberia Railway on the north and the lines into Korea on the southeast (from Tientsin, railway connection is made southward to Nanking and Shanghai); to the south, the railway to Hankow (from where there branch off two lines westward) which makes, at the Yangtze River, in central China, connection with the line southward to Canton. At and around Peiping Chinese troops have always been stationed in considerable numbers and there exist extensive permanent barracks. Before 1931, all of the important treaty powers had in Peiping legation guards in about equal numbers and had at Tientsin small armed forces in about equal numbers. Since 1931, the Japanese have greatly increased the number of their armed forces theoretically based on Tientsin. During last year, the Japanese armed forces in this region have numbered approximately 10,000. These Japanese armed forces have made themselves a nuisance both to the Chinese and to nationals of other countries. They seem to have a passion for engaging in “maneuvers.” They seem to derive special pleasure from “maneuvering” during the hours between midnight and daybreak. Inside the walled city of Peiping the Japanese “guard” has frequently turned out in the middle of the night, dashed into and out of various points, carried and set up and fired off machine guns, etc., etc., on many occasions. Outside of the city and all along the railway as far as Tientsin, units of the Japanese forces are constantly engaged in marching and counter-marching, staging sham battles, passing over cultivated farm lands, requisitioning quarters, etc., etc. Foreign observers, even those most sympathetic to the Japanese, have been unanimous in the opinion that these activities of the Japanese armed forces, whether or not so intended, have been inevitably provocative. Many times have these observers expressed surprise that the Chinese have been able to exercise the amount of self-restraint required to avert armed clashes. Those who wish accurately to envisage and disinterestedly to understand this situation should realize that these Japanese activities are taking place on territory which is clearly Chinese, which is strategically and politically and economically important, and where the Japanese have no right to be except as a right may be claimed under provisions of the Boxer Protocol of 1901. (Note: In the Boxer Protocol it was provided that the powers might maintain armed forces at Peiping and armed forces along the railway line, for two purposes, (1) guarding their legations and (2) keeping “open” a line of communication between Peiping and the sea. The significant fact in this connection is that during recent years the Japanese have introduced and maintained in the area armed forces numbering five to ten times as many as those maintained by any of the other Treaty Powers. Admitting that this may be within the letter of the Boxer Protocol, most observers affirm that it is not within the spirit and intent of that Protocol. None but the Japanese perceive any need or justification for constant “maneuvering” such as the Japanese persistently engage in.)

The outstanding political facts are as follows: some 4 years ago Japanese armies came into north China from Manchuria and Jehol and advanced to the gates of Peiping. Under Japanese aegis, there were set up in 1935 two autonomous régimes with renegade Chinese in nominal control and the Japanese Kwantung Army functioning as a “power behind the throne.” Ever since, the Kwantung Army and some Japanese leaders in Tokyo have been intent on cutting north China from the rest of China, with the line of demarkation roughly indicated by the Yellow River. High authority in Tokyo has been opposed to this project, especially so during recent months in the course of which there has been increasing evidence of a disposition on the part of the Nanking Government to resist with force, and while there have been various upsets in the internal situation in Japan. Meanwhile, it has become clear that China is making great progress in the fields of economic reconstruction, financial stabilization, military preparedness and national solidarity of opinion on the subject of resistance to Japanese pressure. Most recently, the Japanese have succeeded in setting up a Cabinet which, with Prince Konoye at its head, has a more widespread basis of articulate and popular support than have had the succession of Japanese Cabinets which have preceded it during recent years.

In regard to the present hostilities, the simple facts are as follows: on the night of July 7, Japanese armed forces in the neighborhood of Marco Polo Bridge, some 10 miles southwest of Peiping, engaging in night “maneuvers,” met with some form of resistance on the part of Chinese armed forces at their proper stations in that neighborhood. Hostilities thereupon began. Since then there have been, effected by local representatives of the two nationalities, a series of truces followed in series by resumptions of hostilities. The military operations of the Japanese have been extended as shown by clashes at points many miles distant from the point of the original clash. The question arises, what objective could those operations have had other than (1) to bring on widespread hostilities and (2) to drive Chinese armed forces out of and away from the (strictly Chinese) region involved?

With regard to the broader military situation, the simple facts are: the Japanese have already moved in reinforcements from Manchuria: they are estimated now to have in the area west of Tientsin perhaps as many as 20,000 men. The Japanese Government has either sent or assembled for sending, from Japan, two divisions (approximately 40,000 men). A Japanese naval squadron is standing off of Shanghai. The Nanking Government has ordered to proceed to the north six divisions of what are affirmed to be Chiang Kai-shek’s best troops. Thus, each side is bringing into or toward the affected area heavy reinforcements, and, on the Japanese side, a minatory gesture is being made at the most vital point on the China coast. It should be kept in mind that all of the stationing of military reinforcements is taking place on Chinese soil.

The simple facts in regard to the diplomatic situation are: China is on the defensive: the Chinese Government has taken the position that the question involved in north China is a national and not merely a local question; the Chinese Government has declared its desire not to fight and has asked the powers to take steps on behalf of peace. The Japanese are on the offensive: they have taken the position that the situation in north China is of no rightful concern to the Nanking Government but is a local question; they have affirmed to the powers that they are entirely within their rights in their military operations in north China, and they have stated that “the presence of disorderly Chinese troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area … disturbs peace and order in north China which is of vital importance to Japan …”; they have declared that “the Japanese Government has decided to take precautionary steps to meet all situations …”;⁹⁹ they have stated that they want peace but that they intend to handle this matter conclusively.

(Note: Japanese demands as given in the press are: (1) Withdrawal of all Chinese troops from the fighting zone; (2) Punishment of all Chinese troops held responsible for the outbreak last week; (3) Termination of anti-Japanese activities in north China; (4) Support of Japanese anti-Communism movement.)

99. Omissions indicated in the original. The quotations are taken from the memorandum from the Japanese Embassy to the Department of State, July 12, 1937, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 318.