Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, The Far East, Volume IV

500.A15A5/678

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 1665

Tokyo, February 7, 1936.
[Received February 24.]

Sir: Reference is respectfully made to the Department’s strictly confidential telegram No. 2, January 7, 7 p.m.,⁶⁹ and to our strictly confidential reply No. 7, January 9, 6 p.m., both telegrams on the subject of rumored negotiations for a non-aggression pact between Japan and China and a tentative personal proposal made by Mr. Craigie, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Norman Davis that we consider the advisability of concluding non-aggression pacts between the United States, Great Britain and Japan, should a Sino-Japanese pact be consummated, in return for the acceptance by the Japanese of a naval agreement acceding to the present naval status quo. In our reply I stated that we did not think that a Sino-Japanese pact was feasible at the present time, but that should it materialize, the idea advanced by Mr. Craigie should not be turned aside without careful consideration in view of the obsolescence of the present Far Eastern treaty structure and the necessity of revising our future outlook and policy in the Far East. It appears desirable to supplement our telegram with a more detailed explanation of our thoughts on the question, namely that while doubting the feasibility of a Sino-Japanese non-aggression pact for some time to come, and further doubting the advisability at present of bilateral non-aggression pacts between the United States, Great Britain and Japan, we believe that our Government should lose no opportunity to explore every avenue which might lead to a political agreement respecting American rights and interests in the Far East, in view of the fact that new facts and conditions will eventually compel us, as well as other peoples of the world, to revise our outlook upon the political status of the Far East.

It would seem desirable first to examine the “new facts and conditions” in the Far East, mentioned in our telegram No. 7, January 9, 6 p.m., and then consider the course which the United States can most wisely and profitably follow in this part of the world in future. This discussion seems for the moment to be hypothetical and academic.

In considering the premises upon which an argument for or against the conclusion of revised political agreements in respect to the Far East may be based, the following points might be taken into consideration:

Premises

(1) The attitude of Japan in the past toward such collective pacts as have been concluded for the security of the world in general and the Far East in particular has not been such as to inspire confidence in the inviolability of such non-aggression pacts as Japan may adhere to in the future.

(2) Nothing save defeat in war (and perhaps in the long run not even that) will arrest the Japanese movement to obtain eventually at least de facto political, military and economic control of the northern areas of China. This movement may be accelerated by military operations as in Manchuria, or it may develop slowly behind a facade of alleged autonomous governments subservient to the Japanese, as in Hopei and Chahar.

(3) The movement is based on a three-fold urge: (a) to provide broader economic opportunity for Japan’s steadily expanding population; (b) to control essential raw materials which Japan lacks; and (c) to consolidate Japan’s strategic position against Soviet Russia and thereby to hold Communism in check. The basic and primary urges are the first and second, but the principal impelling force at the moment, at least among the military, is the third urge, namely, to place themselves in such a position on the mainland of Asia as to prevent the spread of Communism, especially into Japan, to preserve a Pax Japonica in the areas adjacent to their own territory, and to consolidate their control of Manchuria by securing a degree of control over Mongolia and North China. These urges in Japan are strong and insistent, and the world cannot expect that they will be eradicated by moral suasion or other peaceful methods.

(4) The Japanese expansionist movement will interfere to a progressively greater extent with American rights and interests in the areas which come under Japanese control, as it has already interfered with our rights and interests in Manchuria. At the same time, it will probably interfere to an even greater degree with British rights and interests which are believed to be more extensive than ours in the areas under consideration.

(5) We as a nation are therefore faced with certain inescapable facts with which it is becoming increasingly impracticable to deal on a legal, moral or idealistic basis—in other words on any of the foundations upon which the policy and acts of the United States in the Far East are traditionally based. This does not mean that the United States should scrap its time-honored belief in the principle of the inviolability of treaties and in the moral and idealistic standards which it has traditionally championed, but it does mean that in dealing with Japan we can no longer rely on those principles and standards and that we must supplement them in whatever effective way may command itself.

(6) If and when China enters into some political agreement with Japan, whether called a non-aggression pact or given some other name, it can be assumed that the agreement would accept, expressly or tacitly, the fact of the existence of “Manchukuo” and of the Japanese political and economic penetration of North China. It is obvious that under such circumstances the present treaty structure governing the relations of the Powers with China, already crumbling, would either juridically or practically have become entirely obsolete. The principle of the maintenance of the territorial and administrative integrity of China would then have lapsed, China herself having accepted the violation of her own territorial and administrative integrity.

(7) The United States would then be confronted with the problem either of endeavoring to uphold an obsolete treaty and to defend a helpless country, or of simply endeavoring to safeguard American rights and interests in the Far East as best we might under the conditions then obtaining. In endeavoring to safeguard our rights and interests we would not have to deal with a general scramble of the Powers for spheres of influence or special privileges as in the past, but exclusively with the activities of one country, Japan.

Possibility of a Sino-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact

In considering the arguments for and against revised political agreements, based upon the above premises, it might be well first to consider the possibility of a Sino-Japanese non-aggression pact because much of the argument to follow is based upon the existence or non-existence of some such agreement.

In the opinion of this Embassy, it is doubtful if any Sino-Japanese non-aggression or other political pact can be concluded at the present time. The Japanese military, still the dominant force in the Japanese Government, do not wish to have their hands tied by any pacts binding the nation to peaceful methods. They had their experience of such pacts with the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, and they do not desire any more such pacts, except possibly with Great Britain and with the United States, the only nations in the Pacific strong enough to oppose Japan by sea. This attitude on the part of the Japanese military is indicated by their refusal to consider the various non-aggression trial balloons sent up by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it appears to be extremely doubtful if the Chinese Government would accept a non-aggression or other political pact with Japan. As was pointed out earlier in this despatch, a non-aggression pact implies some sort of political agreement, and any sort of peace-making political agreement between China and Japan at the present time would certainly imply the acceptance, de facto or de jure, by China of the existence of “Manchukuo” and of the partial loss of sovereignty over North China. It is not believed that any government in China today could or would conclude such a pact. This view is, I believe, shared by our Embassy in China. At the same time, it must be remembered that Japan is pressing China for a political agreement involving acceptance by China of the status quo, and therefore the possibility exists that China may eventually be forced to acquiesce in Japan’s demands, choosing between acquiescence or war with Japan. In either case, however, as far as can now be foreseen, the result will be the partial or complete domination of China by Japan, and it is this fact which we must take into consideration in mapping our future course in the Far East.

Possible Advantages of Anglo-American-Japanese Non-Aggression Pacts

Turning now to the question of a tripartite or a series of bilateral pacts between the United States, Great Britain and Japan in regard to our respective relations in the Far East, it can be argued, as an advantage of such a pact or pacts, that we could stabilize the situation in the Far East to an extent sufficient to warrant the United States and Great Britain in asking Japan to accept the naval status quo, thereby giving us a definite naval superiority over Japan for a period of years. It is believed that any pacts or agreements entered into in the future relating to conditions in the Far East should be made to cover only a definite, limited period, probably for not more than, say, ten years and renewable for another similarly limited period at such time as could best be obtained at the time of renewal. The gradual decay of the treaty structure based on the Washington Conference of 1921 and 1922 is evidence of the impracticability of concluding pacts designed to cover an unlimited period such as in the case, for instance, with the Nine-Power Treaty. If, however, for a period of approximately ten years we could obtain naval superiority over Japan and at the same time avoid an expensive and dangerous naval construction race, something worthwhile would have been accomplished. The question of the quid pro quo—a very large question—will be discussed later when considering the disadvantages of such a pact or pacts.

It is believed possible that the British Government may be seriously considering some sort of political agreement with Japan whereby in return for Britain’s acceptance of the status quo on the Asiatic mainland, Japan will agree to respect British rights and interests in Asia. If Great Britain should conclude such an agreement and the United States refuse to consider a similar agreement, we would be confronted with the same situation that the Four-Power Pacific Pact⁷⁰ was designed to eliminate, namely, an Anglo-Japanese Alliance, although in somewhat altered and attenuated form. The position of the United States in the Pacific area in general and in the Far East in particular would thereby be weakened.

The principal argument in favor of the conclusion of a non-aggression or some similar political pact with Japan, however, is the simple one that, if we wish to reduce the permanent danger of conflict with Japan, we shall eventually be compelled to reach some political agreement in respect to the Far East which will take into consideration the new facts and conditions mentioned previously in this despatch. It is certain that nothing short of superior force will stop Japan’s advance into Asia, and as the United States and Great Britain are distinctly not inclined to employ force against Japan, while China apparently is not capable of exerting sufficient force to restrain Japan, it would appear that the only effective course which we can pursue will be to endeavor to slow up the Japanese expansionist movement by a series of agreements of limited duration, each of which would be designed to restrain Japan in one direction or another. The situation in the Far East, perhaps to a greater degree than in any other part of the world, is not static, but decidedly dynamic, and therefore does not lend itself to the conclusion of more or less permanent treaties, such as the Nine-Power Treaty was intended to be. We are now, therefore, faced with the problem of searching again for the most effective means whereby Japanese interference with American rights and interests in the Far East can be held in check, while at the same time reducing to a minimum the friction between Japan and the United States which inevitably increases the potential risk of war. A tripartite non-aggression pact, or a series of bilateral non-aggression pacts, between the United States, Great Britain and Japan, would be a step along this road.

Disadvantages of Non-Aggression Pacts

Turning now to the disadvantages of such non-aggression pact or pacts, the first would appear to be the very meagre security which we would obtain by this means. Our past experience with Japanese observance of such treaties does not conduce to any degree of optimism in regard to the future observance by Japan of any pact designed to secure our rights and interests (or those of China) in the Far East.

We would, moreover, be forfeiting, to the extent that we were bound by the tripartite or bilateral agreements, our right or privilege of cooperating with other Powers in collective action to restrain Japan—a policy which the American Government has previously adopted, with indifferent success, in dealing with Sino-Japanese disputes and in endeavoring to implement the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the Far East. We would also to some extent lose our freedom of action and would to that degree increase Japan’s freedom of action in the Far East. Against this it can be argued that the United States is already bound by the Kellogg-Briand Pact to abjure war as an instrument of national policy, and that therefore, in concluding a non-aggression or other peace pact with Japan, the United States would lose no freedom of action not already renounced.

The principal argument against the conclusion of a non-aggression or similar pact with Japan, however, is that such a pact implies a political agreement, and any political agreement with Japan made now or in the foreseeable future would have to include our express or tacit acceptance of the status quo on the Asiatic mainland. It can be argued that “Manchukuo” is a political entity which does exist, irrespective of the means by which it was brought into being or by which it is being maintained in existence, and that the fact of its existence has been recognized by China and by other countries whenever they have had dealings of any kind with that country. Our recognition or non-recognition of the fact of “Manchukuo’s” existence, therefore, would not greatly alter the existing situation, and it is argued that recognition by the United States of the de facto existtence of “Manchukuo” would be a small price to pay for our security, even for a limited period, in the Far East, for the lessening of the danger of war with Japan, and for obviating the necessity of entering an expensive naval construction race. On the other hand, however, even our tacit acceptance of the status quo on the Asiatic mainland would to that extent condone Japan’s actions in Asia and would indicate an abandonment of the principles of world peace for the general acceptance and observance of which the United States has struggled for many years. It is not believed that the American Government and the American people are prepared to take this step, now or in the near future.

Conclusion

As was stated before, the consensus of opinion in this Embassy is that a Sino-Japanese non-aggression pact is not feasible at the present time and that the disadvantages of a tripartite non-aggression pact, or a series of bilateral non-aggression pacts between the United States, Great Britain and Japan probably outweigh the advantages. Nevertheless it is believed that our Government should not neglect carefully to explore every avenue which might lead to some variety of political agreement with Japan which would tend to protect our interests in this part of the world and to reduce the friction between the United States and Japan. As was expressed by Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson in 1932 (telegram No. 1078, September 8, 11 a.m.⁷¹), in discussing a possible conference on the Far Eastern question in Geneva:

“We must sooner or later deal with the situation which those forces (the forces driving Japan into China) have created. It is better that we deal with it now by methods of peace than later by the methods of war …⁷²

“If the opportunity … presents itself the United States could come forward with a plan for an international conference to take up and consider the question of the situation in the East linked with such questions as the limitation of armaments and the modification of promises under the Kellogg Pact …”

The Embassy believes that the fact that it does not consider a nonaggression pact to be desirable or feasible at the present moment does not exclude the possibility of some other form of agreement which, while not sacrificing our principles or our rights and interests, would tend to obviate to some extent, at least, the risk of armed conflict with Japan. It may be said that in times past the Japanese have considered the obligations of bilateral treaties as more compelling than those involved in general or multilateral pacts. We must also recognize that any political arrangement with Japan must take into account the fact that the attitude of Soviet Russia is an important consideration in Japanese political calculations.

Pending, however, the possible conclusion of some political agreement with Japan, it is our firm belief that the primary method of supplementing the legal, moral and idealistic principles for which the United States has always stood sponsor in the Far East is to build and maintain our Navy at a strength sufficient for adequate defense in case of Japanese aggression against our rights and interests (see despatch No. 1102, December 27, 1934⁷³). While our Navy is not maintained for purposes of aggression, from which we are restrained by our commitments under the Kellogg-Briand Pact, plus our national policy of non-aggression, plus the practical difficulties of obtaining concrete results by war with Japan, nevertheless it is not believed that we should gratuitously sacrifice the factor of warning inherent in the possession of a strong fleet. Such a factor tends to support and implement our diplomacy if only by its psychological effect. If and when we do negotiate some political agreement with Japan in respect to the Far East, to replace the Nine-Power Treaty, we shall be in a much better position to insist upon our rights and legitimate interests if we possess a strong fleet than if we permit our naval strength to fall below that indicated for adequate defense. We should not lose sight of the fact, deplorable but true, that no practical and effective code of international morality upon which the world can rely has yet been discovered, and that the standards of morality of one nation in certain given circumstances have little or no relation to the standards of another nation in other circumstances, and little or no relation to the standards of the individuals of the nations in question. To shape our foreign policy on the unsound theory that other nations are guided and bound by our own present standards of international ethics would be to court sure disaster.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

69. See telegram No. 4, of the same date, to the Ambassador in China, p. 3.
70. Signed at Washington, December 13, 1921, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 33.
71. For telegram No. 1078, dated September 7, 1932, 9 p.m., see Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. iv, p. 229.
72. Omissions indicated in the original.
73. Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. iii, p. 821.