894.20/155
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 23.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit a report on the trial of Lieutenant Colonel Saburo Aizawa for the murder of Major-General Nagata*, with particular reference to its bearing on the recent uprising and on the political views of the discontented element in the Army.
On August 12, 1935, Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa stabbed to death Major-General Nagata, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, who was then in his office. Aizawa, of Samurai family, had as a result of the August 1 Army shifts been transferred from his post in Northern Japan to Formosa and was on his way to Formosa when he assassinated Nagata. He was detained and questioned by the gendarmerie and later placed in the Tokyo Military Prison where he remained until his trial.
The public trial was opened at the Court Martial of the First Division in Tokyo on January 28. The counsels for the defense were Lieutenant-Colonel Sakichi Mitsui and Dr. Somei Uzawa, a member of the House of Peers and of the Seiyukai political party, and President of Meiji University. Mr. Tomosaburo Shimada, in charge of the judicial affairs of the First Division, was the chief prosecutor and was assisted by Mr. Kotaro Sugihara, a judicial official attached to the Army. The presiding judge was Major-General Shozaburo Sato, Commander of the First Infantry Brigade.
There was never any question of Aizawa’s guilt, since this was admitted by him at the very start. The manner in which the trial was conducted from the beginning showed conclusively that the fate of Aizawa was only a minor consideration. It transpired with increasing clarity as the trial proceeded that the important aspects of the case were the political ideas entertained by a section of the Army and reports that a large number of prominent men were involved in the affair, either directly or in some nebulous way. That which began as the cold-blooded murder of a high-ranking Army officer by one of his subordinates developed into an intensely dramatic episode that affected almost all phases of Japan’s political life.
In the formal indictment against Aizawa it was stated that since about 1930 he had been worrying about the future of Japan; that he had become convinced in June, 1933, of the necessity of reforming the War Ministry, as the Army had failed to unite for the clarification of the national polity spirit; that he had taken an antipathy for General Nagata in the belief that the General was hindering the national [Page 743] reformation under the pretext of control of the Army; and that his antipathy had become more intense when General Masaki was relieved of his post of Director General of Military Education since he believed General Nagata responsible for the dismissal. The trial proceeded for nearly a month and was indefinitely postponed on February 27, the day after the murder of Viscount Saito, General Watanabe, Finance Minister Takahashi, and Colonel Matsuo, the Prime Minister’s brother-in-law.
This trial has unusual significance because the revelations brought out during its course are closely associated with the feeling in military circles that prompted the May 15 incident and subsequent plots and incidents. The names of the persons mentioned in the Aizawa trial figured prominently in the trial of the officers connected with the murder of Premier Inukai on May 15, 1932. In November, 1934, there was discovered a plot of younger Army officers for the “renovation of the country” and the assassination of Prince Saionji, the Genro, as well as Dr. Suzuki, President of the Seiyukai. Since this plot was alleged to have been frustrated by Major-General Nagata, it came up for frequent mention in the trial of Aizawa and was referred to as the “secret incident of November.” On July 16, 1935, General Jinsaburo Masaki, Inspector General of Military Education, was removed from office and General Watanabe was appointed in his place.† In view of the suspicion held by Aizawa and others that Nagata had been largely responsible for Masaki’s dismissal, this event occupied a great deal of attention in the trial. Shortly after Masaki’s dismissal Captains Kaji Muranaka and Asaichi Isobe issued a pamphlet defending Masaki and accusing Nagata of being connected with the large business interests and also of being a spy for the senior statesmen. It was disclosed during the hearings that Muranaka and Isobe had been associates of Aizawa. Their pamphlet was referred to in the trial as the “secret evidence” of Nagata’s guilt and was apparently considered to have influenced Aizawa in this action. The mystery which surrounds this document is indicated by the fact that the Embassy’s Military Attaché was unable to obtain a copy of it.
Perhaps the most significant development of the trial is the revelation of a desire held by various Army officers and persons outside the Army for a “renovation of the nation” to destroy the influence of the senior statesmen and the big industrialists and of the bureaucrats and Army officers affiliated with them. This feeling was made clear both by Aizawa’s testimony and by the statements of Colonel Mitsui and Dr. Uzawa, the defense counsels. Aizawa himself defined the renovation of the nation, otherwise known as the Showa restoration, [Page 744] as “the return of political and financial powers to the Emperor.” In the light of all the other testimony this rather vague phrase could probably be interpreted as follows: “The Showa Restoration will be achieved when the Emperor has ceased to be influenced by the senior statesmen and their backers, the financial magnates.” In addition, Aizawa admitted that he had desired to carry out a reformation by removing present civil officials and effecting perfect control of the Army by the Emperor. When asked to explain more concretely the practical method for bringing about the “Showa Restoration”, Aizawa replied that the Minister of Education could not properly educate the general public and that this should be done by Army reserve men. Lieutenant-Colonel Mitsui supported and amplified Aizawa’s statements by asserting that the national impasse was characterized by Japan’s international isolation, the chaotic condition of national thoughts, poverty among the people, and political instability; that the real cause of the Aizawa-Nagata incident was the conflict between the financial interests and the conservative forces close to the Throne on the one hand, and the radical elements desirous of the “Showa Restoration” on the other; that the conservatives had the upper hand and as a result had nearly “poisoned” the Imperial Army.
As stated above, the names of a number of prominent men were brought into the hearings of the Court Martial. Viscount Saito was charged by the defendant and his counsels with having been instrumental in Japan’s accepting the London Naval Treaty; with responsibility for the “illegal dismissal” of General Masaki from the post of Inspector General of Military Education and General Watanabe’s appointment in his place; with having guaranteed the future status of General Hayashi (then Minister for War) and Major-General Nagata if they would bring about the removal of Masaki; with having induced Prince Saionji to respond to the Emperor that Admiral Okada was the suitable man for the post of Premier; and with having asked Premier Okada to suppress those who aimed at the Showa Restoration. Aizawa accused Generals Minami, Hayashi, and Ugaki of having schemed with the senior statesmen, bureaucrats, and financial leaders to persuade General Nagata to cause the removal of General Masaki. In addition, he said: “General Ugaki is the Ashikaga Takauji (i. e., the embodiment of disloyalty in the Japanese mind) of the Showa era.” The defendant also believed, according to certain statements found in his diary, that Count Makino and Prince Saionji were also responsible for obstructing the Showa Restoration. At the tenth and last hearing on February 25, Lieutenant Colonel Mitsui, defense counsel, stated that he wanted to summon Mr. Seihen Ikeda of the Mitsui interests; Mr. Ijuro Ota, Ikeda’s relative; Marquess Koicho Kido; Major General Saburo Inouye; Mr. Sakichi Shimozono, personal secretary of Count Makino; and Mr. Toshiki Karasawa, Director of the Police [Page 745] Affairs Bureau of the Home Office. In connection with his desire to question Ikeda and Ota, Lieutenant Colonel Mitsui said that he wanted to find out whether they had conferred with General Nagata on the suppression of the Showa restoration movement and whether they had extended financial assistance to him. Among other men mentioned for summoning to the trial before its adjournment were General Ugaki and Lieutenant-General Hajime Sugiyama, Vice Chief of Staff. On February 25 General Masaki appeared for questioning in camera, the public not being admitted for fear that the proceedings would tend to injure the interests of the Army. According to Domei (news agency), after remaining for fifty minutes General Masaki left the court room abruptly and apparently in indignation. The reasons for General Masaki’s sudden departure from the Court Martial are not known, although the news agency quoted above stated that he had refused to give concrete evidence on the ground that in so doing he would violate Article 235 of the Court Martial Regulations, which provides that testimony involving official secrets may not be given by members of the Supreme War Council without Imperial Sanction.
A great part of the questioning and testimony had to do with Aizawa’s motives, probably on account of the prosecution’s desire to ascertain whether higher officers had influenced the assassin. According to his testimony, Aizawa’s motives were: his belief that Nagata was a “source of evil incarnate” and the principal obstructionists of the “Showa Restoration”; his despair over the corruption in the Army; and his conviction that elements in the Army were consorting with senior statesmen. Although Aizawa insisted throughout the trial that the murder was purely a case of direct action, suspicion would naturally fall on the Army officers with whom he admitted having had contact for several years past. These associates in the Army, as far as can be gathered from the testimony published by the newspapers, were Captains Asaichi Isobe and Koji Muranaka, the joint authors of the “secret pamphlet” referred to above; Captain Okishi; Zei Nishida; two naval officers involved in the May 15 incident; former Army Captains Sone, Eichi Okura, Ando, Sato, and Koda; Captain Tsuji; and one Kazutero Kita. Although some observers suspected General Masaki of direct complicity in the murder, there is no evidence of this. All that is known, according to the defendant’s statements, is that he was an admirer of Masaki and killed General Nagata on account of the latter’s alleged connection with Masaki’s “disgrace”. Aizawa was also closely questioned as to whether he had been aware of the guilt attached to the murder of a superior officer and the punishment which might be administered to him. The prosecution’s reason for insisting upon this point was doubtless that of discovering whether Aizawa had received from higher officials a promise of clemency. The defendant’s answers were vague, namely, that he had not thought of [Page 746] punishment because his inspiration had come from “on high”; that he had anticipated that he would be questioned for a few days by the gendarmerie and subsequently tried by officers in his regiment who would understand his motives and thus condone him; and that perhaps he would be allowed the honor of pleading his case before the Emperor. It will be remarked that many of Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa’s statements were extremely illogical. However, the force of his emotional convictions is aptly exemplified by a statement attributed to him in connection with his indictment. When asked if he had thought how the renovation of the nation must he effected he replied: “I did not ‘think’; I acted. It (the indictment) also claims that I was moved by the ‘words’ of my associates. It was not their words but the communion of their souls that moved me”.
As already reported to the Department, the developments that came to light in the Aizawa trial were probably one of the immediate causes of the February 26 uprising.‡ The revelations of the trial, whether true or not, undoubtedly excited the feelings of the plotters and perhaps forced them to act on February 26 instead of later. There is no doubt of Masaki’s influence, passive at least, on the officers who took part in the rebellion. Evidences of this influence are the following: his known opposition to the moderate element in the Army, comprised of such men as General Hayashi, ex-Minister for War, and General Watanabe, Masaki’s successor in office; the coincidence that he was admired by the younger chauvinist officers, as revealed by the trial; and the fact that as Inspector General of Education he went a long way toward moulding the chauvinist ideals of the younger officers. It may also be pointed out that Captains Ando and Nonaka, two of the ringleaders in the attempted coup d’état, were cadets at the Military Academy during the time that both Masaki and Aizawa were instructors there. Also, Nonaka was a member of the Aizawa Court Martial and must have heard Masaki’s testimony at the secret session of February 25. And it is very significant that former Captains Koji Muranaka and Asaichi Isobe, who were close associates of Aizawa, were among those who took part in the revolt, according to the communiqué of Martial Law Headquarters issued on the afternoon of March 1, which contained the statement: “The majority of the remaining officers and Koji Muranaka, Asaichi Isobe, and Zensuke Isobe, who participated in the revolt, were put in the military prison.” Perhaps the insurgents were also inspired by the following statements made by Lieutenant-Colonel Mitsui at the second hearing of the trial on January 30: that the spirit of the Showa Restoration was about to be manifested through Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa; that a large majority of the younger officers in the Army were determined to oust outside influences; that the nation desired sincerely that the [Page 747] Army should prove itself to be the Army of the Emperor; and that if the Court failed to understand the spirit which guided Aizawa, a second Aizawa and even a third would appear.
As no official record of the trial has been available, the statements made during its proceedings were obtained by the Embassy from several newspapers. However, as the trial (except for one session in camera) was open to reporters and as the newspapers consulted by the Embassy were generally in agreement, it is thought that the testimony and statements recorded in this despatch can be relied on.
Respectfully yours,
- See Embassy’s telegram No. 166, August 13, 1935, and despatch No. 1450, August 23, 1935. [Footnote in the original; telegram and despatch not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s telegram No. 151 of July 16, 1935, and despatch No. 1414 of July 26, 1935. [Footnote in the original; for telegram No. 151 see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. iii, p. 314; despatch not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s telegram No. 37 of February 26, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]↩