894.20/151
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Salisbury)8
There are many cliques in the Japanese Army, among which the two outstanding groups affecting the situation in Japan Proper at present may be designated by the terms (1) the Araki-Mazaki group or the Immoderates and (2) the Hayashi-Imai group or the Moderates. According to the source of information mentioned in the covering despatch, there are many other groups among the army officers of varying degrees of viewpoint. One of them is the Ugaki group which stands closer to the Hayashi-Imai group than to the Immoderates; and General Ugaki, now Governor General of Chosen, is gradually becoming more favorably regarded by army officers than formerly and the possibility of his becoming prime minister in the not very remote future is increasing. These informants were not sure with regard to the attitude of officers in Manchuria with the exception of that of General Minami, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador to “Manchukuo”, who, they were all confident, is close to General Hayashi of the Moderates. They were also not certain with regard to the attitude of the Japanese military officers stationed in China. One official said, however, with reference to the inflammatory statements issued by these officers from time to time that he had personally known General Tada, the new Commander of the Japanese Tientsin Garrison, that he had been greatly surprised at the inflammatory pamphlet which had been given to the press last month at a luncheon at which General Tada was host, and that he believed that such statements were issued because these officers felt them to be necessary in order to retain their prestige. Another official expressed the belief that the officers in Manchuria have been influenced by the “moderate” General Minami to some extent, while the officers in China Proper are still immoderate.
[Page 371]The Hayashi-Imai group is regarded by civilian Japanese as being composed of officers who are what army officers ought to be from the normal viewpoint and as intending to unify the army and to restrict its activities to the sphere which an army normally occupies. The Araki-Mazaki group is regarded as emotional and as entering into spheres in which an army, from the normal viewpoint, has no proper place. Although the Hayashi-Imai group is gaining strength, the Araki-Mazaki group is still the stronger of the two.
Two civilian Japanese officials stated definitely that the assassination during this past summer of General Nagata was not the sudden act of a discontented officer (Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa) but that the Araki-Mazaki group had had foreknowledge of the act and that General Nagata was killed because the Araki-Mazaki group hoped thereby to put fear into the Hayashi-Imai group because the latter had succeeded in ousting General Mazaki from office and in effecting thereby certain transfers and retirements which strengthened the moderate group at the expense of the immoderates. One of the results of the assassination was the resignation of General Hayashi as Minister of War and the compromise appointment to that post of General Kawashima, described by a Foreign Office official as “a dark horse” who had theretofore scarcely been heard of by civilians and who is thought to stand somewhere between the Moderates and the Immoderates in opinions. (There is a rumor current, though not confirmed, that Prince Chichibu, brother of the Emperor, who was transferred August 1 to Hirosaki, near Aomori, in northern Japan, was so transferred because the Moderates wished to make it impossible for the Immoderates to make any use of Prince Chichibu in any plot looking toward a change in the political situation in Tokyo. It will be recalled that the plot of junior officers of October, 1931, allegedly envisaged making Chichibu nominal dictator of Japan.) According to one of the informants, the suicide of Colonel Yamada, which followed the assassination of General Nagata, was due to his remorse arising from the fact that he had had prior knowledge of the plot to assassinate the officer but had done nothing to circumvent it. So active a remorse was induced by Lieutenant General Kiyoshi Imai, who succeeded the deceased General Nagata as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and who lectured Colonel Yamada for two or three hours on his iniquity in withholding his guilty knowledge.
According to one official, the methods of the Moderates are illustrated by their activities in connection with the elections of last spring for representatives for the prefectural assemblies. He stated that General Imai, whom this informant regards as the most significant of the Moderates and whom another official believes may become eventually Vice Minister and then Minister of War, urged General [Page 372] Hayashi, then Minister of War to instruct all reservist organizations to discourage their members from running for membership in the prefectural assemblies and not to vote for reservists standing for office. He urged this on the grounds (1) that reservists should not participate in politics and (2) that, if reservists were elected, they would be unable to do anything to enhance the prestige and the reputation of the Army. General Hayashi followed this advice, and as a result only three reservists out of a total number of some 200 reservist candidates were elected to membership in the prefectural assemblies. Presumably this was a source of irritation to the Immoderates.
These informants believe that there has occurred some decrease in the prestige of the Army among the people of Japan, but all were agreed that the mass of the people is still strongly behind the military. One of the informants, an official who traveled during the past summer on official business through the northern part of the main island, stated that he had found that enthusiasm for the military had waned somewhat in the rural districts. He also said that a number of his friends who had served three months’ periods during this past summer as reservists in areas outside of Tokyo had noticed an absence in those areas of reactionary officers, an observation which led them to think that reactionary officers were at present largely stationed in Tokyo. A Foreign Office official stated that Mr. Hirota, the Foreign Minister, can do nothing effective to decrease the power of the military, that gradually—very gradually—there is growing among the people an understanding of the injuriousness of the present military policy, but that civilian officials must move most cautiously in efforts to lessen the prestige of the military because of attendant danger. Another informant, who is deeply interested in politics and who intends to stand for membership in the Diet in 1936, expressed the belief that there would occur during the next three years a significant decrease in the prestige of the Army. According to one of the informants, the decreased prestige was indicated by the complete failure of the President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, Mr. Matsuoka, during the past two weeks to obtain any money either in Tokyo or in Osaka for investment in North China in accordance with the plans of the military.
None of these informants were very clear with regard to the significance to Japan which lies in the possible success of the Hayashi-Imai moderate group in gaining control of the Army. They seemed to think that it would not have much effect for some time on the present China policy but that their gaining control, together with a lowered prestige of the military, would make probable an eventual restriction of the activities of the Japanese military to “Manchukuo”. None of them believed that any change would occur soon enough to alter [Page 373] the plans of the Japanese military with regard to North China. None of them seemed interested in what is going on in North China and none seemed to have information in regard thereto. They were all agreed that there could be no withdrawal by the Japanese further than to the Great Wall. The informants in general anticipated that there would occur more assassinations within the Japanese Army.
There was noticeable among the informants a tone of resignation with regard to developments which may occur in the near future but a distinct hope for the somewhat distant future, a hope which seemed to envisage an eventual return to conditions somewhat approximating conditions which existed prior to the Mukden incident of 1931.
When asked to give their opinions with regard to the effect of the policy of the League of Nations and of Secretary of State Stimson9 with regard to the Manchurian situation, these informants stated that that policy had in no way restrained the Japanese military, had in fact strengthened the military by gaining the military additional popular support among the people of Japan, and had made it possible for the military to go further on the Asiatic mainland than they could have done or would have done if the League and Mr. Stimson had been less vocal. They seemed to be of the opinion that the Japanese military would have confined their activities to Manchuria if the Western powers had been more restrained in their attitude toward Japan.