611.4231/1257

The Chargé in Canada (Baldwin) to the Secretary of State

No. 90

Sir: I have the honor to refer to telegraphic instruction No. 108, September 21, 2 p.m.,14 with regard to the pending trade negotiations [Page 23] between the United States and Canada, and to enclose for the strictly confidential information of the interested officials a copy of a memorandum prepared by the Minister of his conversation with Dr. O. D. Skelton, Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, on this question.

Respectfully yours,

La Verne Baldwin
[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Minister in Canada (Armour)

I called on Dr. Skelton this morning by appointment and informed him of my conversation with Mr. Hickerson the previous evening. I told Dr. Skelton that I thought it would be very useful if the State Department could be given through Mr. Herridge, at any rate a rough idea of what concessions the Canadian Government was prepared to make on American products under the trade agreement. I pointed out that possibly they might be able to submit their list on the distinct understanding that it was of course subject to the Prime Minister’s approval, but that I felt it would be difficult for the President to give his final approval to our list of concessions if he did not have at least a pretty good idea of what concessions the Canadian Government on its part was prepared to make.

Dr. Skelton felt this to be a perfectly reasonable suggestion, but wondered how it would be possible for them to put it into practical effect. After thinking it over, however, he said that he would make an attempt to get in touch with the Prime Minister and see if it would not be possible for them to accept the suggestion.

He said it was most unfortunate that they had not had one or two more days with the Prime Minister before he left as this would have enabled them to get his final approval. As it was, they were not expecting him back until the end of next week, but nevertheless he would see what could be done to comply with the State Department’s wishes.

I asked Dr. Skelton what on their own list they felt to be the essentials; not, I said, that I would interpret his answer as meaning that articles not mentioned were unessential, but that I merely wished to know the articles on which they placed the greatest score.

His answer was cattle and Douglas fir. As to cattle, he agreed that the results were what the Canadians were interested in and that the formula or procedure by which these results were arrived at, that is to say, whether by quota or some other formula, was not he felt so important, and if the quota method would make it easier for the American government to secure approval of the cattle people he could see no objection to it.

He said that he did feel that some concessions that would be pleasing [Page 24] to the Maritime Provinces were also essential. We had, it is true, suggested concessions on halibut and were willing to “freeze” lobsters on the free list, but potatoes of course constituted the most important item so far as New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island were concerned, and some concessions on cod would be most helpful in order to placate Nova Scotia. He said that he understood the difficulties confronting us on both these articles. With this end in view they had prepared a formula by which he thought we might do something for their “seed potatoes” and hoped very much that our Government would see its way clear to carry out this suggestion.

Dr. Skelton said that he felt that this was certainly the propitious moment to put through the agreement and that every effort to this end should be made. I expressed some surprise at certain remarks I had seen attributed to the Prime Minister in his speeches in the west, notably to the effect that he asked for a mandate from the people in order to put through a trade agreement with the United States after the elections, and asked whether this meant that he no longer entertained the earnest hope that he had expressed to me, particularly on August 13th last, to see the trade agreement concluded at the earliest possible date. Dr. Skelton said that he felt that this remark might be explained as meaning that if no agreement was actually reached prior to the elections the Prime Minister wished to protect himself for the future; that he knew that the Prime Minister still hoped very much to see an agreement concluded along the lines indicated as soon as possible and he, Dr. Skelton, personally felt that this was the time to do it He also felt that an agreement concluded with the Conservative government, whose past history of course had shown it to be less in favor of tariff reductions, had certain advantages over a similar agreement concluded with a Liberal government if such were to come into power which, of course, had always stood for some form of tariff reductions. In other words, he voiced the idea already expressed by others (but coming from Dr. Skelton this opinion, I think, carries with it a particular significance). Dr. Skelton said he was leaving for Toronto tonight but would endeavor to get in touch with the Prime Minister before his departure and would communicate with me, he hoped, later in the afternoon or early evening.

  1. Not printed; it instructed the Minister in Canada to proceed to Washington in connection with trade agreement negotiations (123.AR52/345).