793.94/8448
The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 15.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that during the past two months there has been in Japan a very noticeable decrease in expressions of belligerency against Soviet Russia and China. This decrease has manifested itself in various ways; principally, however, in the unofficial utterances of members of the defense forces and in the tone of [Page 390] the Japanese press. After the Chengtu, Pakhoi and Hankow incidents the Japanese defense forces gave press interviews in which they threatened to take “direct” or “independent” action in China to protect Japanese nationals and interests, should the Chinese Government fail to afford such protection. The Japanese newspapers at that time generally supported the fighting forces. Since then several further incidents have occurred in China in which Japanese nationals were killed or their property destroyed, but in Japan the defense forces are no longer taking advantage of these opportunities for pugnacious talk. The newspapers, moreover, have given little news space to the incidents and have completely ignored them in their editorial columns.
In regard to the Soviet Union, moreover, the Japanese nation seems to have lost much of the belligerency which characterized its relations with the country until recently. Frontier incidents no longer arouse excitement and resentment in the Japanese press and even the recent refusal of the Soviet Union to sign the new fisheries agreement has been received calmly by the people and the defense forces of the country.
It is difficult to state whether this apparent loss of pugnacity is real or is inspired by the Government for reasons of its own. A survey of conditions both internal and external leads observers to believe that this change is largely due to existing domestic and external circumstances, with perhaps some official inspiration. Following are some of the causes which appear to have led to a loss of belligerency on the part of the Japanese nation, as collected from numerous sources of information in Tokyo.
1. Internal Conditions.
The Japanese army is not at all certain of its political position in Japan. It has had to endure several political defeats since the first of the year. In the February 26 incident the army was compelled by the pressure of public opinion to execute the ring leaders of the rebellion, although it will be remembered that in the incident of May 15, 1932, light sentences only were imposed upon the ring leaders of that incident. In the cases of the Diet reform and other administrative reform issues, the Army, after sending up what appeared to be trial balloons advocating drastic measures, was compelled by the outburst of public resentment to withdraw the statements unofficially made. There appears to be a strong under-current of feeling against the military among the people of Japan—a feeling which is not usually manifested and which lacks leadership but which is strong enough to cause the army to withdraw from its advanced position from time to time. Moreover, the Army is still divided within itself. General Terauchi, the Minister of War, has carried out extensive reforms designed [Page 391] to purge the Army of the more radical elements, but rumors which have reached the Embassy indicate that the younger officers of both the Army and the Navy are still as radically opposed to the present political system in Japan as they were before the purge took place. With this division within itself, and the popular feeling opposed to the imposition of the military will upon the nation, the Army does not feel in a position to take any drastic steps in China or Russia at the moment.
The people of Japan, for their part, seem to have lost interest in military adventures. For many months past the Army has been holding up the difficulties in Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese relations as indications of the crisis which was to come in 1935 and 1936. The crisis has not materialized and, until recently, it appeared that the difficulties in the relations between Japan and China and Japan and the Soviet Union would be settled by diplomatic means. It was to be expected, under such circumstances, that the people of the country would gradually lose interest in the war-scares of the military. The people cannot be kept at a high tension indefinitely. Too many cries of “Wolf!” cause them to disbelieve in the existence of the wolf. Another factor contributing to the indifference of the people toward Sino-Japanese problems arises from the censorship on news of the negotiations. The exact nature of the Japanese demands on China, their scope and the extent to which the Japanese Government is prepared to go in enforcing those demands, have been kept from the people of Japan. Public opinion is therefore unformed in regard to the question, and the press is unable to reflect the sentiments of the public. The public is better informed in regard to Russo-Japanese relations, but here again there seems to be no very definite indication of public opinion.
Moreover, the attention of the people has been distracted from external affairs by pressing domestic problems. The taxation increase and taxation reform schemes, the increase in the military budget demands, the plans for administrative reform and the quarrel between the Army and the political parties over the reform of the Diet have occupied the attention of the Japanese people to the exclusion of Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese affairs. There is also a feeling of unrest among the people of Japan. The heavy increase of taxation planned for the coming fiscal year is not being favorably received by the nation, and the slowly-developing struggle between parliamentarism and Fascism in Japan is causing a feeling of insecurity among the financial and industrial elements.
Under these conditions it is not surprising that the military have dropped war-like talk for the time being. On the other hand, it is quite probable that the military have deliberately tried to calm the nation and to prevent outbreaks of anti-Chinese or anti-Russian feeling which might get out of hand and force the nation into war. For [Page 392] the above-mentioned domestic reasons, and for external reasons which will be discussed later, it appears that the Japanese Army is not prepared to engage in a major war on the Asiatic continent, and consequently it is not only possible but probable that the military have desired that the Japanese nation lose interest in the minor incidents on the continent which formerly were exaggerated in order to fan the war-like ardor of the people.
2. External Conditions.
Perhaps chief among the external circumstances causing Japan to exhibit less pugnacity in its relations with its neighbors on the Asiatic continent is the strength and determination against further aggression shown by both China and Soviet Russia during recent months. The Soviet Union has indicated unmistakably that while it does not desire war with Japan, it will fight to the extent of its ability to preserve every inch of its territory or territory which it believes should be under its control. This determination, as the Japanese Army knows, is backed by military force probably superior to any which Japan could put into the field of conflict within a reasonable period. At the same time the rapidly growing unification of China and that country’s determination not to concede further loss of sovereignty have given the Japanese cause for thought. A war with China would undoubtedly result in early victories for Japan, whereby the Japanese Army and Navy could hold the Chinese coastal provinces, but it is not believed, even in Japan, that the war would be so soon resolved. It is considered more probable that the war would last in a guerilla form for years and would impose such a severe financial strain on Japan that the economic structure might collapse. In order to proceed further with its expansion schemes on the continent, therefore, it appears that it will be necessary for Japan to use force, and the country is not apparently prepared for this step.
It is also quite probable that the Japanese Army had expected another world war to break out in Europe as a result of the Spanish civil war and the growing tendency to divide into leftist and fascist blocs. Anticipating that such a war would give Japan a free hand in Asia, the fighting forces indulged in expansionist sentiments until recent months, but as the European war did not materialize, the fighting forces considered it best to drop their expansion schemes for the moment. The Japanese nation also realizes that it is more or less isolated in a world of conflicting ideas and policies. A need for a friend is being felt, and the possibility also exists that the military decided to relax its pressure on China and to discontinue its threats against the Soviet Union until such time as the pending agreement with Germany should be concluded.
A survey of the domestic causes of the apparent lessening of the [Page 393] belligerent spirit among the people of Japan reveals the fact that they are largely temporary in character, or of such a nature as to be readily overcome by an inspired outburst of patriotic fervor. From this viewpoint the loss of pugnacity cannot be considered as permanent; it is rather a temporary phenomenon subject to change at any time. The external causes of the lessening of belligerency, however, are more fixed in character and are more liable to act as a permanent restraint on Japanese pugnacity in the Far East.
Respectfully yours,