894.00/651
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 1.]
Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1784, dated April 17, 1936,48 concerning the results flowing from the incident of [Page 770] February 26, 1936, I now have the honor to report the following developments in the situation.
Position of the Army
The Japanese Army, and particularly that portion of the Army which has been concerning itself with political questions and advocating ultra-nationalistic principles, does not appear to be in favor in Japan at the moment. Since the convening of the special session of the Diet on May 1, numerous critical interpellations have been directed at the Minister for War, the most striking one being that of Mr. Takao Saito, a Minseito member of the Lower House, delivered on May 7 (Embassy’s despatch No. 1826, dated May 13, 193650). In the course of his interpellation, Mr. Saito criticized the tendency of young Army officers to meddle in political affairs and described their ideas as “naive”, “laughable” and “simple and pure but puerile”. He condemned the Army authorities for not having taken steps at an earlier date to eliminate erroneous ideas in the Army and declared that the May 15 and February 26 incidents could have been prevented if the higher authorities in the Army had endeavored from the first to remove the causes of the evil. He further declared that extreme rightists were as dangerous to the State as extreme leftists and advised the higher military authorities to guide properly the younger officers, in order to prevent the growth of dangerous ideas. His speech was greeted with loud and prolonged applause and was later commented upon most favorably by several newspapers, indicating clearly that the general sentiment in the country is favorable to the critics of the Army and opposed to that section of the Army which has advocated extreme reactionary principles.
The Army has been somewhat embarrassed by these demonstrations of lack of sympathy, and consequently is apparently taking strong measures to eliminate from the Army those elements which have called down upon the Army the wrath of the public. The most striking example of these measures is the sentencing to death of Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa, the murderer of Lieutenant-General Nagata in August last (see Embassy’s despatch No. 1821, dated May 12, 1936). This sentence, imposed by the First Division Court Martial (held in camera) on May 7, 1936, is much more severe than the sentences imposed upon the young Army and Navy officers involved in the murder of Premier Inukai on May 15, 1932. It will be remembered that the young officers involved in that affair received prison sentences of from one to fifteen years, with, of course, commutation of sentence [Page 771] for good behavior and by Imperial clemency, although the civilian participants in the May 15 affair, who were tried in the civil courts, received life sentences. The sentence imposed upon Colonel Aizawa51 is also an indication of the severity of the sentences which will be imposed upon the young officers involved in the incident of February 26 and of the determination of the Army to rid itself of those who are subjecting the organization to the criticism of the public.
At the same time, the Army does not seem to be greatly worried over the criticisms in the Diet and the newspapers. It is proceeding calmly and smugly on its way, believing thoroughly in its mission as the savior of Japan. It continues to keep Tokyo in the grip of martial law, has asked for larger appropriations than ever, has formulated and proposed bills for the mobilization of industries, for the preservation of national industrial mobilization secrets and for the control of “seditious literature”. These measures, if passed, obviously would increase the power of the Army to control the internal administration of the country. In addition there have been inaugurated so-called “Three-Minister Conferences”, composed of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War and Navy, for the purpose of discussing Japan’s foreign policies. The Three-Minister Conferences have received criticism in the Diet, but the Army and Navy maintain that, from the broad viewpoint of national defense, their Ministers should have the right and opportunity to express their views in regard to foreign policy as well as to internal administration.
It would appear, therefore, that the military, rather than being crushed by the shame of the February 26 incident, have in fact taken advantage of the incident to tighten their hold upon the Japanese Government and to further the so-called “Showa Restoration” (which in fact means the restoration of some form of government resembling the Shogunate). At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the military sincerely believe that the nation stands in grave danger of involvement in a serious war in the not distant future and that it is therefore of pressing necessity that the defense forces be augmented and the nation unified under the Emperor (with, of course, the leadership of the military). The military’s insistence upon dominance in the Government can be ascribed quite as well to the immediate necessity, real or fancied, of defense, as to the more vague idea of a return of military government in Japan.
Economic, Social and Administrative Reforms
As will be observed from a perusal of the addresses of the Premier and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Finance and War before the [Page 772] Diet on May 6 (Embassy’s despatch No. 1830, dated May 14, 193652), no concrete measures were announced for the execution of the economic, social and administrative reforms promised the nation by the Hirota Cabinet upon its inauguration. The policies outlined in the speeches before the Diet were vague and not very convincing, and the Cabinet has not introduced any reform measures of importance, the bulk of the bills introduced having been carried over from the previous government. The only social reform bill of importance introduced by the Hirota Cabinet is one compelling industrialists to build up retirement allowance funds for their employees. This lack of concrete reform measures has disappointed the nation, which apparently had expected much of the present national or “transcendental” Cabinet. Several of the prominent newspapers, including the Asahi, the Kokumin, the Yomiuri and the Jiji, have commented editorially upon the vagueness of the speeches of the Ministers, the unsatisfactory nature of their replies to interpellations and the failure of the Cabinet to carry out the promised administrative reforms. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi of May 13 stated that the Army also is dissatisfied with the lack of zeal for administrative reform in the civilian government. The Army, according to the newspaper, feels this especially strongly because the Army itself has been endeavoring, with success, to purge itself of the elements leading to unrest and indiscipline. It believes that the civilian authorities should show the same zeal in effecting reforms, instead of issuing vague promises only.
Mr. Hirota’s announced policy, however, was to undertake economic and administrative reforms slowly and gradually, in order to avoid any great disturbance of the life of the people, and in reply to interpellations in the Diet, the Cabinet Ministers involved have stated that administrative reforms and changes in the economic system will be studied after the present session of the Diet. Observers of the situation are becoming of the opinion, however, that the Hirota Cabinet is deliberately procrastinating in regard to reform measures, in the expectation that the agitation for such measures will die out, and that the Government then will be able to maintain the status quo, with only such minor reform measures as may be forced upon the Government by discontented elements in and out of the administration. The possibility always exists, however, that if the Government adopts such procrastinating and half-way tactics, and instead of earnestly endeavoring to correct the maladjustments and abuses in Japan, attempts to suppress by use of force all symptoms of unrest and discontent, there will arise other and perhaps worse incidents than those of May 15, 1932, and February 26, 1936.
Respectfully yours,