Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/1115

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)

[Washington,] June 25, 1936.

In Tokyo’s despatch No. 1798, April 30, 1936, Ambassador Grew reported as follows:

“On April 30, 1936, Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, recently appointed Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, called and stated, in the course of our conversation, that the population problem in Japan was becoming increasingly difficult and that foreign countries should realize the seriousness of the situation and endeavor to help Japan in finding an adequate outlet. He said that it was principally a matter of finding outlets for Japan’s trade, with opportunity for Japanese subjects to follow that trade. Upon being asked, he said that it meant peaceful penetration. Again upon being asked, he said that he thought that the ‘blue-water school’ (i. e., the school advocating expansion to the south) would win out eventually over the ‘continental school’.”

Under date May 20, 1936, Mr. Grew states in his diary that on that day Mr. Yoshida called on him and a conversation was held which covered approximately an hour. In the course of this, Yoshida stated that he was expounding a personal point of view: he said that it was necessary to solve Japan’s problem of overpopulation, necessary to find some outlet, as well as important to acquire increased opportunities for obtaining raw materials and especially oil. Grew asked how Japan expected to acquire those things if they already belonged to other nations. Yoshida said he hoped that new sources of raw materials and oil could be exploited and possible contacts be made with countries which already possessed such sources. He said that Japan’s thought was only one of peaceful penetration and that in developing this peaceful penetration he hoped that the United States might lend its cooperation and play the part of “honest broker”. He said that the talk of war with Soviet Russia or with the United States or with Great Britain was utterly foolish and that Japan’s aims and efforts were purely pacific. He wished that Japan and the United States together might solve the whole problem of permanent peace in the Pacific area.

Under date June 12, 1936, the Secretary of State made a memorandum of the conversation held between him and Mr. Yoshida on that day.⁴¹ Yoshida said that he was very desirous of promoting better relations and better understanding between his country and the United States. He said that the one big fact which he wanted the American people to recognize was the immense and rapidly growing population of Japan and the absolute necessity for more territory for their existence in anything like a satisfactory way. He referred to the fact that there was misunderstanding and misapprehension on the part of our people in this respect as it related to Japanese movements in and about China; that this also was probably true as to the British; that the Japanese armaments were not intended for war against any particular country, especially us, but that Japanese naval officials were always undertaking to create additional vacancies and additional room for promotion, etc., etc. He expressed an earnest desire for conference, collaboration and, without alliances, such relationships as would work out any questions arising in an amicable and fairly satisfactory way. He expressed his purpose to have a number of conversations with Ambassador Bingham, as well as with the British officials, on these subjects, with the view to the former conversations getting back to the Secretary….⁴² He stated that he would like for the Secretary to remember the difficulties of the businessmen and traders of Japan and the necessity for outside trade.

On June 16, 1936, Mr. Yoshida called on Mr. Norman Davis. According to Mr. Davis’ record, in a letter of June 17,⁴³ Yoshida said that he felt he could talk with Mr. Davis with entire frankness. He had endeavored to explain to the Secretary of State the problem confronting Japan of keeping its growing population employed, but he had not entered into details. The Japanese people do not want to leave home and the most practical solution would be to keep them employed at home by expanding their trade abroad. The wiser element in the Army realize that the Army has gone too far. They realize that they have created an impossible situation and are calling upon the diplomats for help. The Army has been surprised to find out how well Russia is prepared. They may need to take a new tack. Japan needs to see to it that no other country join with Russia and, if possible, to get an alignment with some other power. He had conferred with Army leaders in Tokyo and these leaders feel that in regard to China they should cultivate the friendship and cooperation of Great Britain and the United States. In fact, they want to cultivate friendship with Nanking also. He knew that Great Britain would not make any agreement with Japan without the approval of the United States, but his idea was first to approach the British with a view to ascertaining whether they have any definite opinion as to the best way to deal with the China situation. Then, if it is found possible to reach a tentative meeting of minds conditional upon American approval and cooperation, he would visit Washington on his way back to Tokyo. He is convinced that the United States holds the key to the whole situation. The liberal elements in Japan have been strengthened and the Army leaders are becoming more moderate in their views: the wiser ones are getting the upper hand over the wild younger officers. The wiser naval officers realize that they made a mistake in leaving the Naval Conference without an agreement; but they are not as yet speaking out and he did not know whether opinion would change sufficiently during the next few months to make the Government feel justified in signing the Naval Treaty. There could be no ultimate solution to the naval question nor to any of the difficult problems in the Far East without a political foundation. It is essential to establish such a foundation.

Comment:

There are two points which, on a basis of these records of conversation, Yoshida appears to reiterate: first, that Japan must expand; second, that the United States or the United States and Great Britain should cooperate with Japan. It happens that a year and a half ago, in the course of an after-dinner conversation at the residence of Mr. William Castle,⁴⁴ Yoshida laid emphasis upon the idea that the United States, Great Britain and Japan should cooperate in regard to China. With that fact in mind, scrutiny of the present record gives an impression that Yoshida entertains a hope of bringing about some kind of a tentative agreement with the British authorities in London for British-Japanese cooperation, perhaps conditional upon its proving possible to bring the United States into the arrangement, after which the proposal would be brought here for the American Government’s consideration.

It would be interesting to know just what Yoshida said to Colonel House⁴⁵ that was in Colonel House’s opinion so extraordinarily important. However, without that information, what we have here suffices to indicate that Yoshida is working toward the objective of bringing about some kind of a Japanese-British-American rapprochement. As a matter of tactics, he advances the thesis that Japan “must expand”, and he suggests that we and the British assist toward rather than place obstacles in the way of that solution of the problem of Japan’s needs. Also, he affirms that liberal influence in Japan is increasing in strength and that moderate views among the “wiser officers” in the Army are increasing in effectiveness. He intimates that moderate views in the Navy may in the course of some months become effective. In these tactics we find a repetition of the method and the affirmations with which we have become familiar on the part of Japanese diplomats.

In the light of what has been reported with regard to the Leith-Ross conversations in Japan and of the text of Leith-Ross’ statement issued this week in Shanghai; and of a newspaper report of some weeks ago that Yoshida was going to make certain proposals to the British Government, it is reasonable for us to suppose that efforts are being made and will be made by some Japanese and some British representatives—with or without the definite approval and authorization of the respective foreign offices—to work up some form of a Japanese-British understanding elaborated with an eye to its being potentially attractive to the United States, the objective envisaged being that of a Japanese-British-American cooperative entente with regard to policy in the Far East (or perhaps even policy in general).

It does not appear, however, that Ambassador Yoshida has disclosed to any of his American collocutors what any of the particular principles or provisions or specifications of such an understanding should be or what plan of action or of operation he has in mind.⁴⁶

S[tanley] K. H[ornbeck]

41. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 241.
42. Omission indicated in the original.
43. Not printed.
44. Under Secretary of State, 1931–33.
45. Edward M. House, member of the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.
46. The Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Hamilton, on June 26 made the following notation: “Very good. Also, no matter how sincere Yoshida may be, will not his efforts in London serve, as did Matsudaira’s, to attract the attention and support of some of the British and thus to throw a partial smoke-screen around Japan’s continued aggression in China?”