761.94/942
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 4, 1937.]
Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s last despatch on the subject*, I have the honor to report that the reluctance of the Soviet Government to sign the new Fisheries Treaty, the draft of which was approved by the Privy Council on November 18, last, and which was to have been signed at Moscow on November 20, has become an issue of such importance in Soviet-Japanese relations as not only to overshadow all other outstanding issues but to strike a blow at the Hirota Cabinet itself. This situation has arisen out of the resentment shown by Moscow when the news of the German-Japanese agreement became known and the consequent retaliation on the part of the Soviet Government which took the form of refusing to sign the Fisheries Pact and of suspending all negotiations on other pending questions.
Leaving aside the wisdom of Japan’s step vis-à-vis Germany, the Japanese Foreign Minister must be found guilty of a major tactical error in having imparted the fact to the Soviet Ambassador only a few days before the date set for the signature of a treaty settling the most pressing and immediate question at issue between Japan and the USSR. The swift reaction of the Soviet Government and its consequences, [Page 427] coupled with the breakdown of the recent negotiations at Nanking over North China, caused an attack to be launched against the Hirota Cabinet which has not only severely shaken it but leaves its future uncertain.
On December 9 Mr. Arita was forced to face the Privy Council and among other things to explain the refusal of Moscow to sign the Fisheries Pact. During the course of the questioning it came out that Mr. Arita had informed the Soviet Ambassador of the German-Japanese agreement, under a pledge of secrecy, a few days before November 20, the date set for the signature of the Fisheries Treaty. Mr. Arita said that it was a matter of regret if Mr. Yurenev had communicated the matter to his home government and was pressed no further on this question. When asked what step was to be taken in case the new Fisheries Treaty was not signed, the Foreign Minister replied that there was no other way except to enforce free fishing on the strength of the rights acquired by Japanese under the Portsmouth Treaty.4 The Council then remarked that this would be a very grave step and one which would concern the Army and Navy.
Attacks in the press continued and the Nichi Nichi said the following day that while the (Privy) Councillors “regard with sympathy the present mistake which Mr. Arita seems to have made in the Soviet Fishery Treaty affair, as a pitfall into which an individual easily falls, the Foreign Minister is to be censured as a diplomat for lack of foresight”. The Jiji Shimpo a few days later predicted that “the Foreign Minister’s resignation is inevitable because of general diplomatic failure”, referring specifically to the Sino-Japanese negotiations and the Fisheries Pact.
At first the attitude was taken here that the Soviet Government, after recovering from its first irritation, would sign the new Treaty before the end of the year the argument being that (1) if the Pact, already approved by the Privy Council, is not signed, it will affect the fate of the Hirota Cabinet. Not only are there no prospects of a new Cabinet more friendly to the USSR than the present one but there are prospects of the opposite, and (2) if greater pressure is brought to bear upon Japan the result would be a nationwide resentment against Soviet Russia. Therefore, in order to avoid either of the two foregoing contingencies as well as to keep the faith, the Soviet Government will sign the Treaty.
However, a detailed report has reached here of Ambassador Shige-mitsu’s recent interview with Litvinov and the attitude of the Soviet Foreign Commissar, if correctly reported, was apparently such as to render the signing of the Fisheries Pact before the end of the year virtually impossible. Mr. Shigemitsu, under instructions, is said to have [Page 428] attempted to explain the “true meaning” of the German-Japanese agreement and to have expressed a wish to seek an early settlement of various pending issues. In reply Mr. Litvinov is reported to have severely criticized the anti-Comintern Pact and to have said that it was so clearly directed against the Soviet Union that the Government could not possibly respond favorably to the Ambassador’s proposals for the solution of the various pending problems.
Hope has therefore been practically abandoned that the Fisheries Treaty will be signed before the end of the year and the question is now arising as to what the situation will be regarding Japanese fisheries. If so-called “free-fishing” is declared, under the rights accruing by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the result will be a virtual rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries because the Japanese fishing fleet will have to be supported by Japanese armed vessels and the opportunities for conflict will be frequent and unavoidable. It is however being pointed out in the press here, for the attention of the Soviet Government, that the Japanese deep sea fisheries could inflict enormous damage upon the Soviet fishery industry in Soviet territorial waters by the simple use of so-called floating nets by which salmon and trout could be entirely cut off, for instance, from the coast and rivers of Kamchatka. One paper remarked that since 1934 the number of Japanese vessels engaged in deep sea fisheries has been reduced by one half in the interest of protecting certain species of fish; but that if the Japanese fishery industries cared to do so, they could increase their activities to such an extent as to deal the salmon and trout fisheries in Soviet waters a fatal blow.
There is no doubt a great deal of truth in these contentions and, in view of the similar threat which could at any time be made to the Alaskan and Canadian salmon fisheries, the matter is of more than academic interest to the United States.
At any rate, to return to the question of Soviet-Japanese relations, the prospect for anything but an increase in friction and danger in the near future appears to be remote. Despite the feeling that the German pact may have been unskilfully handled by Mr. Arita, the knowledge that Japan has at last emerged from the isolation which followed her departure from the League of Nations and has acquired a powerful friend and ally in Germany has undoubtedly made a deep impression upon the Japanese public. If, in addition, the Hirota Cabinet with its “Hirota diplomacy” should be turned out, any succeeding Government would probably be less favorably inclined to attempt the patient negotiations with Soviet Russia followed by Mr. Hirota during the [Page 429] past few years which, when all is said and done, have removed many obstacles to the improvement of relations between the two countries.
Respectfully yours,
- Embassy’s despatch No. 2160, November 26, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Russo-Japanese peace treaty signed September 5, 1905, Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 824.↩