852.00/2920
The Minister in Portugal (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 1.]
Sir: Referring to my despatch No. 1009 of August 5, 1936, and to the final paragraph of my telegram of August 8, 1 PM.,48 I have the honor to summarize as follows the course of recent negotiations as to the French proposal of non-intervention in the affairs of Spain.
As indicated in the telegram referred to above, the representatives of Great Britain and France called at the Foreign Office in Lisbon on August 7th and invited Portugal to adhere to the proposed policy of non-intervention. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Armindo Monteiro, promised to give careful consideration to this invitation, but made certain observations in which he emphasized the special dangers for Portugal arising from the present situation in Spain. He also [Page 486] suggested the possibility that Portugal might find it necessary for her own protection to go even so far as to recognize and assist the Burgos government. On this subject, I have received for my confidential information a copy of a despatch from the Belgian Minister, Count de Lichtervelde, in which he reported to his government on August 11th a detailed account of this interview as given to him directly by Dr. Monteiro, of which document a confidential copy is enclosed herewith.49
On August 10th, having received instructions from his government, Mr. Charles Dodd, Chargé d’Affaires of Great Britain, went to the Foreign Office to bring to Portugal the reassurances on the subject of security which the observations of Dr. Monteiro on August 7th seemed to require. In this interview, Mr. Dodd is reported to have said that Great Britain has a sympathetic understanding of the natural anxiety in Portugal created by the Spanish situation. He emphasized, however, the importance from the point of view of European peace of prompt and general acceptance of the proposed agreement for nonintervention in Spain. In this connection, he went on to point out that Portugal has the protection of the Covenant of the League of Nations50 against any direct threat to its security; and he added that, in any great emergency, the attitude of Great Britain would continue to be governed by the terms of the existing treaty of alliance between England and Portugal.51 Dr. Monteiro replied that he would again give careful consideration to these assurances and would reply as soon as possible to the proposal which he had received.
On the evening of August 13th, after prolonged conferences during that day between Dr. Salazar, the Prime Minister, Dr. Monteiro, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Sampayo, the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the representatives of France and Great Britain were given by Dr. Monteiro the reply of Portugal for which they had been waiting. In this reply, the Portuguese Government accepts in principle the proposed agreement for non-intervention, but reserves liberty of action in case an emergency arises involving the security of Portuguese frontiers or the internal peace and security of Portugal itself.
To the considerable anxiety of the French Minister, the newspapers for August 14th contained no reference whatsoever to the subject of non-intervention, but Dr. Monteiro’s reply was published in full in the newspapers of August 15th. I am enclosing the text of this statement as it appears in the Diario da Marthã, semi-official organ of [Page 487] the government, for that date, together with a complete translation of this document.52
In spite of the acceptance of the principle of non-intervention in this guarded and modified form, the French Minister, Mr. Amé-Leroy, with whom I had an informal conversation on this subject recently, told me that in view of the reservations contained in the document, he was still uncertain as to the actual policy which would be pursued by the Portuguese Government in this matter. He said that the Portuguese Government had accepted the principle of non-intervention with obvious reluctance and that, on account of the highly excited state of public opinion here in Portugal, it would be difficult for the Portuguese Government to avoid at least indirect assistance to the rival government in Burgos. He did not believe, however, that in view of the strong support which had been given to the French proposal by the Government of Great Britain, Portugal would be likely to accord actual recognition to the Burgos government in advance of similar action by larger countries.
There are other indications that the document now published does not necessarily mark any fundamental change of policy on the part of the Government of Portugal. Thus, it is currently reported that foodstuffs and other supplies are continuing to reach the revolutionary forces through Portugal in substantial quantities; and the newspapers of the fifteenth, including those of an almost semi-official character, reported the capture of Badajoz by the revolutionary forces with prominent statements in the headlines to the effect that “Portugal has now ceased to have any frontier with robbers and assassins”. Similarly, in a recent conversation, the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs told me that, in his judgment, the choice in Spain was no longer between a republic and a military dictatorship, but rather between reasonable security and subversive anarchy; and this point of view is entirely evident from the reservations in the Portuguese reply.
The newspapers here in Lisbon have received the announcement of Dr. Monteiro’s reply without enthusiasm, and praise the reservations rather than the central idea. In the circumstances, the actual policy of Portugal is still uncertain, and may be expected to depend quite as much on the course of military events in Spain as on the phrases of the official reply. This uncertainty is emphasized by an announcement that the British Ambassador, Sir Charles Wingfield, is interrupting his leave in England to return to his post in Lisbon in the next few days.
Respectfully yours,
- Neither printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 69.↩
- For text of treaty of defensive alliance signed May 16, 1703, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. i, p. 501. The earliest treaty of alliance was signed June 16, 1373, ibid., p. 462.↩
- Not printed.↩