124.93/326
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
Why Not Move the Embassy From Peiping?
The principal reason for moving would be that it is usual to have diplomatic missions at capital cities: Peiping is no longer the capital city; Nanking is now the capital of China.
But, in China the conditions are exceptional. Nanking has not long been the capital, and it is by no means certain that it will remain [Page 538] the capital: the Chinese themselves hastily moved a part of their Government offices from Nanking in 1932 and they have plans for a removal at any moment to a point in the interior (as far west as Szechwan Province).
As matters stand, a considerable removal of our Embassy from Peiping to Nanking has since 1928 gradually been effected. We have at Nanking a substantial working Embassy. We retain in Peiping the principal residence of the Ambassador, the records, the wireless station, the establishments of the Military Attaché and the Naval Attaché, and the Marine Guard.
Complete removal from Peiping would entail not only the removal of the diplomatic establishment but withdrawal of the wireless station and of our armed forces in North China. It is doubtful whether we would be permitted to transfer the wireless station to Nanking. That station is run by the Marine Guard at the Embassy. It is practically certain that we would not be permitted to transfer the Guard to Nanking. Moreover, if we were to withdraw the Guard from Peiping, it would follow that we ought to withdraw our Army force from Tientsin.
But, in addition to the Embassy staff, there are in and around Peiping and Tientsin some 1,300 American nationals (with their various interests). Withdrawal of the Marine Guard and the Army force would deprive these people of the sense of security (comparative) which the presence of the armed forces gives them.
Our Embassy in Peiping (located in the Legation Quarter) and our military forces at Peiping and Tientsin are a part of the international system, created under treaty provisions, for promoting security and, indirectly, stability in the situation in China. We have in connection with them certain legal and certain moral obligations to the other powers, including China. The Chinese do not at present urgently desire that the powers give up the rights and obligations involved in this situation. None of the powers (except Japan) desires that such a removal and withdrawal be now consummated, and most of the powers which have major interests in China (including inter alia the United States, Great Britain and France) have not effected such removal and withdrawal. We ought not make such moves independently and without consideration of the interests and the opinions of the other powers.
Complete removal of our Embassy and withdrawal of our armed forces would by just that much diminish the political hazard of our position in China.
But, while possibly diminishing a political hazard in one respect (physical), it would increase that hazard in another respect (psychological). While decreasing our points of contact, it would increasingly expose to assault and abuse those of our points of contact [Page 539] (nationals and property) which remain in situ quo. Moreover, it would bring upon us reproaches of the Chinese and other powers (except the Japanese) and would tend to confirm the view of many foreign critics of the United States that this country has no feeling of responsibility in regard to rights and obligations which it possesses in common with other powers and that we cannot be relied on in situations of general international concern. It would encourage and facilitate more “positive” action on the part of Japan in the direction of applying armed pressure in prosecution of her China policy.
The presence at Nanking of our whole diplomatic establishment would give some advantage in the field of contacts with Chinese officialdom.
But, it would deprive us of the advantage of contacts with the personnel of the diplomatic establishments of other nations which remain at Peiping; and it would weaken the principle of cooperation among the powers in defense of common interests.
As matters stand, we have both at Nanking and at Peiping establishments which meet the needs of the situation. From each and from the position of both we derive certain advantages. Adjustments we are constantly making. An abrupt and complete removal of the Peiping establishment would deprive us of a part of the advantage which the present system gives us.
If there were available at Nanking adequate housing for our whole diplomatic establishment, and if it were certain that the Chinese Government is firmly seated at Nanking, delay in completing the removal of our establishment to that city might be difficult to defend.
But, there is not available there adequate housing and it is by no means certain that the Chinese will not some day precipitately move their Government to some other point.
To move, we would have to have a Congressional appropriation; and when we move we will probably incur a substantial loss in disposing of our Government property at Peiping.
If we could make this move without adversely affecting the political situation in China and the Far East in general, the case for moving might be made very strong.
But, this Administration has been proceeding in the field of Far Eastern relations and policy on the principle of making what contributions we can to the stabilizing of the situation and of avoiding action or gestures which would tend, by injecting new factors of uncertainty, of suspicion, of nervousness and of friction into it, to disturb the situation.
It is the belief of the officer personnel of FE that we should be governed in the conducting of our Far Eastern relations by the same principles that govern our conducting of relations with other parts of the world and that we should as rapidly as possible make our agencies [Page 540] and our methods in that field the same as those which we employ elsewhere. It is necessary, however, to deal with situations as we find them. The Far East is still in many respects a “special” region. The agencies and methods which have been used and which are in use there are in many respects “special”. These we want to change—as rapidly and as effectively as may be. The changes should, however, be made gradually—as the situation changes. We try to keep up with—in fact we try to keep a little ahead of—changes in the situation; but we feel that it would not be sound policy and it would not be to anybody’s interest for the United States to proceed in regard to this situation as though the situation had already been changed, and so completely changed, as to be no longer special and to call no longer for special agencies and methods.
We feel that the removal of the Embassy to the Chinese capital and the withdrawal of our Marine Guard from Peiping and our Army force from Tientsin should be consummated at the earliest opportune moment. But we believe that the moment has not yet arrived when it would be in the best interests of the United States to make these moves. In this view we have the concurrence of officers of the Navy and of the Army who have made special study of these questions.