894.032/140
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 23.]
Sir: I have the honor to observe that for the first time since 1930 a Foreign Minister of Japan has been able to deliver a speech* on the country’s foreign relations, as Mr. Hirota did on January 22, 1935, at the opening of the regular session of the Diet, and point with gratification to a real improvement—at least in one direction. The recent conclusion of the negotiations for the sale of the North Manchuria Railway has made this possible with respect to Soviet Russia.
In form Mr. Hirota’s speech was orthodox; in tone perhaps more than ordinarily optimistic; and in substance a model of carefully chosen expression cloaking at the same time a purposeful policy of undisputed leadership in the Far East. This policy, which is described by the Japanese as “the preservation of peace in East Asia”, has been [Page 46] enunciated so often that it hardly seems necessary to repeat it. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the basic factor with which all nations have to contend in dealing with Japan, whether it be in the field of naval disarmament, political questions or commercial and economic problems, it may be found of interest to review several of the public announcements made in this connection during the past year.
In his speech to the Diet on January 23, 1934,46 Mr. Hirota said: “We should not forget for a moment that Japan, serving as the only cornerstone for the edifice of peace of East Asia, bears the entire burden of responsibilities”. While this statement did not pass unnoticed, it was not generally taken up until repeated in more direct form by Mr. Amau in his now famous statement of April 17, 1934.47 He said: “… at the same time we consider it only natural that, to keep peace and order in East Asia, we must even act alone on our own responsibility …” Nothing could be clearer than these two announcements, following one another as they do.
The next reference to this policy is found in Mr. Hirota’s statement in his speech before the extraordinary session of the Diet on November 30, 1934: “I am very pleased to say that on the whole our relations with the various countries of Asia, Europe and America have grown increasingly cordial because better understanding now prevails among the Powers regarding Japan’s position in East Asia”. This is of particular interest in that it carries the implication of acceptance by the rest of the world of Japan’s policy and this is supported by Mr. Hirota’s remarks before the Diet two weeks ago in which he said: “Japan attachés great importance to her friendship with other states in East Asia, and counts on their participation in bearing the serious responsibilities for the maintenance of peace in this part of the world”.
Bearing in mind, then, the nature of this announced policy in the pursuit of which Japan has not hesitated to resort to force of arms and presumably will not hesitate to do so in the future, the repeated expressions by Mr. Hirota in the speech under consideration of good will, fraternal sentiments, non-aggression pacts, friendship, collaboration, cooperation and peaceful purposes may be viewed with perhaps a keener perception of the realities involved.
Paragraph by paragraph Mr. Hirota in his speech takes up Japan’s relations with the various countries important to her and with the outstanding question of naval disarmament. In most cases he deals with generalities and emphasizes Japan’s peaceful purposes; the same time, however, it is often possible to extract a kernel of fact from which a [Page 47] conclusion may be drawn as to the Government’s real intentions regarding the various problems.
In dealing with “Manchukuo” Mr. Hirota avoids any direct or indirect suggestion of recognition by other powers and contents himself with the simple statement that “the work of laying the national foundations of Manchukuo has been completed.” By implication the question of recognition is for the time being at least a matter of indifference to Japan. He emphasizes the economic importance of the new state to Japan as well as the ties of friendship which bind the two countries together.
Touching the question of the suspension of the preliminary naval conversations he says: “We sincerely hope for … the achievement of a new equitable agreement which will embody the principles of nonaggression and non-menace and effect an actual and sweeping armament reduction …”
With the United States “there exists no question … which is intrinsically difficult of an amicable solution”, and the “good understanding and cooperation between Japan and Great Britain constitute really an important contribution to the peace of the world”.
For the first time since his incumbency Mr. Hirota has been able to speak with a measure of guarded optimism about the relations with the Soviet Union. Referring to the impending settlement of the North Manchuria Railway question he says that the Japanese Government is planning “to accelerate the peaceful development of Soviet-Japanese relations by redoubling their efforts for the solution of other pending problems”, and he indicates that the first problem to be undertaken will be that of the establishment of a demilitarized zone along the “Manchukuo”-Soviet frontier. That this question is uppermost in the minds of the Japanese will be found by reference to Mr. Hirota’s speech before the Diet in January of last year in which he said that no difficult questions were encountered in Soviet-Japanese relations from the conclusion of the Peking Basic Treaty of 192548 even through the Manchurian Incident but that “recently the attitude of Soviet Russia toward Japan seems to have undergone a change … Japan is certainly setting up no new military establishments along the Manchukuo-Soviet frontiers”. And recently, in reply to an interpellation in the Diet on January 25, 1935, Mr. Hirota said: “I contemplate calling the attention of the Soviet Government to the status of Soviet defense in the Far East, particularly on the Soviet-Manchukuo frontier”.
At this point it is highly significant to note that the remarkable progress which Mr. Hirota has been able to achieve in the improvement of [Page 48] relations with Soviet Russia during the past year has come about only after the energetic militarization and defense of the Eastern Provinces by the Soviet Government and this fact may prove an object lesson from which other nations may well profit in dealing with Japan.
In describing Japan’s problems in relation to China, the Foreign Minister emphasizes the communist dangers abroad in that country, possibly with the intention of appealing to the other foreign countries. He also makes an indirect appeal for a termination of the anti-Japanese boycott in China. In connection with recent telegrams from Peiping regarding the rumor that Chiang Kai Shek has decided to adopt a policy of “coordination” with Japan, there may be a hint in this direction in Mr. Hirota’s statement: “I may add that the Japanese Government are glad to acknowledge the fact that… there is today a growing trend among the Chinese people to appreciate the true motive of Japan. While we will do everything to encourage this tendency, I hope that China will collaborate with us further in that direction”.
He finds the foreign trade situation, in which some countries have abrogated their commercial treaties with Japan to be “extremely regrettable” and he makes the following statement which in some ways may be considered as the most important statement in his speech: “For a country like Japan with a vast population on the one hand and meagre natural resources on the other, foreign trade constitutes an important peaceful means of livelihood”. The word “peaceful” gives this sentence its significance for it brings to mind the only possible alternative, namely that Japan would otherwise be driven to seek means of livelihood by force.
There follows a reference to the failure of the Batavia Trade parley and a conventional expression to the effect that it removed misunderstandings and clarified the respective positions of Japan and the Netherlands.
In conclusion Mr. Hirota mentions the fact that Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations will become effective on March 27, next, and exhorts the nation to exert itself in the pursuance of its policy and purpose.
Careful reading of the Foreign Minister’s address will reveal that however important may be the varied and widely diffused problems with which Japan has to deal, the all-important, the vital, inescapable factor in each one is China. It is Japan’s relationship to China and her intense pre-occupation with the chaotic political conditions there which basically govern her relations with other nations; and it is the policy of those nations in dealing with China which affects their relationship with Japan. It is this question which is at the root of Japan’s “preservation of peace in East Asia” policy; it is this question which has determined the course of the naval conversations at London; it is [Page 49] this question which all but brought Soviet Russia into open conflict with Japan and which, indeed, has done so in the past. The politico-economic struggle with which both the United States and Great Britain are engaged with Japan has its basis fundamentally in the question of China. Remove that question and Japan’s relations with the rest of the world would be as normal as those of other nations with each other.
In this connection I enclose an article49 by Baron Yoshiro Sakatani, member of the House of Peers, as it appeared in the Japan Advertiser of January 9, 1935. He develops this thesis in an interesting manner and makes several statements which assume considerable importance, especially when read in conjunction with the Foreign Minister’s speech. Baron Sakatani says that no close student of the preliminary naval conversations at London can fail to note “a dark undercurrent which poisons the minds of the delegations; and that current has its fountainhead in the discrepancies of opinions regarding the policy toward China”. He claims that the United States places over-emphasis upon the “so-called Open Door” in China and maintains that those British and American statesmen who fear that to give Japan complete freedom of action in the East would jeopardize their interests in China are under a grave misapprehension.
To those who may feel that Mr. Hirota’s avowal of peaceful purposes and conciliatory methods are to be taken at their face value, the following passages in Baron Sakatani’s article should be studied: “If England and America aim to form their own policies toward China independently of Japan, the two nations would be attempting a thing imprudent and unwise”. And, again: “One can imagine no greater obstacle to the peace of the world than that England and America, backed by their powerful navies, should assume the leadership in the Far East”.
Thinly veiled threats, these, and clothed in the language of diplomacy, but not to be in any sense ignored.
Respectfully yours,
- Embassy’s telegram No. 12, January 22, 3 p.m. [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.]↩
- Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. iii, pp. 9, 13.↩
- Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 224.↩
- Signed at Peking, January 20, 1925, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxxiv, p. 31.↩
- Not reprinted.↩