Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1935, The Far East, Volume III

747.94/17

The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State

No. 26

Sydney, October 12, 1935.
[Received November 6.]

Sir: Following my recent visit to Canberra I have attempted, on the basis of my conversations there, supplemented by impressions gained in Sydney, to analyze and appraise the Australian Government’s view of its present-day relations with Japan.

1. As much as any one factor, Australian mistrust of Japan keeps the Commonwealth content not only to follow Great Britain (sometimes against its immediate interests) in the latter’s foreign policy, but to play the role of an active and willing partner in the Imperial association. When Mr. Lyons, the Prime Minister, said to me the other day “My Government will follow the British lead: I can never forget that some day Australia may find herself in Abyssinia’s present plight”, and when, in like vein, Mr. Menzies, the Attorney-General, in the course of a careful statement of policy before Parliament declared—”If we do not support Britain why should she support us?” both men were thinking of Japan and of Japan alone.

2. Relying as she does upon British help in case of Japanese aggression, it naturally follows that Australia desires to see the British Fleet as powerful as possible. This is particularly true in the cruiser category, where a marked British predominance would play an important role in keeping Australian communications free and open. Australia is obviously out of sympathy with our policy of demanding parity with Great Britain in the cruiser class and still more so with our policy of advocating a further (even if proportionate) reduction in the number of cruisers. I have found no sympathy with the conception of relativity in computing naval strength; logic to the contrary notwithstanding, Australia seems to prefer a large British fleet in the absolute sense even if it means a larger Japanese fleet.

3. Despite the near completion of the Singapore base, Australia still considers Britain’s present fleet undermanned and too weak adequately to protect her. She also questions whether America would come to her aid and cites our withdrawal from the Philippines as an instance of our growing disinterestedness in the Pacific. At any rate, with British strength impaired and with American aid doubtful, Australia considers herself driven by logic to “make friends” with Japan.

4. Another factor enters into the picture at this point, namely, Japan’s increasing purchases of Australian wool and her very large adverse trade balance with Australia. Japan is using this situation in every legitimate way in an attempt to force concessions from the Commonwealth, and so uneasy is Australia over the possibility (remote, it seems to me) of losing Japanese competition in her wool auctions and the Japanese market for her primary products, that there is a noticeable disposition to conclude a trade treaty with Japan even at the cost of considerable sacrifice. Negotiations to date have been unproductive, largely for the reason that Japan competes in the Australian market primarily with Great Britain, and concessions that would penalize British trade are considered both inadvisable from the political point of view and, as a result of the Ottawa agreements,² impossible from the legal. Could Australia find concessions at our expense that would satisfy Japan there is a strong possibility that she would grant them, so marked is her present resentment at our failure to purchase from Australia.

5. Australia believes that Japan must expand in some direction, and rejoices every time Japan becomes involved abroad, provided it is not in a southerly direction. Thus I have yet to meet an Australian who opposed Japan’s Manchurian policy or desired to see Japan out of Manchukuo. This view finds reflection in an idea which I have heard referred to in conversation by Mr. Lyons, and by several nonofficial Australians, that one of the greatest contributions that could be made to world peace would be some sort of a Pacific pact based on the theory that the present status quo in the Pacific represented a fair balance of strength which could well be perpetuated.

6. Meanwhile, although Australia is more than willing to negotiate directly with Japan on matters of trade, she is decidedly unwilling to negotiate directly with Japan on political matters. Hence her reluctance to establish diplomatic representation in Tokyo. Partly, I think this is due to a certain inherent inferiority complex of Australia in foreign affairs; partly to an absence of trained men; partly to a belief that Great Britain can speak in her behalf more forcibly than she could herself; and partly to a fear that Japan may some day publicly raise certain unpalatable subjects, such as Japanese immigration into Queensland, Japanese participation in the coastwise trade, etc.

7. I have been told in strict confidence by an Australian of promience, who is not a member of the Government but to whom the Government is beholden, that Japan some six weeks ago sent a note seriously urging Australia to reconsider her immigration policy; she even offered that if a Japanese immigrant should marry, or even consort with a white woman, he would at once be “recalled”. According to my informant, Ambassador Debuchi during his recent visit merely asked whether the note had been received, and did not push the subject further. I report this with considerable reserve, as I have to date had no confirmatory evidence.

8. Occasionally I have come across expressions of faint regret that the Anglo-Japanese alliance had lapsed, on the theory that while it lasted Japan could not possibly afford to endanger or even to embarrass Australia. Frequently, however, I have seen evidences of a belief that Australia stood definitely to gain from rivalry between Japan on the one hand and the United States on the other, with Great Britain acting as honest broker between the two.

9. With these varied elements of the picture before it I think the Department can understand the reasons for Australia’s reluctance to take a strong stand, similar to that taken by General Smuts,³ in favor of an Anglo-American alignment during the Naval Conversations in London last autumn.⁴ “We must give Japan no excuse to adopt an anti-Australian policy, either political or commercial” epitomizes Australian policy today.

Respectfully yours,

J. Pierrepont Moffat

2. Signed August 20, 1932; for British Act of Parliament to enable effect to be given to the Ottawa agreements, on November 15, 1932, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxxxv, p. 151.
3. Gen. Jan C. Smuts, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. i, pp. 299 ff.