852.00/6579: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 30—4:32 p.m.]
623. My 612, September 25, 4 p.m. The Cabinet has approved provisionally a draft of a joint communication by Great Britain and France to Italy which has been under elaboration for the past several days. It is understood the note will propose three-power talks on means for making effective non-intervention in Spain and that it will tackle the all-important problem of withdrawal of the foreign forces now in that country.
I gather from conversations during the last 2 days with responsible officials that they view the problem plainly in its immediate aspect as an Anglo-Italian issue with France and Germany as figures. Mussolini wants a rapprochement with England and at the same time hopes that he can gather enough support to have it on his own terms. The conclusion of the Nyon Agreement, however, with its demonstration that Great Britain and France meant business on the vitally important issue of law and security in the Mediterranean has somewhat shaken his confidence; and his visit to Hitler has not, it is believed, offered him anything in the way of encouragement toward enlarging the scope of his activities in Spain. Whether he will accept the Anglo-French démarche is of course not known, but even if he does, it would be bold, in the view here, to argue optimistically that [Page 407] any very forward step had been taken toward a real Anglo-Italian rapprochement. The Foreign Office views with extreme regret that the question of recognizing the fait accompli in Abyssinia has not been settled at Geneva. It has been made plain to me that the Foreign Office is willing to recognize the Italian conquest as a fait accompli but obviously the question of a formula for putting this recognition into effect offers real difficulties. Great Britain cannot disassociate herself easily from the League on such a matter and Mussolini is thought to hold the entirely erroneous belief that Great Britain is trying to block recognition of the Italian conquest. He is suspicious of British sincerity and it seems that he does not fully understand that the thing vital to this country on which it will not recede is absolute security of the sea route through the Mediterranean. Just why the British are not willing themselves to take the initiative at Geneva on this question, in view of their realistic conception of the facts, is not clear, although they may perhaps consider that Mussolini would, in his present aggrieved and truculent state of mind, take it as an indication of British weakness, thus making negotiation with him difficult on more important and pressing issues.