793.94/7566
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
In giving consideration to the question whether the American Government should at this time make some sort of diplomatic approach to the Japanese Government in regard to the situation in North China, it seems to this Division that there should be clarity of thought in [Page 464] regard to the objectives which the American Government should seek and those which it might expect to attain.
Our first objective should be the safeguarding of American interests, including persons, property, policy, influence, sanctity of treaties, and peace. We should do that which offers best hope of ameliorating the situation as contrasted with making it worse. We need to keep in mind the question of the record and of facilitating other action, if and when, in the future. We must keep in mind the fact that it is our constant policy to work for the safeguarding of the open door and the principle of respect for China’s political, territorial and administrative integrity. In deciding upon any step (positive or negative) we should envisage the step to be taken next in case the step taken at the moment has unsatisfactory consequences.
The situation is one in which the Japanese army is dictating Japan’s course and is proceeding according to its own lights and toward its own objectives. That army will work its will in North China until and except as it encounters resistance of force to force. Protests, whether by the Chinese alone or by other powers or by both, will have little effect on the Japanese army’s program unless and except as there stands behind those protests likelihood, in the Japanese estimate, of application of force in case the protests are not heeded.
This country has no intention of using force. Nor has any other of the occidental powers. The Chinese have some thought of resorting to force, but they are not likely to do so unless they get the impression that some one or more of the occidental powers will become embroiled and come in some manner to their assistance. Resort to force by the Chinese without the assistance of one or more foreign powers would probably result in political calamity to China and a much more extensive forward movement by the Japanese army than that army is likely to engage in in the near future if not thus challenged. Foreign governments should therefore be very careful to avoid giving the Chinese any ground for a false expectation of armed assistance or in any way encouraging them to resort to force as a gesture.
Mere representations on our part at this point would not cause the Japanese army to halt. Nor would representations by this and several other governments. Effort on our part to bring about a concert of representations would do more harm than good.
The one useful purpose which might be served by our making, on our own initiative and without collaboration with other powers, some carefully formulated representation would lie in the fact of our keeping the record clear and complete and signifying to all concerned that the American Government has in no way abandoned its fundamental principles and is not indifferent to situations which [Page 465] threaten disregard by other powers of them. In connection with any step taken for that purpose, it is important that we choose the most opportune moment. A step taken for that purpose should be taken neither too early nor too late. It should be taken when it will tend to clarify rather than to confuse and to reduce rather than to increase the tension inherent in the situation to which it relates.
Representations were made last week by the British Government to the Japanese Government, in the form of an inquiry with an express reference to the Nine Power Pact. The Japanese Government is reported to have disclaimed, in reply, any association with or responsibility for the “autonomy” movement in North China and to have disregarded the reference to the Nine Power Pact.
From point of view of the principle of cooperation and of parallel action among the interested powers, the American Government must consider whether or not it should follow suit. It should not, however, follow suit merely for the sake of keeping the record clear in that connection. Its decision should be made rather on the basis of the effect which it will have in regard to the situation in China and in Japan.
Any representation which we might make now should be so made, as to substance and method, as not to incite the Japanese army to increased vigor in the prosecution of its China policy and not to encourage the Chinese to armed resistance. It should be such as to be beyond the range of attack by those critics in this country who have charged the American Government in the past with “baiting” Japan. Unless we can make it such, it would probably be best for us for the time being to refrain from action.
The British Government has informed us of the action which it has taken, but it has not otherwise made any suggestion, express or implied, that we act. The Chinese Government has informed us of the protest which it has made to Japan and has asked for an indication of our attitude and, by intimation, of our intention. Except for these indications, it has in nowise been suggested from any quarter that the American Government ought at this moment and under existing circumstances to “do something”. The American press correspondents have been inquiring with regard to our intentions, but have not indicated an expectation or desire that we act. The editorial writers in the American press have commented in great numbers and repeatedly on the recent development in North China, have pointed to the renewed evidence of Japan’s imperialistic trend, of the Japanese army’s dominant position, of that army’s indifference to treaty obligations, etc., and to the menace of all this to the interests of other powers and to the cause of peace; but, in practically no case have they advanced the view that action by the American Government is called for.
[Page 466]We thus are in a position to make our decision on the basis, substantially, of what seems to us most practicable and expedient.
There are several possible courses which may well be given consideration, among which are: (a) to remain silent; (b) to make a statement to the Japanese Ambassador here; (c) to make an approach, in Tokyo, in the form of an inquiry, to the Japanese Foreign Office; (d) to make an approach in the form of an inquiry to several of the other interested governments, including, perhaps, Japan, China, Great Britain, and conceivably others; (e) to make a statement to the British Government; (f) make a public statement.
If we remain silent, we run the risk of there developing an impression that we are indifferent to the situation—which we are not—and of its being charged that there is inconsistency between our manifestation of concern in regard to the Italo-Ethiopian situation and our lack of manifestation of concern in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation; and we make it possible for the charge to be made later that we have been neglectful.
If we make a statement to the Japanese Ambassador here, we have no assurance as to what the Ambassador will give to the press or report to his Government.
If we make an approach to the Japanese Foreign Office, we may be sure that the Japanese army will make use of the fact for its own ends, and we run the risk of a snub such as the British Government has received in Tokyo.
If we make an approach to several of the other interested governments, we run the risk of misinterpretation in China, misconstruction and misrepresentation in Japan, and a chargé by critics in this country that we are “trying to start something”.
As the situation in North China is still highly fluid, it is believed that the moment has not yet arrived for making a statement in reservation of our rights; and it is believed that approaches in the form of an inquiry to any of the other governments would be essentially futile, might merely tend to inflame the situation, and might react to our embarrassment.
There remains among the possibilities indicated above one course of action which might be advantageous: that is, to make a statement to the British Government. At all times in deciding upon courses of action with regard to Far Eastern matters, we should keep in mind the fact that where common interests are involved cooperation or parallel action on the part of the American and the British Governments offers possibility of advantage. Experience has shown that it is difficult to have this cooperation. Both countries should, however, strive for it when and where possible. In the present instance, the British Government has acted, has informed us of its action, and [Page 467] has had a rebuff from the Japanese. It has not seen fit to inform us of the rebuff. We have given it no indication of our attitude. If now we were to inform the British Government of our view of the situation and our intention with regard to it, it is believed that several useful purposes would be served by our doing so: it would appear in the record that we have not been indifferent to the situation; it would be manifest to the British that we are sympathetic to the effort which they have made; it could not be charged later by the British Government that, at a moment when they have manifested concern, we have contented ourselves with an attitude of stony silence.
In the light of the above, it is recommended that we make a statement to the British Ambassador here and to the Foreign Office in London, with a memorandum, along lines indicated in the draft here attached.67
Also, it is recommended that, in order to signify to our public and to interested governments and publics abroad that we are not indifferent to and not overlooking the situation, and to dispose of the inquiries which are being made by press correspondents here, the Secretary make to the press for publication a prepared statement. A draft of a possible such statement is here attached.68