740.00/178: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:43 p.m.]
652–655. I lunched with Blum today. He expressed the opinion that the net result of all the recent political conversations in London and Paris would be very small.
He said that Eden and Chamberlain had assured the French, the Austrians, and the Czechs that they were not disinterested in the fate of Czechoslovakia and Austria but that Eden had made it entirely clear to Guido Schmidt, Austrian Foreign Minister, that it would be very difficult to persuade the British public to go to war on behalf of Austria.
Blum said that Schmidt in his conversations in both London and Paris had been most reserved. He had said that Austria’s position was based on maintaining close contact with Italy and on developing [Page 94] friendly relations with Germany. He intended to continue to push as hard as he could for closer relations with Hungary and Czechoslovakia but he could not take any position which would lead to an open break with Germany or Italy.
Blum said that Hodza, Czech Foreign Minister, was doing everything that he could to bring about close relations between Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia and that he did not despair that the negotiations in progress might produce some result.
Blum said that Litvinov had assured him categorically that if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia and if France should go to war with Germany to defend Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union would make war on Germany at once.
I commented that I did not see how the aid of the Soviet Union could be very effective in view of the condition of Soviet roads and railroads leading to the west and in view of the fact that Soviet planes and armies could not cross Poland or Rumania. Blum said that he felt Rumania was so closely bound to Czechoslovakia and had such a keen sense that Rumania would be a tempting morsel for Germany if Czechoslovakia should succumb that the Rumanians would cooperate with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in case of German attack on Czechoslovakia.
Blum agreed that Hitler had the political initiative on the continent of Europe at the moment and he did not see any way to take this initiative out of the hands of Germany. It was tragic but true that at the present time the situation was beginning to resemble more and more the situation before 1914. He could see nothing better to do than to recreate the close entente between England, France, and Russia which had existed before 1914. Litvinov had requested him to do his utmost to bring about a rapprochement between England and the Soviet Union. He believed that the single chance of preserving peace in Europe would lie in such a rapprochement and therefore he favored it.
I suggested that it would not be easy to convince the present British Government to have close relations with the Soviet Union especially in view of the recent wholesale exilings and shootings. Blum said that he did not believe it would be any more difficult for the British Government to work with the present Russian Government than it had been before the war for the French Left Governments to work with Czarist Governments. In any case he felt that there was no other alternative and he intended to try to bring about closer relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
All the information that he had received recently led him to believe that relations between Italy and England were bound to grow worse. He was convinced that the basis of the recent conversations between [Page 95] Germany and Italy had been that Mussolini had agreed not to oppose Hitler’s ambitions in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in return for German support in the Mediterranean. He thought that Mussolini now intended to attempt to establish himself with increased strength in the eastern Mediterranean and would need Germany’s support and therefore could not oppose Germany in Central Europe.
I commented that in all this I could see nothing very constructive. Blum replied that the tragedy of his position at the present moment was that with the greatest will in the world on his part and on the part of the entire French people to achieve peace, there seemed to be nothing constructive to be done.
Blum asked me if Mr. Norman Davis had left for the United States and I replied that he had. He said that he regretted this as the French Government after consultation with the British Government last night had decided to invite both Germany and Italy to send representatives to the impending Disarmament Conference at Geneva.23 Whatever the replies might be from Germany and Italy this would at least put them up against the problem of making some reply.
Schacht would be coming to Paris next week. He did not know what Schacht would have to suggest but in view of the fact that Schacht had ended all his recent conversations with a demand for the return of all the former German colonies taken from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, he did not hope for ideal results. Delbos in London had discussed the question of return of German colonies with the British. The British had taken the position that they would not be ready to return German colonies to Germany merely to have Germany make further demands after the colonies were returned. If, however, the question of the return of some portion of the former German colonies to Germany should be the only capstone needed to complete a structure of peace for the world, it would [not] refuse to discuss the question.
I suggested to Blum that this was precisely what the British had said to Van Zeeland with regard to reduction of barriers to International commerce and the rehabilitation of the economic life of the world and that the British seemed to be reserving a large number of capstones.
He agreed that this was so and our conversation concluded with some remarks on the tragedy of a man who ardently desires peace and is at the head of a nation which ardently desires peace yet is overcome in any attempt to devise a method to achieve peace by the force of existing circumstances.