852.00/4105: Telegram (part air)

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Acting Secretary of State

513. 1. The Council this afternoon unanimously adopted a resolution in the Spanish affair embodying chief points:

(1)
International good understanding should be maintained irrespective of the internal regimes of states.
(2)
A duty is incumbent on League states to respect the territorial integrity and independence of other states.
(3)
Urges that the effectiveness of the Non-intervention Committee be enhanced.
(4)
Views with sympathy the Franco-British démarche.
(5)
Asserts the desirability of humanitarian efforts.
(6)
Offers the League’s technical services for eventual reconstruction.

2. This resolution was the result of negotiations between Council members lasting throughout the day in which the representatives of Great Britain, France, Spain and Chile played the leading role. I learned from participants the following respecting points enumerated above, reference being made to the full text of the resolution which is being carried in the American press:

(a)
This was at the instance of the British with privately admitted preoccupations respecting the recent German-Japanese arrangements.
(b)
The language employed while a paraphrase of article X of the Covenant omits at the insistence of Chile direct reference to that article. Latin Americans who are aware of this Chilean position, while unable to explain its reasons, stress its possible significance.
(c)
The whole tenor of this provision is a stressing of the desirability of effective non-intervention undertakings, the Spanish representative not objecting to non-intervention efforts should they be [Page 609] really effective and privately admitting that such would be of military value to the Spanish Government.
(d)
The word “mediation” does not appear in this provision, Spain objecting to its use as implying political and military weakness.
(e)
The Chilean representative urged that the resolution include entrusting the Red Cross with the protection and evacuation of individuals who have sought asylum in the diplomatic missions at Madrid. The British and other European Council members objected to this as contrary to their principle and practice respecting the right of asylum. The Spanish representative objected on the ground that there “are missions and missions and refugees and refugees.” Latin Americans here tell me privately that Del Vayo could not accept the Red Cross being given authority in any humanitarian efforts due to the differences between himself and the Red Cross which arose when he represented that organization among the White Russians in 1920 and 21 …

3. The Spanish representative in accepting the resolution stated that the Council had not exhausted the issue which he had raised and that consequently he reserves the right to call upon the Council later to resume its efforts.

4. Edwards, speaking for Chile, voiced his contentions described under (e) above and was supported by the Bolivian representative who cited the Montevideo and Habana agreements.

Del Vayo responded by stating that he would be willing to discuss this matter individually with the interested governments.

5. Edwards, in the name of the President of Chile, endorsed the Franco-British démarches.

6. The general view here is that the Spaniards gained all they had expected by procuring a public general reaffirmation of the legitimacy of their Government and thus obtained an “answer” to Germany and Italy (Consulate’s 490, December 3, 4 p.m., paragraph 237). The participation and action of Chile and Bolivia are likewise regarded as an answer to the rumoius of a widespread tendency among Latin American states to recognize Franco.

The Latin American representatives here, however, display marked antipathy to the Madrid Government. They assert that the reason why Del Vayo opposed the evacuation of the refugees in the Madrid diplomatic missions is that they are being held as hostages to prevent the recognition of Franco by the governments concerned.

7. The British representative stated to me that he believed that the provision in the resolution respecting non-intervention would at least [Page 610] to some degree result in Germany and Italy being more wary in giving aid to Franco or in any event that they would do so less openly.

Gilbert
  1. Not printed.