893.515/514
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 8.]
I have the honor to report that the first intimation that the British Government was feeling out the attitude of the interested Governments in regard to some form of joint international assistance for China reached the Japanese public through news despatches dated Washington, March 1, which described the visit of Sir Ronald Lindsay to the Under Secretary of State on that day and assumed that the visit was concerned with reports that various Powers were considering loans to China. Some of the news despatches inferred that the Powers were considering such loans for the purpose of rendering it unnecessary for China to enter into any economic alliance with Japan, as such an alliance would create numerous international points of friction.
Under a London date of March 2, official confirmation was given to the report that the British Government had approached the members of the Four-Power Consortium, inviting them to make suggestions for joint financial assistance to China, but emphasizing that this action was not taken in order to forestall any separate Sino-Japanese agreement which might be reached.
These reports were received in Japan with suspicion and some indications that the Japanese consider joint financial aid to China as a move to thwart Japan’s aims and objects in China. Following are some of the official and non-official views expressed in this connection.
Official Reaction.
Although the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had previously informed the British Ambassador in Tokyo that the cooperation of the Powers interested, especially the United States and Great Britain, in any constructive plan to assist China in her present difficulties, would be welcomed by Japan, Mr. E. Amau, the spokesman for the Foreign Office, did not adopt this same attitude when questioned by the foreign press correspondents on March 4 and March 6. He gave the correspondents the impression that he was resentful and suspicious of the reported conversations. On March 4 he said, according to the newspapers, that it was premature to make any statement in regard to Japan’s response to a proposal for joint international assistance to [Page 561] China, because no approach had yet been made to Japan. Questioned in regard to Japan’s attitude toward joint financial assistance to China, he evaded the question by expatiating upon the fact that the recent turn for the better in Sino-Japanese relations was due to a change of heart on the part of the Chinese leaders, who were now returning to Sun Yat-sen’s policy of promoting friendly relations with Japan. “This is not a new policy for China, nor is it a new policy for Japan. Chinese leaders, who at one time deviated from Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s original policy, are merely returning to it.” “Why not let China and Japan alone?” Asked if the return to Sun’s policy would mean China’s dependency on Japan’s financial aid alone, Amau said that he did not think so. Anyway, “Japan is not in a position to discuss with others its relations with China.” Asked if the Sun policy would exclude the possibility of other powers assisting China, Amau replied that he did not think so. Asked if he believed that the move for joint financial assistance to China was for the purpose of blocking a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, Amau replied that “It seems that the powers are excited and agitated. That is a mistake, as China is simply returning to its original policy of cultivating friendly relations with Japan. China has not asked for a financial loan from Japan. This question has not arisen recently between the two countries.” Asked if Japan would object to joint financial assistance to China, if Japan would be willing to discuss such assistance, and if Japan would receive favorably a plan to extend credits to China, Amau replied, “We can’t say.”
In his interview with the foreign press correspondents on March 6, Mr. Amau admitted that the Japanese Government had been informed of the British move but refused to comment on it, except to say that “Japan has no objection to discussing an international loan to China through diplomatic channels”. The press correspondents took this to mean that the Japanese Government would refuse to be drawn into a conference, where it might find itself in a minority. He also said that “We must make it clear that Chinese matters must be taken care of by the Chinese themselves”, implying that international assistance involving any degree of control over Chinese affairs would be opposed by the Japanese Government.
There was an odd discrepancy between the cordial attitude taken by Mr. Hirota in discussing international assistance to China with the British Ambassador, and the semi-resentful, semi-belligerent attitude taken by Mr. Amau in discussing the same matter with the foreign press correspondents. It may be (as has often been suspected) that Mr. Amau takes his cues from others than his nominal chief. The military for some time past have been persistently deprecating the alleged change of heart on the part of the Chinese statesmen, [Page 562] insisting that the moves for improved relations with Japan are insincere and that deeds, not words, must be forthcoming to prove China’s sincerity. It is probable that the Japanese military, for some purpose of their own, are opposing a Sino-Japanese diplomatic rapprochement, and likewise are opposing international aid for China.
Newspaper Comment.
The newspaper comment has been practically unanimously adverse to any sort of international assistance to China and is inclined to attribute ulterior motives to the proposal initiated by Great Britain. The general interpretation given by the Japanese newspapers to the move for international assistance for China is that it is intended to frustrate Sino-Japanese economic cooperation—the goal toward which they profess to believe the recent conversations between Japanese diplomatic and military officers and Chinese officials were directed. How far the newspaper comment reflects Japanese official opinion it is impossible to state, but the unanimity of the comment would appear to indicate an inspiration from some source.
[Here follows Japanese press comment.]
Mr. Hirota’s Attitude.
That the moderate Asahi version of the official attitude is more nearly correct than the chauvinistic Nichi-Nichi version is definitely shown by two conversations which Mr. Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had with the British Ambassador and myself. In his conversation with me on March 2, 1935, Mr. Hirota stated that the Chinese Government had come to realize recently the necessity of improving relations with Japan and that the Japanese officials had therefore been discussing at Nanking the possibilities of attaining this end through the curtailment of anti-Japanese agitation in China. Mr. Hirota asserted that he believed sincerely that the solution of various problems such as the naval question could be found if relations could be improved between Japan, China and the Soviet Union, and that he also believed that the Chinese authorities shared this view. He added, however, that the financial difficulties of China constituted a stumbling block to the betterment of relations, and that this factor affected other nations as well as Japan, implying that international assistance to China is indicated by the circumstances. He then said that he was working to construct a real basis for peace in the Far East but that this work would take time, and in the meantime he hoped that the Powers would repose confidence in his efforts. (Embassy’s telegram No. 43, March 2, 1 p.m.75).
Mr. Hirota expressed much the same sentiments to Sir Robert Clive, the British Ambassador, in a conversation with him at about the same [Page 563] time, adding that, as far as he (Mr. Hirota) was concerned, he would be glad of the cooperation of the Powers, and especially for that of the United States and Great Britain, in devising some constructive plan for the assistance of China in her present difficulties. He said that he did not think that a mere loan to China under the circumstances would solve China’s monetary difficulties, and stated that Japan was not considering lending money to China.
These statements of Mr. Hirota tend to emphasize the cleavage of opinion between the conservative element of the Foreign Office and the chauvinists, whether in or out of the Foreign Office. The military, the chauvinists in the Foreign Office (as represented by Mr. Amau) and most of the newspapers, appear to stand with the “hands off China” policy enunciated by Mr. Amau last April,76 while Mr. Hirota and his associates apparently sincerely desire to effect a real rapprochement with China (as well as with other countries) and welcome international assistance toward this end. Every indication points to the conclusion that Mr. Hirota and the conservative element in the Government are rapidly returning to the principles of the “Shidehara Diplomacy”,77 the foremost of which was the principle of befriending China instead of coercing that nation.
Respectfully yours,
- Ante, p. 67.↩
- See statement of April 17, 1934, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 224.↩
- Named for Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1924–27, 1929–31.↩