793.94/7879
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 4.]
Sir: I have the honor to state that Sir Alexander Cadogan, the retiring British Ambassador, called on me today to say goodbye, and in the course of the conversation told me briefly of the results of recent conversations which he had held with some of the leading persons in Nanking.
Our conversation was, of course, informal and had the nature of an exchange of impressions. Sir Alexander said that he had had farewell interviews with General Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yuan, Mr. Chang Ch’un, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and others, and had taken pains to inquire whether any progress had been made in the conversations recently held between the two persons just named and Mr. Arita, until recently Japanese Ambassador in Nanking, who has returned to Tokyo to take up the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs.
General Chiang Kai-shek had, as usual, been rather uncommunicative, but he and Mr. Chang Ch’un had both stated, in effect, that the [Page 96] conversations with Mr. Arita had not resulted in any progress in settling the differences between Japan and China. Mr. Chang Ch’un told Sir Alexander there was still a lack of agreement in regard to a fundamental issue between the two Governments, but it seemed possible that some agreement in regard to various details might possibly be reached. Sir Alexander said that he had observed to Mr. Chang Ch’un that there were two ways of handling such a situation as exists between Japan and China; one way would be to try to reach a basic understanding and leave details for later consideration, while the other way would be to adjust such differences as could be adjusted, hoping thus to reach, ultimately, a settlement of the fundamental issue. To this Mr. Chang Ch’un had said that the second method seemed to be the only one feasible.
I remarked that the fundamental issue which Mr. Chang Ch’un had referred to as still being a point of disagreement between Japan and China was probably the refusal of China to submit to Japanese tutelage, and Sir Alexander concurrred in this supposition.
The British Ambassador said that he had talked with Mr. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, and Mr. Suma had confirmed the general feeling that no progress had been made in the conversations between Mr. Arita and General Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Chang Ch’un. In fact, Mr. Suma said, some of the outstanding questions which were formerly under negotiation had been “discarded” by the Chinese. Sir Alexander said that he had not been able to ascertain clearly what Mr. Suma meant by this statement. My own supposition is that Mr. Suma meant either that the Chinese had refused to carry to a conclusion some of the discussions which were in progress, or that Mr. Suma meant that the Chinese Government had repudiated some of the positions formerly taken by it. For example, the press has carried statements made by Japanese officials that the Chinese Government had “accepted” Mr. Hirota’s “three principles”, whereas published statements of Chinese leaders assert that these “three principles” have not been accepted by China, except as subjects for discussion.
Sir Alexander inquired what I thought had been the result of the February 26 incident in Tokyo, that is, what phase of Japanese policy toward China had gained the ascendancy in the Japanese Government as the outcome of that incident. I replied that, while my impressions were all gathered at secondhand, I felt that the rather socialistic attitude toward alleged unequal distribution of wealth in Japan had gained some headway and that the plan to expand on the continent through military occupation of territory had probably become more firmly entrenched as the policy of the Japanese Government. Sir Alexander said that nothing important had happened since the February 26 incident in the way of Japanese military activities [Page 97] in north China, and I observed that I had heard several important Chinese express the opinion at the time the incident occurred that China might expect a lull of several months, until normality had been restored in the political scene in Tokyo.
Sir Alexander said that it irritated him to hear Japanese complain of China’s lack of friendship for Japan and he intimated that in his conversation with Mr. Suma he had pointed out the unreasonableness of expecting the Chinese to be friendly toward Japan so long as Japan maintained in power a puppet like Yin Ju-keng in the demilitarized zone of eastern Hopei Province, and did not take steps to prevent Japanese smuggling into Hopei Province. During our conversation I referred to a recent informal dissertation I had heard given by Mr. Tai Chi-tao, President of the Examination Yuan, on what he termed the historic urge of Japan to expand on the Asiatic mainland. It was President Tai’s opinion that this urge had existed for centuries, would continue to form Japanese foreign policy and would ultimately be the cause of the destruction of Japan. Sir Alexander said that it was all very well to talk about a mere “urge” to expand on the mainland, but doubtless Japan is in a desperate situation and must do something to improve it. This fact must be taken into account. I remarked that this office had recently prepared a translation of an editorial which appeared in a Nanking popular journal, drawing lessons for China from the bold action of Germany in breaking the shackles of “unequal treaties”. Sir Alexander said he feared that the writer of the editorial had not carried his argument to its logical conclusion and called attention to the fact that Germany has become powerful through discipline and energy, whereas China seems to remain perpetually an inert mass. I observed in regard to this that General Chiang seemed to be doing his best to create a powerful military machine and that he was reported to be sending large numbers of troops to the region of Haichow, north Kiangsu Province, in apparent fear that the Japanese might attempt to seize the Lung-Hai Railway. Sir Alexander said that he had heard of the Chinese apprehension that the Japanese might seek to seize this railway, beginning at the port of Haichow.
I remarked that the editorial to which I had referred showed that Chinese are beginning to think of China in relation to the general international set-up. For example, they were drawing lessons from the demonstrated ability of Ethiopia, a nation at least as backward as China, to oppose Italy for many months and were beginning to wonder whether if China were to oppose Japan’s encroachments actively, other nations would not think more highly of China and would not come to China’s assistance. Such Chinese were speculating what would be the attitude of the leading nations, say Great Britain and the United States, if China should begin such active resistance.
[Page 98]Sir Alexander said that “feelers” on this subject had been put to him and he had not hesitated to reply that the Chinese might expect nothing from Great Britain. I observed that the Chinese might feel themselves warranted in expecting some support from Great Britain, since that country had been, in public opinion, foremost in measures designed to place some restraint on Italy in its imperialistic schemes in Ethiopia. Sir Alexander replied that the Chinese ought to be able to see that the two situations are entirely different; in Europe it was possible for Great Britain to enlist the joint support of other nations, whereas in the Far East there would be no nation to join Great Britain in opposing Japan’s encroachments on China. He pointed out that it would be impossible for Great Britain to exert any military strength of its own in the Far East. I assented to his general view and admitted that the nearest Great Power, the United States, would be extremely unlikely to take any part in the matter, since American participation in any war is enormously more expensive than participation by any other nation, and there were no American interests in China which would seem to warrant the colossal expenditure that past experience indicated would probably be necessary.
Sir Alexander said that he was glad to have had his experience as Ambassador in China before taking up his new post of Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, although he felt that his experience in China had been too brief to give him a genuine insight into the problems here. I replied that I did not feel that this was the case, that Sir Alexander had acquired a thorough comprehension of the psychological factors which mould political events in the Far East and that the details were more or less inconsequential. Sir Alexander said he hoped to have an interesting talk in Tokyo with the British Ambassador there.
Sir Alexander expressed the hope that if I should pass through London I would establish contact with him, so that our relations might be continued.
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy