862.00/3539
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Germany (Dodd)90
The telegrams of the 8th and 12th of July91 give the decisive points in the drift here, but I am giving what seems to me a fair interpretation, although the letter can not reach you in time to be of any decisive value.
The apparent solidarity of the Stresa opposition to the Hitler attitude on armaments and the so-called East Locarno pact was substantially broken by the Fuehrer’s May 21 address. The von Ribbentrop92 negotiations in London seemed to be a great and almost sudden success, all Germans rejoicing. However, English opinion is by no means a unit, and the discussion which followed Hoare’s speech before the House of Commons on the 12th seems to indicate the usual English swing the other way.
My conversations with von Neurath on the 6th, von Ribbentrop on the 11th and François-Poncet (French Ambassador) on the 12th seem to me to show that the Hitler regime is bent on encircling Russia. Absolute control of the Baltic was the major point in the British naval agreement. If Russia begins naval construction on the gulf of Finland on a large scale, as is rumored here, the German 35% will not be regarded as sufficient. Further, the Chancellor has repeatedly said that he could make no arrangements with any Powers which might deny German advances into Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—“barbaric peoples,” he said to Sir John Simon.
[Page 338]The other means of encircling Russia is the entente with Japan which gives that country an almost free hand in Asia. The French Ambassador says that Japan might take Vladivostock and seize far eastern Russia and yet there would be no war in that zone. I have heard stories here that Japan actually intends to seize Vladivostock this year. The execution of his German program, according to reported conversations with von Bülow yesterday with a prominent German-American now here, depends on two things: 1. The gift to Poland of some Czechoslovakian and Russian annexations for the western end of the Corridor. 2. Simple maintenance of peace a few years. That is, the German expansion according to the Brest-Litovsk treaty of 191893 will be steadily carried out. The facts and attitudes here support this view. The people favor this, even though they may not like the existing régime.
The French, as all the world knows, wish to use Russia as a means of defeating the German expansion program. Consequently, the Stresa and League “front” of last April and the secret agreement between France and Mussolini. Although the Italian dictator has long been hated in France, the French Government does all it can to make him a counterpoise to the German dictator, far more powerful. And the evidence of the last six months shows Hitler to be somewhat more clever than his Italian model; but he has not abandoned Mein Kampf ideas. If France and Italy hold together and keep the Little Entente in line, they may carry their Russian pact into reality—even if England holds aloof. The Franco-Russian combination makes Czechoslovakia its front against Germany, just as Germany-Japan make their fronts on the gulf of Finland and Vladivostock. The Poles constitute the one risky factor. Their representatives here always say they will never yield a foot of the Corridor, although they frequently talk of their right to parts of Czechoslovakia and Ukraine. (The Germans want Poland to face the Black Sea.) Thus we have the old balance of power system of 1672–1914 in place of the cooperative system which Wilson thought to be a guarantee of peace and disarmament; and curiously enough England is in the position she has been for hundreds of years. The British-German naval agreement gives Hitler an advantage equal in importance to the Franco-Russian aircraft fields in Czechoslovakia.
Thus we have Europe stalled in a way which fairly guarantees peace for some years to come—Mussolini’s African game being the danger point. However, I am fairly certain that Mussolini will not risk too much in Abyssinia. Most German leaders here are very hopeful that the Italian dictator will go to war and lose half his [Page 339] power. This would give the Nazi Party another chance to seize Austria. But the Austrian Minister here told me on July 12 that the Hapsburgs will be slowly brought back to power in Vienna. That, he said, is their one promise of independence. As I said in my telegram of the 8th, even von Neurath protests against Hapsburg restoration. Prince Louis Ferdinand, the cleverest and only popular Hohenzollern, said in my house on the 9th of July in strictest confidence that the Hohenzollerns had no liking for the Hapsburgers, but they prayed for their restoration—and actual restoration in Vienna would stir immense interest here in favor of the Crown Prince and give Hitler a serious problem. The army officers generally incline towards the Hohenzollerns and a parliamentary system. Nobody favors Wilhelm II, though he talks always as if he were the only royalty to be entrusted with power. All this only tends to balance off the rival forces of the Continent, England looking on through her ancient eyes.
What gives me most anxiety is the increasing aggressiveness of Japan. If that continues, the Far East will force the United States to face that way in helpless manner. The first great cause of this sad world complex was the failure of our country to recognize the real state of things in 1920. The second was the Franco-Italian armament program which gave Hitler his chance. The third blunder was the British refusal to act when Japan seized Manchukuo; and present-day economic nationalism tends to fix things everywhere. All of which gives us a prostrate world, with the Nazi dictatorship moving toward the domination of Europe and the Japanese dictatorship dominating the Far East. This will tend to draw North and South America into a similar zone, which would mean England’s ultimate loss of Canada, India and Australia, and find herself unable to restrain Germany. If English statesmen are not most careful and courageous, their country will begin the course in history which Holland experienced after 1713—reversion to a third-rate Power.
Since I began this summary of the situation in Europe, I have noted that the Germans are increasingly troubled about the Hapsburg possibility, and they begin to fear Italy will decide to give up her foolish plan against Abyssinia. Today I noted increasing anxiety of representative Germans, who know Hitler’s purposes. An eminent editor who consults Schacht and others declared that Germany would not agree to support Secretary Hull’s demand that the Kellogg Pact be kept. It is my opinion that if England and France cooperate, the United States will stop the planned war. It would be a great thing, and it would tend to maintain the delicate balance of powers in Europe. If Germany refuses to support the Kellogg Pact as against Italy, it confirms the general belief in their disavowed aggressive attitude.
- Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Germany as an enclosure to his letter of July 17; received July 26.↩
- Telegram of July 8 not printed; for text of telegram of July 12, see vol. i, p. 77.↩
- Joachim von Ribbentrop, Special Ambassador at Large for Adolf Hitler.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. i, p. 442.↩