893.01 Manchuria/1257
The Consul General at Mukden (Ballantine) to the Minister in China (Johnson)39
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the general subject of “Manchukuo’s” unique international status and in that connection to report briefly concerning a series of interviews had within the past week with leading Japanese and Japanese “Manchukuo” officials in Manchuria by Mr. Denzil Clarke, former British Vice Consul at Mukden, who recently retired from the British foreign service and is now engaged in personal studies of Far Eastern affairs. Among those interviewed by Mr. Clarke were: General Jiro Minami, Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army and Japanese Ambassador to “Manchukuo”; Major General Kenji Doihara, head of the Japanese Special Mission at Mukden; K. Moriya and M. Tani, Counsellors of the Japanese Embassy at Hsinking; and C. Ohashi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the “Manchukuo” Government. The information recorded and conclusions drawn by Mr. Clarke from the interviews are in close accord with my own observations gained from recent conversations with Japanese officials, and, in view of his reputation as a careful student of Manchurian problems, are believed to be of considerable interest.
Mr. Clarke’s discussions in general centered on aspects of the recognition, or rather non-recognition, question, and the future possibilities of foreign business enterprise in Manchuria. The outstanding features of present Japanese psychology indicated by the interviews were: a [Page 152] pessimistic conviction that, despite the recent Japanese overtures to China, prospects of recognition by that country remain as remote as ever, due to the, allegedly, obstructive influence of Britain and the United States; frank abandonment of the pretense of Chinese ministerial authority in the “Manchukuo” Government and resort instead to rationalization of the Government’s anomalies on the basis of temporary expediency; and a very determined hostility to active participation of foreign firms in Manchurian commercial enterprise.
In connection with the recognition question, General Doihara, with apparent frankness, informed Mr. Clarke that his principal mission on his recent tour of China had been to acquaint Chinese leaders of all factions with the soundness and advantages of “Manchukuo” and to endeavor to persuade them of the wisdom of according de jure recognition. He had found some Chinese receptive to his appeals, but many had failed to respond. For the present he saw no possibility of recognition by China and felt there was little use worrying over the matter. Other officials interviewed showed even clearer evidence of disappointment in the results of the recent overtures to China. General Minami, as well as Vice Minister Ohashi and Counsellors Tani and Moriya, volunteered the opinion that China’s obdurate stand on the recognition issue was due to the unwillingness of Britain and America to give the necessary “lead”, without which China would never act, and the General further expressed himself as strongly opposed to the present “Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East which seeks to exclude Japan from the sphere of its activities”, as an element full of danger to the peace of the world. Mr. Clarke found officials at Hsinking apparently more concerned over non-recognition than Tokyo Government circles, and Mr. Ohashi in particular, who has always championed “Manchukuo” with justifiably paternal fervor, appeared to consider the foreign powers’ failure to recognize “realities” as almost a personal affront to his dignity.
In relation to the subject of recognition, the foreign powers’ distrust of the “artificiality” of the “Manchukuo” Government was discussed at considerable length with Mr. Ohashi and Mr. Tani. They both frankly admitted in effect that the Chinese who have been occupying the chairs of Ministers are nothing but ineffectual figureheads—due, they allege to the unavailability of capable Chinese for posts of high authority—who must nevertheless be maintained as a face-saving concession to Chinese sensibilities.* They appeared exasperated that western nations, apparently unable to appreciate the necessity for this deference to oriental psychology, should obstinately continue to regard such a recourse as a Japanese deception clumsily calculated to convince [Page 153] the world of “Manchukuo’s” independent status rather than in its true light as a temporary expedient which, in pursuance of Japan’s undertaken policy of “enlightened despotism,” must be employed until trained Chinese become available for high positions. Mr. Ohashi said that an order had recently gone out restricting the further appointment of Japanese as “Manchukuo” officials, that it was his Government’s permanent policy to train Japanese and Chinese indiscriminately for future employment, and that exhaustive efforts were being made to discover and develop Chinese talent. Both he and Mr. Tani professedly foresaw a time—admittedly after many years—when the population of the country would become so homogeneous that racial distinctions would be forgotten and officials selected without thought of racial origin. From these and general impressions gained in all his interviews, Mr. Clarke feels justified in the belief that intelligent Japanese have in general abandoned the practice of insulting foreigners’ intelligence with the fiction of “Manchukuo” independence and fallen back upon the doctrine of simple expedience, according to oriental standards, which, it is evidently felt with all sincerity, the Powers have no right to condemn. (Without necessarily questioning the sincerity with which Japanese idealists have advanced the theories set forth in this paragraph, it should be pointed out that Japanese have not in any of the countries to which they have immigrated in considerable numbers shown the slightest tendency to assimilate themselves in any degree with native populations).
Referring to the “Manchukuo” Government’s original statement to foreign nations regarding obligations under China’s treaties, Mr. Ohashi said that as the statement had been made unilaterally it could, he presumed, be canceled unilaterally. He also propounded the theory that the Nine Power Treaty, like the Washington Treaties, are now obsolete because, since their ratification, Soviet Russia has become a great power, thereby completely altering conditions; that any treaty becomes inoperative if conditions affecting it are changed and one party does not agree to revision or cancelation.
In respect to foreign business enterprise in Manchuria, Mr. Clarke was much struck with the evidence which his interviews disclosed of the intense hostility existing in Japanese official and business circles to foreign participation in the country’s economic activities. In interesting contrast to the reassuring tone of statements anent the “Open Door” and equal opportunity which used to be given publicity two years and even a year ago—none of the officials made any attempt to conceal the fact that further foreign commercial enterprise in Manchuria is not welcome and that even the continued presence of foreign commercial representatives still in the country is jealously resented. Mr. Tani referred to the unique case of a contract for construction of a [Page 154] government building in Hsinking recently given to a French firm as an experiment made at financial sacrifice for international considerations which had proved too costly and impracticable to warrant repetition. It was clearly the consensus of opinion of those interviewed that, in the face of intense inter-Japanese competition and existing economic policies, foreign enterprise must be confined to supplying, within the limitations imposed by Japan-”Manchukuo” bloc economy, such commodities as can not be supplied by Japanese firms, and that, moreover, to maintain the sales of such products, foreign firms will as a rule be faced with the necessity of withdrawing their own selling agencies from Manchuria and marketing the goods through the well qualified distributing systems of large Japanese firms. (In the latter connection, it may be observed that the desired exclusion of foreign selling agents, as distinguished from the exclusion of foreign products, is quite in keeping with Japan’s traditional aversion to permitting retention of any degree of management of her trade in foreign hands and with her present practice whereby, for example, Japanese silk is marketed in New York and American cotton purchased in cotton producing centers through Japanese firms exclusively.)
Mr. Clarke noted indications, however, that the authorities, in the carrying out of economic policies, are anxious to avoid infliction of drastic shocks to existing arrangements such as that occasioned by the ill-conceived oil monopoly. Apparently, while further “regulations” in respect to the sale of certain commodities are to be anticipated, no new monopolies are contemplated, at least for the present. General Minami himself stated that foreign interests need have no apprehension regarding establishment of other monopolies, since none are being even considered, and that he had advised the “Manchukuo” Government to proceed most cautiously with any “reforms” that might affect the sale of commodities. Speaking in the same connection, General Doihara informed Mr. Clarke that foreign firms would do well to keep in close touch with Hsinking’s plans for further economic reforms and endeavor to reach prior understandings with the authorities in order to eliminate the risk of later friction as far as possible.
Respectfully yours,
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Mukden in his unnumbered despatch of May 3; received June 4.↩
- In this connection reference is made to the Consulate General’s despatch No. 39 of January 18, 1935, entitled, “Administrative Machinery in Manchuria”. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩