852.00/6545: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:45 p.m.]
1339. Yesterday I discussed with Léger (who in the absence of Delbos is in charge at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) the development [Page 404] of the Nyon Agreement and Delbos’ conversations with Italian representatives in Geneva. Léger said that he was far from optimistic. The Italians in Geneva had been profuse in their statements to Delbos that Italy desired to restore good relations with France and had no intention whatsoever of retaining control of the Balearic Islands or other portions of Spanish territory. They desired merely to assist Franco to crush Bolshevism in Spain and would then withdraw. They desired to participate as equals in the patrol of the Mediterranean.
Léger said that while these statements were being made to Delbos the French Government had received positive information from its consuls and other agents in Italy that the Italian Government had prepared very large forces in Italian ports for an expedition to Spanish territory. There were 20,000 men in one port, 20,000 in another, 10,000 in another and so on, with sufficient transports waiting to carry the troops to Spain. The French Government had communicated this information yesterday to the British Government and had received the reply today that the British Government had received precisely the same information. In addition Delbos was convinced that the Italians had sent large reinforcements to Spain during the past 10 days. He, Léger, was not convinced that this was so; but the proofs were absolute that everything had been prepared for the immediate shipment of a large new Italian expeditionary force to Spain (Daladier, Minister of War, said to me this evening that the French Army had specific information that the number of Italian troops ready to embark for Spain was 70,000).
Léger went on to say that he believed that Mussolini’s policy at the moment was the following: He desired to appear conciliatory toward France before going to visit Hitler in Germany. He also hoped that France might be ready to accept his “ideological crusade” in Spain, if he should promise to get out of the Balearic Islands and other Spanish territory. Léger expressed the opinion that such a promise would be valueless.
Léger said that he had advised Delbos and Chautemps to ask the British at once to join France in making the strongest sort of a démarche in Rome in order to prevent Mussolini from sending the troops now ready to Spain. He said that he felt certain the French Government would propose this action and he believed that Eden would be in favor of it; but he feared that Chamberlain might veto the suggestion.
Léger went on to say that if Italy should send the troops now ready to Spain, France would be compelled either to open the Spanish frontier and ship munitions, airplanes, et cetera, to the Valencia Government or to take some definite military action in the Balearic Islands. He himself believed and had advised Chautemps and Delbos that a joint French-British occupation of Minorca would be less dangerous [Page 405] in its ultimate consequences than the opening of the French-Spanish frontier which would lead to military competition in Spain between France and Italy.
Léger went on to say that under the circumstances it was very difficult for France and England to take seriously the Italian offer to come into the Nyon Agreement. In any case the French and British Governments had decided that no portion of the said steamer route between Port Said and Gibraltar should be placed under control of Italian ships. The French and the British would be glad to give the Italians as broad a band as they might desire to the north of that route but would not allow Italy to place her patrol ships any place on that route. He was not certain therefore that in the end Mussolini would come into the Nyon Agreement.
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