761.9315 Manchuria/36: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, February 4, 1936—5
p.m.
[Received February 4—1:15 p.m.]
[Received February 4—1:15 p.m.]
24. Department’s 17, February 3, 5 p.m.
- 1.
- Siberian-Mongolian border situation.
- (a)
- Incidents relating to the Siberian and Mongolian borders are handled by the Kwantung army headquarters in Hsinking with little reference to Tokyo. Consequently War Office here has apparently little information as to current situation. The Military Attaché of the Embassy62 reports that the War Office continues to refer to the border incidents as “annoying.”
- (b)
- Nippon Dempo in a despatch from Hsinking dated February 2 reports that the Kwantung army has reversed its reported previous decision to take “strong measures” and will now do nothing to aggravate the border situation “for fear that entire Far Eastern situation might take a severe turn for the worse”. A Domei report from Moscow dated February 3 states that the Red Army would assist an impartial commission of inquiry into reported mutiny Manchukuo troops near Mishan January 29 during a skirmish between Japan-Manchukuo and Soviet mutineer forces.
- (c)
- The Soviet Ambassador and General Rink, the Military Attaché, continue to express confidence that owing to the strength of Soviet defenses the Japanese will not attack. The Soviet Military Attaché told Colonel Crane on January 28 that if the Japanese bring too much pressure to bear against the Outer Mongolians the Soviet Government will aid them by technical means. General Rink has just returned from the U.S.S.R. and his confident attitude contrasts strongly with his evident anxiety of a year and more ago.
- (d)
- With regard to the present border situation, although the recent incidents have renewed anxiety, the Embassy foresees no serious trouble in the near future. This does not eliminate possibility of a grave incident rendering it impossible to restrain the opposing armies. (See despatch 1648, January 23 due Washington February 8).
- 2.
- Possibility of war this spring or summer.
- (a)
- Foreign observers consider recent Japanese trial balloon (Embassy’s telegram No. 2163) is an effort to counterbalance Litvinov-Eden64 and Litvinov–Flandin65 conversations. They believe the Foreign Office to be apprehensive of negotiations which may strengthen the U.S.S.R. in Europe.
- (b)
- The Soviet willingness to resist by force Japanese-Manchukuo violations of Mongolian and Siberian borders has demonstrated to the Kwantung army that immediate objectives of revising boundaries and opening Outer Mongolia can only be reached by war. The question has therefore arisen whether these immediate objectives, plus fundamental desire to eliminate Russia from East Asia, will lead Japanese leaders to favor coming spring or summer as most favorable opportunity to strike. It is generally assumed here that the Soviets will not themselves attack. Those who hold that Japan will attack this year claim that increasing strength of Soviet defenses make it a case of “now or never”. The majority, however, feels that the present Government in Japan will not deliberately attack Russia until or unless Russia is also involved in war on her western front. Consequently, the Japanese decision will await developments in Europe.
- (c)
- In considering the possibility of war in the spring or summer of this year, it appears likely that the influences surrounding the throne, Hirota, the majority of the business interests and probably the General Staff in Tokyo will be opposed to war under present circumstances. Should hostilities break out in Europe it is difficult at this stage to foretell in what manner the resulting cleavage of opinion among Japanese leaders for and against a war with Russia would be resolved.
To Peiping by mail.
Grew