893.00/13417: Telegram
The Second Secretary of Legation in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
Nanking, July 7, 1935—9
a.m.
[Received 11 a.m.]
[Received 11 a.m.]
196. Legation’s 338, July 5, 4 p.m.27
- 1.
- I have received no information here indicating the imminence of sweeping government changes. Ho Ying-chin told me yesterday that he might return to Peiping shortly although final decision had not been reached. Suma stated July 5 that he felt certain no important changes would occur at this time unless Wang’s condition should grow worse. A foreign adviser very close to Sun Fo and other party leaders who has been intimately connected with them for many years and whom I have found straightforward and reliable states confidentially that he is unaware of any move to place Sun in Wang’s principal post, that Sun himself is not furthering any such move and plans to leave in a week to spend the summer at Tsingtao. This informant thinks Wang’s illness, which is serious although not grave, is political only in that recent criticism and the impeachment of other officials reported in my 194, July 5, 4 p.m.,27 have so aggravated his ailments through worry that hospitalization became necessary. He states that Wang’s greatest danger of being ousted lies in a protracted absence from his duties. He and others consider Sun Fo a logical successor to Wang in case latter should leave office but he pointed out the possible difficulty with elements antagonistic to the Government if Huang Fu’s alleged weakness vis-à-vis the Japanese should be given [Page 297] the vindication implied in appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs although, on the other hand, such appointment might be the only means of retaining Huang’s valuable services in dealing with the Japanese should the conciliatory policy continue. He said that Chiang Kai-shek would never relinquish his own post in any manner indicating personal capitulation to the Japanese.
- 2.
- In latter connection he made observations which I think are worth noting. He said the Japanese know their aims cannot be realized until Chiang is made to “eat out of their hands” and that the Japanese military are determined to bring this about. Thus, unless Chiang should alter his attitude (which he said Chiang would not) the so-called settlement of North China questions would be ephemeral only and further incidents would occur there and elsewhere. He envisaged a probability, arising from Chiang’s recalcitrance and the insatiate nature of Japanese harassment coupled with the criticism suffered by the Government, that the Chinese would eventually attempt resistance. He stated that Chiang’s idea, which is being increasingly shared in official circles, is that the penalties of resistance can be no greater than those of acquiescence and that China is too big to be conquered, particularly if some helpful rapprochement with Russia can be effected.
To the Department and Legation. To Tokyo by mail.
Atcheson