862.00/3668: Telegram
The Chargé in Germany ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 25—10:05 a.m.]
201. A formal invitation has been received from the Reich Chancellor addressed to the American Chargé d’Affaires to attend the Reich Party rally at Nuremberg from September 6 to September 13.
Developments in this matter since the Embassy’s telegram 194, August 11, 5 p.m.,78 have been as follows:
In conversation with the French and British Ambassadors we learn that they are both under instructions, if it could be so arranged, to attend for a minimum period and that they would obtain assurances from the Foreign Office that no untoward or embarrassing speeches or demonstrations take place during the period they are in attendance. The two Ambassadors have accepted the invitation stipulating that they will arrive in Nuremberg on the evening of September 9 and leave at noon September 11. It is understood that the program for September 10 will be a tea given by the Diplomatic Corps to the Chancellor and on the morning of September 11 some “harmless” youth parade.
From general conversations we gather that the Italian, the Japanese and the majority of other representatives including presumably all of the Latin American will accept for the whole period. I understand, however, that certain representatives including the Dutch, the Swiss and some at least of the Scandinavian will accept to arrive the evening of September 9 remaining through September 13. The invitation was accompanied by a Foreign Office note verbale which, in addition to general directions regarding accommodations, contains the following:
“In case any one of the Chiefs of Mission who has accepted should be unable to be present at the 1937 Reich Party rally from the beginning the compartments reserved for him in the sleeper train will, nevertheless, be held for him during the entire time. In such a case it is requested kindly to inform the Protocol Section of the Foreign Office by the 25th of this month what day he will arrive in Nuremberg”.
The question has been discussed in diplomatic circles as to how it would be possible under international courtesy and usage to “limit” [Page 379] an acceptance extended by the head of state to a chief of a diplomatic mission. The note from the Foreign Office obviously solves this problem. It is clearly evident to us that the stipulation in the note which I have cited was “negotiated” by the British and French with the Foreign Office to meet that difficulty.
We have refrained from approaching the Foreign Office in any way in the matter or of discussing our possible action with my colleagues. We have, nevertheless, noted three chief preoccupations entertained by all of our colleagues who have expressed themselves in this connection:
- (1)
- The established usage rendering it virtually incumbent upon a representative present in the country to accept an invitation from the head of a state to which he is accredited.
- (2)
- In this case, in view of the apparently possible unanimous acceptance, a refusal on the part of a representative might place him in the position of being the sole exception or perhaps of being in the public view unwarrantably associated with some other power in such action.
- (3)
- A refusal might invoke retaliatory action of a similar character on the part of the German representative in the state concerned.
We note the Department’s desire to have us deal with the situation in the light of its local and international implications with the minimum of embarrassment to the Government (Department’s 95, August 23[13], 4 p.m.79). Responsive to this and having in mind the preoccupations indicated above we have given the matter most careful consideration. As a result I have today transmitted a formal acceptance for the minimum period, i. e. that selected by the British and French described above. Whether any other representatives will accept under the same terms I am unable to say.
As of more general interest the British Ambassador took care to impress on us that in this he was not acting in any way jointly with the French. He asserted that while there must be solidarity with France in the West the British could not undertake common action with France in the East and that the principal fundamental policy was that all British-German relations must be independent and bilateral. Henderson80 is now here. It is evident that this is his personal policy which he will endeavor to carry out. He nevertheless spoke of “difficulties” with London and whether this represents considered British policy may be a different matter. On the other hand Poncet81 endeavored to convey the impression that in the Nuremberg matter and by inference in a more general sense British and French policy was concerted.