894.00/544
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 18.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following analysis in amplification of my despatch No. 1255 of April 20, 1935, on the subject of the alleged strengthening of the liberal element in Japan. It will be recalled that that despatch reported a conversation with Foreign Minister Hirota in which he stated that the absence of any reactionary outburst to his recent announcement of no war while he is in office is a result of the common knowledge that he was directly expressing the views of the Emperor; that Mr. Hirota asserted that the democratic influence in the country is steadily growing in strength; and that, in spite of the Embassy’s inability to confirm the Foreign Minister’s stated conviction, an analysis of the situation would be attempted in due course.
A treatment of this subject which suggests itself is to consider the three questions (1) is Japanese policy less inclined toward war? (2) is the military losing influence? and (3) is democratic strength growing?
The trend of events in Japan in recent months has been away from a policy of war. The purchase of the Soviet interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway was effected peaceably, and in the press aftermath of the successful negotiations a tone of moderation and quiet in the relations of Japan and Russia has contrasted conspicuously with the inflaming tactics previously employed. Barga border incidents have been handled cautiously, penetration in Chahar has advanced without bluster, and in north and south China an improved Japanese position is sought by means of economic and political understandings. As for publicity against the United States Navy, for some time (except for an outburst of the last few days) the newspapers have not played up antagonistic items. The tenor of the press is clearly on the side of the methods of peace.
Nor is there cause for believing that this new exterior hides an inner belligerent intention. So long as the chief objectives are brought appreciably closer without fighting, war is unnecessary. Japanese policy appears less inclined to war than it did a year ago, and this waning of the bellicose spirit seems more than merely superficial.
To find Japan desirous of avoiding war, however, is quite different from asserting that the military is losing influence. The evidence points to a continuing preeminence on the part of the military. Certainly the resignation of Prime Minister Saito and the succession of [Page 149] Admiral Okada to his position, with the support of two uncompromising men in the present cabinet as ministers of war and of the navy, does not argue a movement toward civilian power. It should be remembered that the dominant military group, notably idealistic and convinced of its responsibility for the nation’s destiny, thinks in terms of ambitious plans which comprise no less than the future of the Empire. With so extensive a self-assumed field of action, justification for its existence and importance is not lacking even under a warless program. While peaceful methods are the methods now employed, the change of tone need not mean that the guidance of affairs is passing from the military to the civilian, and facts to indicate such a shift are absent. Continuing direction by the military is, furthermore, favored by the constitution of Japan and the psychology of the people.
Mr. Hirota has apparently convinced those in power that he can reach the Government’s objectives without war, at less cost. He is being given a try because the proposal has plausibility, not because the army is in eclipse. Under Mr. Hirota’s administration there has been no abandonment of the gains of the previous aggressive regimes. There has been no retreat. Japan’s foreign policy, in fact, maintains a strong arm under his guidance, in spite of his protestations of gentleness.
Whether a policy of peace will later lead to a decline in the influence of the military, which to regain its position might then turn in the direction of war, is a question for the future. The present despatch is concerned only with reporting existing conditions.
As for the specific question of whether democratic influences in Japan are increasing in strength, observers here would probably be unanimous in answering in the negative. Whatever the changes in political control, they have not thus far enhanced the powers of the people. The recent Diet was singularly outspoken, and a new tone adversely critical of the government and military was audible; but its efforts were strikingly ineffective. The Foreign Minister, however, probably had in mind a slightly different type of development when he spoke of the growing strength of the democratic elements, and to understand the statement a brief biographical digression is necessary.
Mr. Hirota is a native of Fukuoka, where he was born of a family of humble estate. As a young man he became a member of a patriotic society called the Kokuryu Kai, an organization which had its origin in Fukuoka at the time of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905, under the leadership of Mitsuru Toyama and Ryuhei Uchida, both of whom have since become conspicuous public figures in the chauvinist movement. An aim of the society was Japanese expansion in Manchuria. Throughout his distinguished career Mr. Hirota has maintained his [Page 150] membership and still continues the habit of consulting the leaders of the organization. This relation now works both ways. When Mr. Hirota tells the Kokuryu Kai that Japan is not in danger and that rabidly chauvinistic tactics are not necessary, he is able through the confidence which he enjoys at the society’s hands to restrain its activities. At the same time Mr. Hirota’s weight in governmental matters is enormously increased through the support of this powerful society. This is a new situation in Japanese politics. For the first time, a foreign minister who is not a soldier is nevertheless in a powerful position, having the organized backing of a strong civilian society. This is in fact an innovation which should not be ignored, although Mr. Hirota’s reference to it as a growth in democratic trend is far from exact from an American point of view. Mr. Hirota’s relation to the Kokuryu Kai also helps explain his other remarks about refusing the invitation of a political party which is in search of a popular leader. Like other Japanese patriotic societies, the Kokuryu Kai probably has very little faith in the political parties, and Mr. Hirota very likely does not envisage his future political career in such terms. He has been singularly successful in obtaining general confidence, and it would be strange if the frequently-suggested idea of his becoming the nation’s next prime minister were repugnant to him. His conversational remarks indicate that his judgment is against party politics as the course to this goal, and in this decision the present state of affairs in Japan bears out his shrewdness.
It is worthy of note that Mr. Hirota is fully conscious of the unique position in which he finds himself as a result of his membership in the Kokuryu Kai. In private conversation with me shortly after he assumed office, he discussed the fact with frankness and stated that in his opinion the support of the Kokuryu Kai would prove a factor of considerable weight in increasing his political importance. He realizes that his unusual backing is a strong lever in dealing with his colleagues in and out of the government. The months that he has been in office have produced many instances to show that his expectation in this respect, as stated in his conversation with me, was justified.
Mr. Hirota’s influence increases rather than decreases. He has publicly announced that there will be no war while he is in office, and no outburst followed this announcement. But at the same time the military group is not shelved. Many Japanese leaders no doubt now realize in retrospect that the country’s difficulties since 1931 have been multiplied by an unnecessary overriding of treaties. If a more restrained policy allows scope for Japanese interests without the costs of the last four years, the military party is sufficiently opportunist to give it a trial. It may well be that a tempering of the methods of [Page 151] Japan’s foreign policy, without significant change in its aims, is what lies ahead.
It would seem unwise to predicate American policy in the Far East on the hope of democratic developments in this country. The military should be kept in mind as still the strongest single element in Japanese affairs. But the fact that the leaders are persons of military training is incidental only. They are not primarily soldiers but are strong nationalists who, in a country in which the army is a popular institution which offers a career to talent, happen to have been trained as soldiers. They have no aversion to making use of non-military men such as Mr. Hirota when there is coincidence of nationalistic aim and reasonable promise of success.
Respectfully yours,