852.00/4203: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Acting Secretary of State

628. Foreign Office referred in conversation today to the subject of the last paragraph of my 610 of December 14, 6 p.m. and gave its [Page 616] opinion that the only hope of successful mediation in Spain lay in producing a condition of stalemate between the opposing forces which if permitted to continue might well result in the Spaniards themselves demanding expulsion of foreigners and acceptance of an offer of mediation.

Hitler’s prestige since last spring, the Foreign Office continued, had considerably decreased; Europe had not “fallen for” the Bolshevik menace; the German-Japanese alliance had gained them little; Hitler’s backing of Franco had been so far inconclusive; the friendship between Mussolini and Hitler was on the wane and the failure of the 4-year plan was producing such a bad economic situation in Germany today that an attempt to gain some outside success by Hitler seemed almost indicated. Consequently with the deadlock of the efforts of the Non-intervention Committee last week the French and British Governments decided to act urgently and instructed their Ambassadors on the day before Christmas, in Berlin and other interested capitals, to invite the attention of the German and other Governments concerned to the urgent need for measures to prevent the despatch of volunteers to Spain. It was realized Hitler was in Bavaria and Neurath was absent from Berlin but I understand, nevertheless, it was pointed out to the German Foreign Office that neither side in Spain could hope to win a decisive victory without such reinforcement by foreign volunteers as would tend to threaten the peace of Europe. The Foreign Office understands Hitler has this Spanish question under consultation and review at the moment. The Foreign Office pointed out to me that Italy was already shifting her active support of Franco by withdrawals and the Soviets did not seem anxious to push their position in Spain (see paragraph 2 of my 593, December 3, 6 p.m.).

In summing up the loss of German prestige since last spring, as outlined above, the Foreign Office added:

1.
That France had been 50 years behind the rest of the world in social services and in the past year had gone through a social revolution which, even though achieved without bloodshed, had lowered her world prestige.
2.
The Soviets had apparently gotten away with their Spanish policy both at Geneva and before world opinion. Furthermore, the German drive against a Bolshevik menace had not succeeded nor had the German-Japanese alliance proven the threat the Soviets at one time had feared.
3.
Indeed, the Foreign Office stated bluntly that England strengthened her position more than any other country in Europe in the past year. She had successfully “muddled through” the Abyssinian crisis but realized such a situation must never happen again and was rearming accordingly. England was on the verge of concluding an agreement with Italy as regards the Mediterranean. The recent “constitutional crisis” had proved Empire unity to the world. England, [Page 617] with France, had maintained the “non-intervention policy” in Spain and the negotiations for a new Locarno which at one time it seemed Germany might render impossible was apparently being reconsidered by Hitler. The economic position of England had improved in contrast to dictatorships such as Germany, Italy and Japan and the great democracy of England had been able to join in a stabilization agreement with the other great democracy, the United States, in which France had been included. Furthermore, the reaction in the Far East, even in Japan itself, to the German-Japanese treaty had not been unfavorable to England’s position there and indeed had tended to isolate Japan and Russian world contacts generally.

Bingham