893.00/13449
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch No. 66 of November 7, 1935, from Peiping,95 regarding the Communist situation [Page 69] in west China, and briefly to outline below certain aspects of current developments in the anti-Communist campaign in the Shensi-Shansi sector. The information on which this account is given has been obtained partly from newspapers, and partly from conversations held by an officer of the Embassy with persons acquainted with conditions in the area concerned.
As has previously been recorded, little occurred in north Shensi subsequent to the arrival there of the forces of Hsü Hai-tung, P’eng Teh-huai and Mao Tse-tung to supplement the Communist strength of Liu Tzu-tan’s 26th Army Corps. Liu Tzu-tan, a Communist leader of intelligence and experience, had already, by careful organization over a period of years, developed in north Shensi a Communist organization firmly rooted in the agrarian community; the arrival of the military forces of three other powerful veteran leaders gave a guarantee that the growth of the north Shensi organization would be protected by such force as the Communist militarists had at their disposal. Hsü Hai-tung led the 25th Army Corps, whose history dated back to the period when a Chinese Soviet ruled the area at the junction of the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei borders. Mao Tse-tung is the Political Commissioner for the Soviet Government in China, with a revolutionary experience dating back to the beginnings of the Kuomintang in Canton and including the term when the Soviets ruled much of Kiangsi and Fukien. His military organization, as led into Shensi from Szechwan after the long trek from Kiangsi, constitutes the “Shensi-Kansu Branch Forces”, divided into three main columns led by the able irregular strategists Lin Piao, P’eng Teh-huai and Yeh Chien-ying. In conjunction with the Communist military strength reported by General Yen Hsi-shan as already existing in north Shensi under the leadership of Liu Tzu-tan (see the Embassy’s aforementioned despatch of November 7), this accretion of revolutionary strength in the Kansu-Shensi area gave early indications of holding a potential threat, the exact direction of which could not be clearly ascertained, for north China.
In the course of the winter of 1935–6 the Communists had practically undisturbed possession of north Shensi, themselves winning the victories in the few battles occurring with Government troops, and presumably were thus enabled to consolidate their forces and determine on their strategy for the coming year. A move has now been made which may be of significance in this connection. In January, a small Communist force, evidently acting as a vanguard, crossed the Yellow River from Shensi at Sanchiaochen (Chungyang Hsien) and penetrated into west Shansi. The Communist control was established over the fords along the river in the immediate vicinity. Then, beginning on February 22, heavy Communist forces, reputedly under [Page 70] the control of Mao Tse-tung, began to move into west Shansi. More than 10,000 Communist troops are reported already to have entered the western part of the province and to have launched attacks on Chungyang, Shihlou and other district towns in the area. More Communist forces are said to be coming up, while a concentration of troops under Liu Tzu-tan and Hsü Hai-tung is reported to be occurring in the vicinity of Wayaopu, Yungpingchen, Yenchuan and Yenchang, that is, between the Yen and Chingchien Rivers in east-central Shensi. A major move by the Communist forces seems to have been begun.*
The objective of such a military movement is of course difficult to discern, especially in view of the well-known characteristic of the Communist armies of “noising about the east and striking in the west”. An immediate maneuver might logically be expected to take the form of an effort to cut off the five Shansi brigades now in northeast Shensi, where they were despatched to assist the 84th and 86th Government Divisions, if the irregulars felt strong enough. These brigades have now been ordered recalled for the protection of their home province, but a successful drive northward by the Communist forces which have penetrated Shansi would block their return and possibly subject them to a disastrous attack by the Communist armies still in Shensi. There seems to be no indication that the Communist forces plan the evacuation of Shensi at this time: the present move seems designed more to be an extension of their activities to new fields than an aimless retreat in search of possible haven.
The Communist penetration into Shansi constitutes a challenge to the leaders of that province that they will have difficulty in meeting by reason of the deterioration that has afflicted the provincial economy. General Yen Hsi-shan, after last July making known to the world the state of affairs existing in North Shensi, announced that village ownership of land would be put into effect in Shansi in order to revive agriculture and thus overcome the threat offered by Communist ideology. The leaders of the National Government were able to convince him upon the occasion of his attendance at the Kuomintang National Congress that the time was not yet ripe for the institution of such sweeping reforms as he proposed (they also gave him Yuan $5,000,000, according to report), with the result that Yen consented to postpone the implementation of his plan.† Nevertheless, reliable [Page 71] reports from observers who have visited Shansi are to the effect that there exists the greatest activity there under Yen’s direction, along the lines of education, propagandizing and organization, as preparation for reforms to be effected there at no late date. One of the interesting aspects of the situation is that groups of every political complexion have been drawn into those activities, with “radical” periodicals and literature as readily obtainable as the official Kuomintang interpretation of social economics, with the probable result that the orthodox Communist view, only slightly disguised under the veil of anonymity, has been able to compete freely for converts with other political ideologies.
An interesting commentary on the present state of affairs in Shansi was made by Chairman Hsü Yung-ch’ang in a newspaper interview given on February 24, on the occasion of his recent visit to Suiyuan as Yen Hsi-shan’s delegate to the Suiyuan Mongol Political Council.‡ Yen Hsi-shan, Director of the new organ, according to Hsü could not attend because of the veteran general’s concern with the threat offered by the Communists of north Shensi, where the situation was described as being “very tense”. Hsü stated that the Communist leader P’eng Teh-huai had convinced the other Communist strategists that it was preferable to attack Shansi rather than advance northwards against Yülin, and thus to achieve the weakening of the defense line along the Paotow front. But, continued the Shansi Chairman, the Shansi troops in north Shensi would definitely not be withdrawn, although any threat on Shansi itself would be met by moving up other forces already in the province. (The fact that orders have already been issued for the return of the Shansi troops in north Shensi would seem to indicate that the threat is stronger than at first considered. Nevertheless, the evident fact that the Shansi militarists had prior knowledge of the impending attack should have enabled them to make defense preparations.) The Shansi defenses against Communism, he said, had been strengthened by the organization, under the direction of Yen Hsi-shan, of people’s organizations called “Justice Corps” and “Anti-Communist Defense Militia”, and Suiyuan was disposed to follow Shansi’s example and set up similar organizations. However, when it came to the matter of rendering financial assistance to Suiyuan, Hsü was reported to have viewed the situation very pessimistically, saying,
“Shansi hasn’t the slightest chance of doing it. Very shortly, incident upon setting up the Anti-Communist Defense Militia and administering other matters, the people’s burdens will be increased by additional assessments. When Shansi has not time to care for itself, naturally it is impossible to discuss assistance to Suiyuan.”
Hsü said that he had early recognized the dangers inherent in making new assessments on the people, but “The matter must be taken care of, and the only way is to ask the people for money.” But the reporter observed that Hsü was from first to last oppressed by the problems offered by Shansi’s finances. However, Yen Hsi-shan’s proposal for the circulation of “commodity scrip” as currency had not been yet put into effect, according to Chairman Hsü, and Shansi’s currency generally could be considered quite stable. (Independent information is to the effect that Yuan $2,000,000 of the province’s Yuan $88,000,000 in currency is in the form of “commodity scrip”.)
Hsü Yung-ch’ang treated the subject of village ownership of land at some length, stating that the procedure for putting it into effect had already been settled upon but that the people viewed the project with alarm, while the Communists charged that “Of course this won’t be put into effect, it being but a temporary expedient for the deception of the people.” The reporter quoted Hsü as continuing:
“Our idea is that the methods of the Communist Party are too violent, leading inevitably to bloodshed. The procedure involved in the village ownership of land can avoid bloodshed; however, as regards the beginning of its application, it is undeniably impossible to avoid disturbances. We have not as yet come to the time for putting the plan into effect, and we do not plan now to do so. However, should it happen that we are pressed to a point where there is no way out, when it is impossible to avoid bloodshed, then we’ll disregard popular disturbances (and go ahead with the project) by reason of our wish to avoid the shedding of blood.”
It would appear as if the Communist challenge might directly or indirectly bring about interesting events in the sometime “Model Province” of Yen Hsi-shan. The implications those events would hold for Sino-Japanese relations may be readily deduced.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- According to the official interpretation of Vice-Commander-in-Chief of Bandit Suppression Chang Hsueh-liang, at present in Nanking, this movement by the Communist forces is the result of the success of the Government’s campaign against them in Shensi. This explanation can be dismissed as being highly improbable. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Agricultural experts express their doubts regarding 1) the bona fides of Yen Hsi-shan’s project, which possibly would benefit the governing group in Shansi more than the peasants and 2) the economic wisdom of the proposal in a region where 72% of the peasants are reputed to own their land and the agricultural problems evidently are primarily not those of land tenure. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Ta Kung Pao (L’Impartial, Tientsin), February 27, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]↩