852.00/5014: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

409. The Paris edition of the New York Herald carries headline today “Anglo-French blockade of Spain discussed” and “Warships may stop Italian boats bound for Spanish ports” with a story to the effect that this was the information given out by Delbos himself in a press conference yesterday following conversations with the British and German Ambassadors.

I inquired at the Foreign Office this morning regarding the foregoing. I was told that the story was exaggerated and that the account of the press conference held by Delbos as given in the London and French papers is much less sensational (which is true). The Foreign Office said that in his press conference Delbos spoke of the seriousness of the situation, said that he had had a satisfactory talk with the British Ambassador51 in which they had been in agreement upon the necessity of making every effort to bring the volunteers back from Spain and above all to prevent the despatch of additional foreigners to Spain in the future and that if despite the measures of control agreed upon direct Italian assistance to Spain should continue then it would be necessary to consider what could be done to make the control more effective.

I was told in confidence that while in the conference between Delbos and Clerk they had in fact discussed the possibility of being led to consider naval measures of control to prevent Italian assistance to the nationalists in the eventuality that the Italian Government should break away from the Non-Intervention Arrangement and attempt to send troops openly to Spain, this possibility was discussed only in general terms. It is felt at the Foreign Office that British opinion while alarmed over the situation is not yet prepared to envisage action of the character mentioned. The French Government realizes the [Page 261] difficult situation in which Mussolini is placed. They are willing to draw a veil over the past and while they desire to bring about the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain if this is possible they regard as by far the most important matter the complete prohibition on sending any further foreign assistance to Spain. They feel that this prohibition must be made effective, otherwise if Italy continues to send troops into Spain the French Government will be placed in an impossible situation as regards public opinion in this country. The Foreign Office said that in Delbos’ conversation with the German Ambassador the latter while raising certain questions regarding the practicability of withdrawing volunteers from Spain was conciliatory. The official with whom I spoke pointed out that in these latest developments regarding Spain there obviously has been no concerted agreement beforehand between the Germans and Italians: the former were being cautious while the latter seem to be acting on their own initiative.

What troubles them deeply at the Foreign Office about this situation is that they are unable for the moment to see a solution: the Italian military forces have suffered a severe loss of prestige in Spain; it is feared that Mussolini will believe it necessary to achieve a military victory there in order to recover his prestige; from the best information the Foreign Office has it would take some 50 or 60,000 additional Italian troops to capture Madrid: if Mussolini does not send any re-enforcements to Spain the Italian troops now there are apt to be captured or killed which would be a further blow to Italian prestige that the regime there could hardly stand; on the other hand if Mussolini decides to intervene on a large scale in Spain this must inevitably create a most serious situation for France and England.

Wilson
  1. Sir George Clerk.