761.9315 Manchuria/53
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 2.]
Sir: In connection with my despatch No. 1469 of March 18, 1936,7 I have the honor to report the following conversation with Mr. Sakoh, Japanese Counselor of Embassy in Moscow. As I have reported repeatedly to the Department, Sakoh is in charge of all important negotiations with the Soviet Government and is a more important figure in the Japanese Embassy here than Ambassador Ohta.
Sakoh from time to time talks with me intimately and with apparent frankness. In the course of a long conversation of this nature on March 16th, he made a number of statements which I consider important.
After giving me the details of Ohta’s discussion with Stomoniakoff, which had taken place on the afternoon of our conversation, he said that Stomoniakoff had stated that he personally welcomed the proposal of the Japanese Government8 but must refer it to Stalin before definite acceptance.
Sakoh went on to say that Ohta had made it clear that the entire question of the deltas of the Amur and Ussuri rivers must be excluded from the scope of action of the proposed commission. He said that in particular the question of the island of Heiheitsu, which composes the delta opposite Habarovsk at the junction of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, had been reserved as not discussable by the commission. He then indicated clearly that the Japanese Government desires the question of Heiheitsu to remain in suspense as it offers an excellent quasi-legal ground for Japan to start war with the Soviet Union at any time she may desire.
Sakoh predicted that both the commission for the redemarcation of the border from Lake Khanka to the Tumen-Ula river and the proposed commission for redemarcation of the Mongolo-Manchurian border would never reach agreement on any point. He said that the Japanese negotiators would draw out the negotiations until the Japanese political, military, and financial situation had improved. He added that the purpose of the Japanese Government in proposing these commissions was simply to gain time for military preparations.
Sakoh then stated flatly that, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, war with the Soviet Union would remain a national necessity so long as Vladivostok should remain in the hands of the Russians.
[Page 79]In explanation, Sakoh pointed out the familiar fact that Vladivostok today is the exact center of the Japanese Empire and added that the development of the airplane would soon place every inch of Japanese and “Manchukuoan” territory within two hours flight of Russian bombing planes. He asserted, furthermore, that the Soviet Union now has 40 submarines at Vladivostok and is increasing the number of submarines there as rapidly as possible. He added that the threat constituted by these hostile airplanes and submarines at the center of the Japanese Empire was one which could not be removed except by war.
I asked Sakoh when he thought Japan would be ready to attempt to take Vladivostok from the Soviet Union. He replied that, in his opinion, the date for attack would be in 1937—”about a year or a year and a half from now.”
Sakoh went on to state that it would be impossible for Japan to attack the Soviet Union with any hope of success until certain conditions precedent had been fulfilled. Specifically, he explained that the strategic railroads which Japan is now building in Manchuria will not be completed until December, 1936. He added that it was the belief of the Japanese Government that an attack on the Soviet Union could not be successful until Outer Mongolia or at least a considerable portion of it should be in the hands of the Japanese.
Sakoh then went on to say that there was a further factor which was becoming increasingly important: the financial position of Japan. He said that in order to make the essential preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union it would be necessary for Japan to obtain loans from either England or the United States. Sakoh expressed the hope that public opinion in the United States and the Government of the United States might soon come to realize that Japan would be entirely justified in attempting to eliminate Vladivostok as a Russian base of operations and that the growth of this realization might cause the United States to adopt a more friendly attitude toward Japan. He referred to the recent address to the United States Senate by Senator Pittman9 and said that he hoped that it did not represent the views of our Government or American public opinion. He concluded by saying that he hoped the moment had come when relations between Japan and the United States might become more friendly.
Mr. Sakoh enjoys, I believe, the complete confidence of Mr. Hirota and I venture to suggest that his statements may represent the views of at least a portion of the Japanese Government.
Respectfully yours,