751.62/410: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:05 p.m.]
660–665. I discussed with General Gamelin, Chief of the General Staff, last night the situation created by the new political position of Belgium. Gamelin’s opinion did not differ in any essential respect from the views reported to you in my No. 576, May 5, 11 a.m., and previous.
Gamelin said that the ability of France to come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia or any other state of Eastern and Central Europe has been gravely diminished. France could no longer plan to march her troops through Belgium or base her planes on Belgian territory for attack on the Ruhr. Furthermore, as talks between the French and Belgian General Staffs had ceased there could be no certitude in making preparations for French support of Belgium in case Belgium should be attacked by Germany.
(Parenthetically Gamelin expressed great confidence in the defensive position of France. Experience in Spain had proved that a large city was the most formidable of fortifications. In case of German invasion of France, Roubaix, Tourcoing, Valenciennes and Lille would prove to be almost untakeable.)
He went on to say that Germany had already fortified thoroughly the line of the Rhine from Sweden [Switzerland] to Karlsruhe and that an attack between those points would be almost impossibly costly. The only remaining front on which the French Army could attack Germany was the 150 kilometer line between Karlsruhe and Luxemburg. The Germans at the present time were working insistently to fortify this short line. The French General Staff for its part was preparing a great quantity of cannon of the largest caliber and many heavily armed tanks for attack on this line. Gamelin expressed the opinion that great speed in tanks was of little or no value and that heavy armament was vital.
He went on to say that he believed that a sufficient preponderance of heavy artillery and heavy tanks might enable the French to attack successfully on this 150 kilometer front.
I asked Gamelin if it were not the consensus of French military opinion that in spite of the heaviest concentration of guns and tanks conceivable the Germans would be able to hold an attack on this short front by the entire French Army with one half their present forces. He agreed that this was probable.
I then asked Gamelin whether the information of the General Staff indicated that Germany would in the near future dare to risk [Page 97] war with France. He expressed the opinion emphatically that Germany would not dare to take the risk but although Germany could unquestionably achieve large initial successes neither Germany nor Italy had the economic strength to fight a prolonged war and the Germans knew that in spite of initial successes Germany would succumb finally just as she had succumbed in the war of 1914–18 under the pressure of those nations which could fight for a long period.
I then asked Gamelin if he did not believe that as soon as the French people began to realize the new position of Belgium, that the French soldiers would have to attack heavily fortified German lines on a short front, public opinion would begin to turn against such a horrible sacrifice of French lives. He replied that public opinion rarely understood military questions.
I put the same question to Blum yesterday who made very much the same sort of reply; and reasserted emphatically his determination to lead France to war in case Germany should attack Czechoslovakia.
Herriot,24 however, last night expressed to me the opinion that France with only 40,000,000 inhabitants could no longer regard herself as a great power of sufficient military strength or human resources to maintain her position in Central and Eastern Europe and bring effective support to her allies in those regions.
There is no doubt about the determination of the French Government at the present time to support Czechoslovakia in case of German attack on Czechoslovakia but it is certainly conceivable that this determination will weaken during the coming months.
In this connection it is perhaps worth while to note that Gamelin expressed again last night extreme skepticism as to any support which the Soviet Union might give to Czechoslovakia. He said that in the first place he did not believe the Russians would wish to march; if they should wish to march he did not believe their railroads and roads leading to Europe were sufficient to enable them to march to Czechoslovakia and further he did not believe that either Poland or Rumania would permit the passage of Russian troops.
In the course of the evening yesterday I had conversations also with Chautemps, former Prime Minister and now Minister of State, and Auboin, Undersecretary at the Conseil d’Etat, both of whom in much the same terms that Blum had employed earlier in the day expressed the opinion that Europe was drifting toward war; that there was no sign of a constructive policy which might bring peace and reconciliation and that the invention of such a policy was beyond the wit of man. In this connection Chautemps mentioned the possibility of intervention by the President of the United States; but only to comment that unless the President could back his words by pledging [Page 98] the support of the armed forces and the economic and financial strength of the United States against an aggressor words would be without effect. He added that of course he knew any such intervention by the United States was impossible.
- Edouard Herriott, President of the French Chamber of Deputies.↩