852.00/2718: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
776. I lunched alone today at the residency of the Council with Blumel, Chef de Cabinet of Blum. He talked very frankly on a number of subjects principally the Spanish situation. He said that the Government here was taking a very serious view of the situation and was particularly concerned over the possibility of some action by Hitler as the result of the boarding of the German ship Kamerun by a Spanish cruiser and submarine. He said that the German attitude toward the French proposal of a non-intervention pact had been from the outset very conciliatory. On the contrary the Italian attitude had been and continued to be evasive. As regards the question of the sixth German airplane the restitution of which is one of the German conditions for joining the non-intervention pact, he said that the Germans claimed that this was a transport plane, whereas the Spanish Government said it was a military plane destined for the insurgents. The Spanish Government has proposed arbitration of the question by the Hague Court or some other body but the German Government refused this offer and continued to demand restitution pure and simple of the plane. The Spanish Government could not accept this. (I clearly gathered that the French Government has all along been urging the Spanish Government to concede the German point of view in order to remove this obstacle to an international agreement.) While the German attitude has been conciliatory, nevertheless, he said in view of the close working agreement between Germany and Italy he felt that there might well be a policy of Germany showing a conciliatory attitude to please the British while the Italians took the brunt of holding up the agreement with the comparative evasive tactics. In this connection he said he agreed with me that the danger of a European war arising out of this battle of political creeds in relation to the Spanish conflict was not as acute as many people apparently believed since, in the final analysis German policy in Europe was achieving its objectives without having to risk war and in particular [Page 503] it was a major tenet of Germany to refrain for the time being from doing anything which would antagonize Great Britain. At the same time he again referred to the possibility of close team work between Germany and Italy whereby the latter rather than Germany would take the lead in an attitude which might well lead eventually to a most serious international situation in relation to the Spanish conflict.
He said that the opinion of the French military advisers was in general pessimistic as to the chances of the success of the Spanish Government. The Spanish Governmental forces had plenty of enthusiasm but no discipline or military order. In particular Catalonia was in the hands of Anarchists. In brief he said 75% of the civilian population of Spain was for the Frente Popular and 75% of the armed forces for the insurgents. He then went on to say (and I found this particularly interesting) that the French high command Army, Navy and Air, particularly the Navy, was greatly preoccupied by the Spanish struggle and ardently wished for the success of the Madrid Government. These officers he said frankly were by tradition and training conservative, were in the majority instinctively unsympathetic to the aims of the Blum government in France, and by the same token could not by the wildest stretch of the imagination be suspected of any natural sympathy with the efforts of the Left government in Spain to put down the military revolt there. Ordinarily it would be suspected that the sympathies of the French military and naval officers would be with their confreres in Spain but for reasons of a technical nature related to the problem of French security the French military and naval command were heart and soul in favor of the ultimate triumph of the Spanish Government. In this connection he spoke of the impossible [apparent omission] in which France would be placed if communications with North Africa’s reservoir of men and foodstuffs were cut off from continental France.
I asked Blumel whether the British Government had from the outset realized the potential dangers to Great Britain’s interests in the Mediterranean if a military regime were established in Spain subject to Fascist influence. He said that the British Government at first had been rather lukewarm in its support of the French initiative for a nonintervention pact. This he explained by [apparent omission] that at first British conservative opinion, including the Army and Navy, had been that the triumph of the Spanish Government would mean Communism and disorder in Spain and that a victory of the military elements was to be desired. However, more recently the British Government seemed to have shown a clearer realization of the implications to their interests of a victory of the military rebellion in Spain and the British communiqué of last Saturday and the order of the Board of Trade yesterday forbidding the export of war material and even [Page 504] civilian planes to Spain indicated this. He added that the British were “strongly supporting” in Berlin and Rome the French proposal for a non-intervention pact.
As of possible interest he said that when Blum met Vansittart59 recently in Paris on the latter’s return from Berlin, Blum felt that Vansittart failed to show a clear realization of the dangers of the Spanish situation. This Blum felt might be explained by the fact that Vansittart had then been away from England for some time.
Blumel said that the position of the French Government in declining to permit the exportation of war materials and planes to Spain was becoming increasingly difficult. He said that practically all elements of the Popular Front were demanding that in view of the known aid continually being given by Germany and Italy to the rebels in Spain the French Government should no longer be the victim of its own initiative and remain with its hands tied while a situation was being created in Spain definitely menacing to France’s vital interests.
I asked whether the Radical Socialists shared this point of view. He admitted that the Radicals were divided: those on the Left of the party were with the Communists and Socialists in advocating aid to the Spanish Government; those on the Right wing of the party were for continuing every effort to arrive at a non-intervention pact and for avoiding anything which might prejudice the realization of such an agreement.
He went on to say that there was increasing pressure from workers in aviation factories who wanted to take up subscriptions to buy military planes for Spain and from the owners of such factories who worked only for the account of the French Government and now saw an opportunity to increase their sales. From all sides he said the pressure was increasing on the French Government to let down the bars for exporting such material to Spain. I asked, if agreement on the non-intervention pact were not soon reached how long he thought the French Government would continue to forbid the exportation to Spain of war materials and planes. He replied “I do not know”.
I asked what had been the objectives of Jouhaux’s60 trip to Spain and what he had said on his return. Blumel said that he had talked at various times with Jouhaux since his return: the General Confederation of Labor was strongly in favor as everyone knew of direct aid by France to the Spanish Government and Jouhaux had gone to Spain to see what the situation there was.
Jouhaux had brought back glowing accounts that [of?] the enthusiasm and bravery of the Spanish Governmental forces; and he [Page 505] was continuing to insist with all the elements of the C. G. T.61 back of him on a reversal of the French Government’s policy regarding the exportation of war materials to Spain. At the close of our luncheon Blum joined us for a few moments. He said frankly that he was very seriously concerned over the possibility of some action by Hitler based on the boarding of the Kamerun. He said that he had been relieved when Hitler had not sought to create an incident over the execution of the four Germans at Barcelona; however the Olympic games were then going on. Now the games were over and while he agreed with Blumel that the Germans had hitherto been conciliatory as regards the French proposal for a non-intervention pact and that the obstructions had come rather from the Italian side, nevertheless he was now greatly preoccupied over the possibility that Hitler might suddenly take some drastic action as a result of the incident involving this ship.
I might add that Blumel told me that Lansbury, the British labor leader, called on Blum this morning and suggested to him the idea of appealing to President Roosevelt to head up some initiative looking to a mediation of the Spanish conflict; Blum had replied that he thought there was little likelihood of President Roosevelt accepting any such idea. As I gathered the impression that there was some attempt to draw me out on this subject I referred to an article I had read in the Paris edition of the New York Herald today to the effect that the Department of State had replied to Uruguay’s initiative for mediation in Spain by pointing out the traditional policy of the United States of keeping out of European affairs; I also told him of the Department’s recent instructions to our representatives in Spain regarding our policy of non-intervention in the Spanish situation and said that I was sure that any such suggestion would be entirely unacceptable to President Roosevelt.