Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, The Far East, Volume III

761.94/816

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 1165

Tokyo, February 8, 1935.
[Received February 23. ]

Sir: Viewed in a broad sense the course of the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia since September 18, 1931, has been in the main determined by the efforts of the two nations to adjust themselves to the radically different situation created by the separation of Manchuria from the rest of China. The creation of “Manchukuo” has been a major political change whatever we may think of the circumstances of its origin. China has been eliminated in that region, Japan has embarked upon a program of exploitation, and Japan and the USSR have found themselves face to face along a continental frontier.

At the time of the Manchurian incident the USSR did not feel equal to opposing the Japanese military in North Manchuria, but her leaders were not slow to recognize that the new situation required action. Their answer was two fold. In the first place the USSR set about to rim the “Manchukuo” border with fortifications and to improve the lines of communication with the Far East by land, sea, and air. In the second place she realized the futility, not to say the danger, of retaining a railroad through territory under the effective control of the Japanese army. Consequently an offer to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway was made, accompanied no doubt by the hope that the negotiations might prove protracted and thus furnish a sorely needed respite to prepare for a situation which seemed menacing. But from the start no hope was entertained of a return to the status quo ante. The USSR accepted “Manchukuo” as a fact if not as an independent nation, and the action which she took begins to promise stability for her Far Eastern frontiers.

In Japan the full implications of being face to face with the USSR on the continent were not realized at first. Japan was interested in Manchuria heart and soul but not in Soviet Russia. Soviet-Japanese relations were incidental, only vital in so far as they related to Manchuria. Thus the USSR was regarded as a threat to Manchuria which was to be driven as far away as possible. Moreover, in the hysteria of success, only the wiser heads recalled that the Soviet Union was a vast power with potential strength far overshadowing that which she was then able to muster. Accordingly when the inevitable friction caused by the new situation arose, over the Chinese Eastern Railway, the border question and a host of minor irritants, there came to be danger of hostilities. In fact it is commonly believed in Tokyo that an influential faction of the army favored a war to eliminate the USSR from the Far East. Fortunately, however, saner counsels prevailed. It was realized that Russia was also in the Far East to stay, and opportunity was given to Mr. Hirota to seek to settle each issue on its own merits and to gradually arrive thereby at a peaceful stabilization and regularization of the new political situation in the Far East. Moreover Soviet military strength by 1934 aided in proving to the Japanese that a war with the USSR was not to Japan’s best interests at this juncture.

As a corollary of Japan’s primary interest in Manchuria it also follows that only those issues with Soviet Russia affecting this region generally present critical possibilities. They are primarily political not economic issues, and involve the Chinese Eastern Railway and the delimitation and demilitarization of the Siberian border. The economic issues have never appeared dangerous, the fisheries questions, the yen-ruble exchange rate, and, in so far as it is an economic issue, the North Saghalien oil fields. We may expect this distinction to persist in future as well. Those matters which affect “Manchukuo” and the political situation in East Asia are critical, those which are economic in nature are not.

With this the case and with Japan’s real interests in Manchuria and not in Russia, it is frequently asked why Japan and the USSR do not negotiate a non-aggression pact. The latter has proposed it, and Japan’s refusal has naturally aroused suspicion. Two weeks ago before the Diet the Foreign Minister said:

“But I am of the opinion that it is quite difficult to regulate satisfactorily the relations between the two countries through the instrument of a mere paper non-aggression pact. Naturally I do believe that all the important problems now pending between the two must first be solved.”

This is a statement of policy which bears out previous evidence^* received by the Embassy. If the various Soviet-Japanese issues should all be solved and Mr. Hirota believes a general pact to be desirable, then and only then would a bellicose minority be unable to adduce effective objections.

But the foregoing attitude does not imply that the Foreign Office is satisfied with the status quo in regard to the USSR. Before the Diet on January 22 the Foreign Minister stated “our Government are planning to accelerate the peaceful development of Soviet-Japanese relations by redoubling their efforts for the solution of other pending problems”. Again on January 25 he said “As regards the Soviet-Japanese situation the Government is fully prepared to foster a closer friendship with that country”. He has worked for the peaceful settlement of the Russian difficulties because he felt that the USSR had been all but removed from the old sphere of influence in Manchuria. That was the essential fact and it was now time to get on with other matters.

For nearly half a century Japan’s foreign policy in so far as it related to expansion, was centered on Manchuria. All along it has been an effort to win East Asia for the Japanese, to gain security from interference. Korea was an incident along the way, Manchuria has been the “life line”, but as long ago as 1915 Japan served notice in the 21 Demands⁵⁰ that China was within the scope of her ambitions. Again at the present time these deep-rooted ambitions, fanned by the nationalism of the day as well as by the needs of Japan’s growing industrialization, are finding expression. We do not know precisely what is going on in Nanking at present but it seems probable that the natural focus of Japanese ambitions does not lie in the direction of Russia. The normal and potentially the most rewarding development is towards the west and south. To support this contention a certain amount of new evidence has lately appeared.

To begin with there has been much talk of demilitarization of the “Manchukuo”-Siberian frontier. The Foreign Minister specifically mentioned this point both in his address to the Diet on January 22 and in reply to an interpellation on January 25. It seems certain that a determined effort will be made to induce Soviet Russia to accept some sort of arrangement similar to that provided for the Korean frontier in the Treaty of Portsmouth.⁵¹ But the Foreign Minister is a realist, he is surely aware that the Soviet military preparations were made because the USSR did not trust Japan, and he must realize that the removal of the now extensive fortifications is not probable. His interest therefore in this problem is a studied attempt to demonstrate Japan’s peacefulness, its aversion to war, and to place the Soviets with their military preparations in an awkward light. It is not an effort to pave the way for Japanese aggression northwards. Also in an interview with Mr. G. W. Gorman in the Manchuria Daily News, General Minami, Commander of the Kwantung Army, said “we do not hold any imperialistic intentions towards Soviet Russia or her territories” while in referring to China he stated “it would not be impossible nor improbable for the adjacent provinces to declare their independence perhaps to seek attachment to the Manchukuo federation. But … it will be none of our contriving”. This assurance, which was parallel to one given by the War Minister before the Diet, is of course probably of no great value per se, but it is significant that the only hint of political change mentioned by the leader of the Kwantung Army is in the direction of North China, not of Mongolia nor of Soviet Russia.

Another bit of evidence, perhaps, has been furnished by the Buir Nor incident^† on the Outer Mongolian frontier of Hsingan Province, “Manchukuo”. Fighting occurred there over control of the fishing resources of Lake Buir which, located in the midst of desert, is of local importance. At other times or if there was any possibility that the Kwantung Army had aggressive designs in mind, this incident would have aroused much comment and anxiety. But the matter appears to be passing over without further repercussions and a member of the Soviet Embassy has stated with apparent sincerity that the Soviets were not interested in the matter, that it was not worth disputing. Furthermore present indications are that the Japanese are more interested in the general area of Mongolia as the flank approach to North China than to Soviet Russia. Japan is well aware of the state of affairs in Outer Mongolia, it is always referred to as a region of Soviet influence, whereas, to the south of the desert in Inner Mongolia, Japanese agents are reported from time to time as being most active.^‡ Inner Mongolia of course commands North China from Hopei to Shensi and beyond.

With the foregoing in mind it appears unlikely that Soviet Russia will experience any serious interference from Japan for the immediate future barring always the possibility of serious crisis in Russia from some other quarter. In that case the Maritime Province will be no more safe than it was during the period 1919–21. Moreover this is patent to the Soviets themselves. They can hardly have viewed with dismay the shift in Japan’s interest southwards to China. We may conjecture that they would exercise all possible influence to accelerate this shift which is detrimental to the interests of Great Britain and the United States as well as of other Western Powers. The possibility of Japan coming into conflict with these nations is fraught with potential advantages to the USSR. As a matter of fact the Soviet Ambassador^§ and also members of the Soviet Embassy staff have for long somewhat cynically indicated that they believed that relations between Japan and the United States were developing ominously. So far as the Soviets are concerned if they take no steps to foment trouble, they will maintain their defenses around the Amur telling Japan in the only language that the latter cannot misunderstand that the door to the North is locked.

We may expect therefore over the next few years that the attitude of the USSR and Japan in so far as it relates to Manchuria will crystallize along the lines laid down by the Chinese Eastern Railway settlement and possible border negotiations. In effect the USSR has now recognized the new politics of that portion of East Asia and has been eliminated therefrom. As for the future much will depend upon the success and wisdom with which the Japanese carry out their policies in China. With the progress of her ambitions in this direction we may expect that Japan, wishing her back door to be secure behind her, will genuinely work for the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

1. Embassy’s despatch No. 714, March 23, 1934. [Footnote in the original; despatch printed in Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. iii, p. 85.]
50. Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 79 ff.
51. Treaty of Peace Between Japan and Russia, signed August 23/September 5, 1905, Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 824.
52. Monthly Political Report for January 1935. [Footnote in the original; report not printed.]
53. Embassy’s confidential despatch No. 1030, November 1, 1934. [Footnote in the original; for despatch see Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. iii, p. 297.]
54. Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 700, March 8, 1934. [Footnote in the original; for enclosure see Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. iii, p. 69.]