741.94/64
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 24.]
Sir: I have the honor to report several new indications of a Japanese desire for improved relations with Great Britain. First, a press campaign, beginning on July 28 in the Tokyo Asahi, and continuing down until today, has featured a wish on the part of Japanese official circles and on the part of prominent men in British political life for a renewal between Japan and Great Britain of some such friendship as characterized the period of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance;78 and today’s newspapers speak of a plan for Anglo-Japanese cooperation reported to be entertained by Sir Samuel Hoare.79 Second, Foreign Minister Arita, in addressing the Diet in May 1936, took occasion particularly to mention his hope for friendly relations with Great Britain. Third, Ambassador Yoshida, on the way to his new duties in London, expressed, as the Department is aware, the hope that he may succeed in bringing about a renewal of Anglo-Japanese concord into which the United States may then be brought.
The Embassy thinks it probable that all three of these channels of expression have been inspired in the matter by Count Makino, recently retired Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Ambassador Yoshida is Count Makino’s son-in-law, and Foreign Minister Arita also enjoys Makino’s confidence. Informed newspaper men, both Japanese and foreign, are likewise of the opinion that the present agitation for friendship with Great Britain is of Japanese manufacture; and it is believed that the calculated applause in the Diet which met the [Page 262] Foreign Minister’s brief remarks on the subject was arranged in advance. Although the initiative is now definitely on the side of Japan and the outcome is consequently more doubtful than if the desire for a new accord were mutual, nevertheless the subject deserves careful consideration.
Recent months have brought a number of new factors into the relations between Japan and Great Britain:
- (1)
- The preliminary statement by Leith-Ross, the economist sent by the British Government to China to study means of improving conditions there, indicates that his report to the British Government will be adversely critical of many Japanese actions with regard to China and will speak optimistically of the value of a British policy aiming at increased future trade and investment in China.
- (2)
- Statements by members of the British Government and by members of Parliament, as well as representations to the Japanese Government by the British Ambassador in Tokyo, have made clear serious British interest in putting an end to smuggling in North China, especially on account of the importance of such smuggling on the future of the Chinese Maritime Customs. The Chinese Maritime Customs is among the institutions of China the support of which has been a cornerstone of British policy. It is an example of the international, impartial, expert services in which Great Britain has seen the greatest hope for China’s future, and the British Government does not lightly pass over the serious threat contained in the smuggling situation. Very recently, however, Japanese smuggling in North China has become so highly competitive that it has ceased to be particularly profitable and it therefore seems probable that statements emanating from the Japanese Government to the effect that the problem will be attacked hold definite promise.
- (3)
- The recent years of Japan’s expansion have been accompanied by a rapid extension of Japan’s foreign trade, and relief from the pressure of Japanese manufactures in various British markets such as Australia and India has become a problem of the first importance.
- (4)
- Failure of the League of Nations with regard to Ethiopia opens the way for British reconsideration of the policy of refusing recognition of “Manchukuo”, insofar as that policy was based upon faith in the League.
All these factors have their important bearing on the question, “Will the Foreign Minister be successful in bringing Great Britain to a new period of Anglo-Japanese accord, and what will be the nature of the new relations?” Japan seeks a word from Great Britain to China to convince China of the futility of relying on foreign support and the futility of continuing anti-Japan tactics. Japan would expect recognition of “Manchukuo” by China to follow, with later recognition by other countries. Japan seeks a free hand to develop North [Page 263] China in the direction which has been pursued since the Tangku Truce.80 Great Britain, on the other hand, does not seek an ally (as in the days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance) to defeat Russia whom Great Britain does not now fear; but Great Britain would like to have a friendly Japan willing to guarantee and protect British vested rights and interests in China. And Great Britain seeks relief from the growing danger of Japanese trade in the markets of the British Empire. Is there no ground for agreement as between British and Japanese desires?
The Embassy is of the opinion that a sane facing of the future relations of Japan and Great Britain in China should be predicated upon the possibility of a friendly understanding in the not distant future. To be sure, the British public is not to be jockeyed out of its opinions by the views of the British Government, however carefully considered. The strong public sentiment which forced Sir Samuel Hoare out of the office of Foreign Minister is an example of the independence of British public opinion; but this very example also illustrates the practical, easy-going restraint that rescues the British public from backing up its moral protests. A new accord between Great Britain and Japan would arouse the British supporters of the actions of the League of Nations with regard to nonrecognition of the regime in Manchuria; but the British Government, in the light of the decline of the League in the wake of the Ethiopian problem, might opportunistically and convincingly reply that it would be futile to continue to make sacrifices on behalf of a defunct institution. Again, British policy has, for more than a generation, strongly supported international assistance to China in the form of the Chinese Maritime Customs and similar organizations, and there can be little doubt now that Japanese aims in China include a gradual future Japanese control of such administrative organizations; but the Japanese administration in Manchuria has proven itself orderly and not entirely hostile to foreign interests, and even the old British attachment to impartial, international organizations to assist China, might conceivably give way to the belief that British trade in China in proportions comparable to the present will continue to be safe under virtual Japanese administration. There is still occasional romanticizing about huge future trade possibilities in China if Japan is kept out now (an idea mildly endorsed by Leith-Ross); but plenty of sound British business opinion is ready to admit that future foreign trade in China holds no great promise while present political conditions continue to prevail. And strongly tempting Great Britain to an accord with Japan is the immediate and pressing threat of Japanese [Page 264] merchandise in the British Empire. Belief from that haunting danger would be worth diverting Japanese energies to the continent, even at some sacrifice there; and it is not a foregone conclusion that increased Japanese trade in China would inevitably be at the expense of British trade with China. In any event, an accord which would tend to direct Japan’s economic activities toward China might serve to reduce competition from Japanese goods in British territory.
The initiators of the present move for a new basis of Anglo-Japanese relations are the Japanese, but nevertheless the possibility of awakening British response appears sufficiently plausible to warrant careful watching.
Respectfully yours,
- 1902–21.↩
- British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, June-December, 1935.↩
- For text of the agreement signed May 31, 1933, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 120.↩