123 Bullitt, William C./179
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt), Temporarily in Washington, to the Secretary of State
Sir: I have the honor to report that in accordance with the Department’s instruction No. 186 of August 28, 1934,10 I left Moscow on October 10, 1934, to proceed to Washington by way of Siberia and the Far East. …
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Japan
In Tokyo I had many conversations with leading Japanese, including the Emperor, Hirota, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tsushima, Vice Minister of Finance, Shigemitsu, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fukai, of the Bank of Japan, and many other business men and bankers. All these conversations were so polite and formal in nature that they contained nothing of interest.
[Page 5]The Emperor talked vaguely about his love for peace and said that he welcomed greatly such visits as mine as he felt that mutual understanding was the basis for mutual confidence and peace, and that he hoped that as many Americans as possible would visit Japan. The Emperor’s facial “tic” is so severe, his hand clasp so weak, and his difficulty in speaking so great that he at first makes the impression of being a weakling; but when he listens he has a keen and understanding eye and a thoroughly alive and intelligent smile.
Hirota made one statement of some interest. He remarked that the Russians had been afraid of a Japanese attack. I replied that they had been but that they were no longer and that this was in part due to the fact that he was regarded as an advocate of peace and understanding. He replied that he was most certainly an advocate of peace and understanding, that he was convinced that the Chinese Eastern Railway negotiations would come to a successful conclusion and that war between Russia and Japan was out of the question. He said that he desired nothing but peace and peaceful development and added that he had the full support of the Emperor for his policy. He then said, “You know the unique position of our Emperor, his authority is so complete and absolute that no one can stand against his will. I have direct personal contact with the Emperor. Invariably before I make a speech in the Diet I show my speech to the Emperor and he approves it in advance. I know, therefore, that I am secure and that no one can do anything against me no matter how much he may wish to. I do not have to go through intermediaries but see the Emperor personally whenever I need to consult him.”
The heads of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, the Bank of Japan and various other financial and business leaders all said that the present financial policy of selling bonds to cover current deficits could, in their opinion, be continued for at least two years longer.
Tsushima and Fukai both expressed the hope that the United States would cease its silver purchase policy, alleging that the rise in the price of silver was dislocating their plans for financing the new undertakings in “Manchukuo” which is still on the silver standard.
In Tokyo I had one long and rather intimate conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Constantin Yurenev. He expressed the opinion that the negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway would reach a successful conclusion in the near future. He added that he anticipated no serious difficulties in regard to minor matters which would normally be negotiated during the next year. He expressed the opinion that the Japanese Government had given up all idea that it could now attack Siberia. He said that the Japanese not only were most apprehensive because of the superiority of the Russian air force but also that their artillery and communication services [Page 6] were not up to the mark. He said that the Japanese were making every effort to have these services in perfect working order by the Spring of 1936 and that he anticipated no threat of war from Japan until that time.
Yurenev then said that the Japanese were thinking more about war with the United States at the present time than they were about war with the Soviet Union. I suggested that this thought was consonant with the national approval of hara-kiri. He said that I must not underestimate the Japanese fleet, that the Japanese believed today that their fleet was actually stronger than our fleet. He asserted that the Japanese were convinced that ship for ship, man for man, and officer for officer, the quality of their fleet was so superior to the quality of ours that inferiority in numbers would count for little. He added that unquestionably the sailors and officers of the Japanese merchant marine were far superior to ours and that in case of war the personnel of the merchant marine would become extremely important.
In this connection it may be of some interest to note that several times in China present and former members of the Government made remarks to me which seemed to indicate that in many quarters in the Far East the belief prevails that the Japanese Fleet today is superior to our own.
China
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I saw also Doctor W. W. Yen, Chinese Ambassador to Moscow, in Peiping. Doctor Yen informed me that he would not return to the Embassy at Moscow to which he is now accredited. He expressed extreme fear with regard to the activities of the Japanese. He said that he believed that the Japanese would advance further into Inner Mongolia and that unless Chiang Kai-shek should concede everything that the Japanese wished in the provinces north of the Yellow River and Shantung, the Japanese would occupy those provinces. He added that in case of war between Japan and the Soviet Union, the occupation of China as far south as the Yellow River by the Japanese would be inevitable. He said the line of the Yellow River could be held by 50,000 Japanese whereas the line of the Great Wall would require many more. He expressed the belief that Chiang Kai-shek could not continue to hold out much longer against the Japanese and said that he believed that Chiang Kai-shek might soon realize that he could not hope for help from any western powers and that he must give in and accept Japanese tutelage for China. Doctor Yen said that, in his opinion, this outcome was inevitable unless England and the United States could agree on a joint policy with regard to China.
On November 18, I flew from Peiping to Nanking. On the date of my arrival I had a long conversation with Mr. Wang Ching Wei, [Page 7] President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, who seemed especially interested in conditions in the Soviet Union. I told him that the Russian Government was entirely secure, that the Russian Army had been built up to such strength that the Soviet Union no longer feared attack by Japan and asked him if there had been any improvement in relations between China and the Soviet Union. He replied that he could see no immediate basis for an improvement. He said that the Chinese Government had definite evidence that the Soviet Government, or at least the Third International, was supplying money to the Chinese communists by way of Shanghai and Hong Kong. He added that the behavior of the Russians in Sinkiang had led the Chinese Government to believe that the Soviet Government was contemplating an attempt to establish a Communist Government in Sinkiang, that the Soviet Government had interfered repeatedly in the internal administration of Sinkiang, and that the cessation of all Soviet activities in Sinkiang was a sine qua non for improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. He added that the Soviet Government repeatedly had broken agreements with the Chinese Government and that there was no confidence in China in Soviet good faith. He said finally that it was impossible for China to make any move whatever in the direction of improvement of relations with the Soviet Union because the Japanese had absolutely refused to have China make any such move and had threatened immediate military action if China should move toward a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.
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Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩