761.9315 Manchuria/7
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that on his return from an inspection tour of “Manchukuo” the War Minister, General Hayashi, revived interest in the question of the Soviet-“Manchukuo” frontier. According to the press, in various interviews he stated that although there is no serious situation on the frontier at present, nevertheless Soviet planes continued to fly over the border area; he emphasized that the Kwantung Army now had two duties in “Manchukuo”, policing and national defense; he remarked that attention must be given to the continued military preparations being made by the Soviets along the frontier; and he linked these matters with the budget requirements of the army. At Shimonoseki he was quoted as follows by all the leading vernacular papers of Tokyo:
“Across the Manchukuo frontier the Soviet Union has concentrated a great army of 240,000 men and is erecting very strong defense works. The Japanese force to withstand them, on the other hand, is very small. The defensive lines of the Soviets can be seen from the foremost lines of the Japanese guards. Though there is nothing to cause a war between the two countries, the situation must receive close attention.”
At the same time that the several interviews with the War Minister were appearing in the press there were several reports current that the Foreign Office was on the point of opening negotiations for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and the appointment of a joint frontier commission. These reports are as yet unsubstantiated and in regard to them Mr. Hirota is said to have confined his remarks to the statement that for Russia to maintain such large forces on the frontier is both needless and harmful. Nevertheless the reports provided the army with an opportunity to disseminate its view that the proponents of a non-aggression pact were mistaken if they believed that the negotiation of such a pact would facilitate the reduction of national military expenditures. The military authorities are said to have stated that such a pact would provide no assurance of security. [Page 282] In their opinion it would be a dangerous substitute for military power; moreover, although the Soviet Union has concluded numerous nonaggression pacts in Europe, an increase rather than a reduction of armaments has followed.
Although there has been talk of a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Japan for some years, it is believed that the present is the first time that the issue has been publicly linked with the reduction of military expenditure in Japan. The Finance Minister, Mr. Takahashi, has apparently taken a direct interest in the matter. On June 19, 1935, Mr. Takahashi had an interview with the Soviet Ambassador although it is not known what transpired during their talk. Afterwards in a statement to the press he reiterated the thesis so often pronounced by the Foreign Minister that a solution of all pending problems should precede the negotiation of a non-aggression pact but he also stated that a settlement of the various economic issues between the two countries would facilitate a political settlement. He is further reported to have stated at a meeting of the Cabinet Inquiry Council that a non-aggression pact would be helpful in eliminating unrest along the border and that it would contribute toward readjustment of the national finances by reducing military requirements in “Manchukuo”.
The latest steps in the present, rather cautious, public exchange of views on the subject were first a denial by the Foreign Office that negotiations are in progress for the conclusion of a pact with the Soviets, although the hope was expressed that a situation favorable to such negotiations would develop, and second endorsement by an army spokesman of Mr. Takahashi’s opinion that pending issues must be solved first. Finally, when the Soviet Ambassador called on the Foreign Minister on June 26 to protest once more the shooting of a Russian cavalryman* on June 3, 1935, the Foreign Minister, according to report, made use of the occasion to propose the creation of a joint Japanese-Russian-“Manchukuoan” border commission. He is also said to have pointed out the beneficial effect in Japan which would result from a reduction of the Soviet troops in the Far East.
With this question concerning Soviet-Japanese relations being rather prominently aired in the vernacular press it might be expected that public interest would be aroused. This, however, does not appear to be the case. The public as a whole seems to have recognized in the controversy the usual preliminary skirmishings preceding the annual struggle for appropriations. Nor have the writers of editorials discussed the non-aggression pact issue. Only one paper, the Kokumin, has commented and expressed itself as follows: [Page 283]
“Now the people are profoundly distrustful of the Soviet Union which is amassing troops in the Manchukuo border districts. It is out of the question with the majority of us to conclude a pact with such a country”.
Whether the Kokumin has correctly interpreted the sentiment of the country as a whole or not is questionable; the policies of the Foreign Minister, which are directed towards the same general aims as are those of the army, have, as in the case of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the advantage of economy. However, the matter of a nonaggression pact is not now a live issue. There is at present no threat of imminent war with the Soviet Union; neither the Japanese military nor the Soviets, it is believed, are prepared for or wish a war. The attitude of the army is very likely largely motivated by financial considerations; apparently its primary interest in Soviet-Japanese issues at the moment is to use them to manipulate the situation within Japan to its own advantage.† For the time being at least, larger considerations, such as the deep-rooted determination of the army to be free of treaty commitments with the Soviets, are not to the fore.
Respectfully yours,