765.84/1502
The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that this evening I saw Signor Mussolini at the Palazzo Venezia, by appointment. The request to see him was made after my recent return to Rome, and on last Saturday he advised me he would receive me today. I arrived at five o’clock, was kept waiting fifteen or twenty minutes, and left at six fifteen.
It just happened that the time of my engagement coincided with the development at Geneva which contemplated the imminent report of the Sub-Committee of Five assigned to the study of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.
I told him that I had come to pay my respects after an absence of a considerable length of time. After an exchange of personal courtesies I said that I had no instructions from my Government to talk with him and that my Government did not know that I had an appointment with him and had no knowledge of my intentions of speaking with him, I asked if I might speak as an individual and without in [Page 753] any way involving my Government. He said that I might speak in that way.
I said I wanted to be sure that he fully understood my conversation and asked if he preferred me to speak English or French. He said French would be better; so from that point the conversation proceeded in French.
I proceeded to say that I thought that he had today one of the greatest opportunities that any man could have. The position in which he found himself and the circumstances which existed offered him a chance to exert a great influence and do a very great service.
I proceeded to take up the matter mentioned to you in my 572, September 12, 5 p.m. I also had in mind your 143, September 14, 2 p.m.,73 from the second paragraph of which I assumed that there was no prohibition placed upon me in the matter. Acting entirely on my own authority and specifically so stating and announcing that I was speaking as an interested and active student of European politics and anxious to see an adjustment not only of the present difficulties but of the complications which continually threatened the peace of Europe, I proceeded to outline my thoughts.
The Conference at Geneva is proceeding. Most of the Governments in the world are represented there. They are all frightened that war is imminent and afraid that it may spread.
They are in the mood to make some kind of mutual concessions for the common good and to prevent an outbreak of war. A subcommittee of the League is just about to bring in a report making a proposal to Italy and Abyssinia for a sort of compromise in order to avert hostilities.
In other words, the stage is set, and the psychology is correct for a movement to be made calling for mutual concessions on the part of the interested Powers with the possibility that the scope might be extended to include the important elements of European discord as well as the difficulties in Africa.
One of the troubles with the European situation is that these elements are not treated as a whole. They are taken up piece-meal. They recur, one by one, from time to time, and develop into clashes of interest which keep the whole of Europe in a state of political unrest. No attempt has been made to weave them all together and to eliminate at one time the major causes of trouble.
Referring to this situation and mentioning the anxiety which prevailed in Geneva and the desire which must be present there to make some mutual concessions in order to avoid the conflict which apparently every nation desires to avoid, I said that the nations in attendance at the League meeting were held together by a common thought, [Page 754] and I believed any of them would be willing now to make some concession in the interest of general security and peace.
I approached Mussolini with an appeal to his alleged pacific intentions, with an appeal to his vanity, and with an appeal to his sense of the dramatic. I pictured the drama of his refusing a compromise offered by Geneva but immediately taking charge himself of the whole proceedings and making his own proposal as a supplement and demanding that the other Powers make some concession comparable to his. I appealed to his vanity by calling it his own idea—his Four Power Pact—his arrangement between Italy, France, England and Germany, the abortive pact which has never become operative but which might be used by him to further this program. I appealed to him in the ways which, as I understand him, are most apt to interest his understanding, sympathy, and support, with the hope that through those emotions might lie the way to induce him to consider some sort of compromise and pacific settlement. As I went through the recital he made only one or two interruptions. For the rest, he sat with rapt attention and an intent look upon his face. He betrayed no emotion. The expression on his face was fixed. His eyes were immovable and his attention was complete. I doubt if he had ever even in his own mind woven together all the elements of discord in Europe with the related problems of Africa. There was the necessity for German expansion. There was the necessity for Italian expansion. There was the independence of Austria. There was the right of Germany to arm. There was the air Locarno and the hope of reduced armaments. There was the security of France against attack by Germany. These were all woven together about Europe and Africa. The contributions to be made were that Italy should renounce some of her ambitions, even with the thought that the low-land tribes in Abyssinia might not consent and that he might have his little war anyhow. There was the contribution of Germany to guarantee the independence of Austria. There was the contribution of France to agree to the armament of Germany. There was the contribution of England to return part of Germany’s African colonies. And there was the concession of England to join in an air pact to include Italy, which she has heretofore refused, having limited her proposal to France and Germany.
If it could be done, it would eliminate the constant irritation about German aspirations in Austria. It would eliminate the continuing French fear of German aggression, which is the football of politics in France and used by the intermittently reappearing members of the Cabinet as one of the means to maintain themselves in political control. It would provide for the systematic reduction of military establishments. It would provide an opportunity for the reduction of tariffs and obstacles to commerce and some sort of related stabilization [Page 755] of monetary values. It would provide for realizing the expansionist aspirations of Germany and of Italy. It would take out of Europe the major points of clashing interest and re-introduce an era of limited armament, peace, and commerce.
I was saying that the Governments represented at Geneva are now held together by a common thought, and I believed any of them would be willing to make some concession in the interest of general security and peace, and that Geneva was about to make him some proposition of conciliation and compromise.
He interrupted to say “The compromise will not be acceptable.”
I then continued, “I understand that to be the case, and let us assume that you do refuse; that you say, ‘I will not accept the proposal’; but that you then take charge of the negotiations and say ‘I have a proposal of my own to make to you. I will make certain concessions provided each of the great Governments in Europe will make concessions.’”
I suggested that he limit his ambitions in Ethiopia to the extent of leaving intact that part of the country which was the original Ethiopia, as indicated upon the maps which he had filed along with his memorial with the League of Nations, with certain additions to the South and Southwest, and that by agreement with England and France he occupy or take over a large part of the remaining territory but that the original Kingdom of Ethiopia be continued as an independent state.
That was to be his contribution to the general cause. Instead of proceeding to take over the whole territory he would himself suggest a renunciation of some of his objectives provided each of the western Powers would make some contribution of their own to the general cause of peace and proceed to eliminate the principal and recurring causes of war in Europe as well as in Africa. His contribution was based on the thought that he had proceeded with his military plans and that his soldiers were there and that his needs for territorial expansion had been admitted in various quarters.
It was then proposed that he demand of England and France certain concessions on their part. England was to agree to return to Germany a part of the former German colonies in southeast Africa.
At this point he raised up his hand and said, “England! Return colonies! It is to laugh! England would never return anything!”
I replied that he might find an unexpected willingness to cooperate and that he should demand of the other Governments that each of them make some contribution and that that would be the contribution of England. Germany would then be brought into the discussions. His own Four Power Pact would be operating. In case Germany should receive her colonies she would agree, as the quid pro quo, to guarantee the independence of Austria; that England, France, and [Page 756] Italy should then admit the right of Germany to have the land and air armament which she now had and which existed as a matter of fact and that this would be the contribution of France. That the four Governments, England, France, Italy, and Germany, should agree immediately within fifteen or thirty days seriously to attend a conference for the reduction of their respective armaments and that the principles of Locarno be extended to the air and to include all four Governments, and at the same time to have another conference to consider stabilization amongst their currencies and the reduction of duties and tariff barriers.
In this way each of the four great Governments would be making contributions, and each of them would benefit proportionately, all of them having the prospect of a long period of peace in Europe and each of them gaining something direct and specific: Germany, her colonies; France, her security against attack from Germany reinforced by the air Locarno and with reduced German armies; Italy, the independence of Austria; and Italy and Germany, their right of expansion and an enlarged sphere of activity in Africa, and all without the war.
To all this he had listened attentively and with an apparent deep interest. His position did not change while I spoke, nor did he interrupt except for the two instances mentioned. When I finished he continued to regard me for a moment, then sat back in his chair, and in a very quiet voice said, “It is too late. My plans have developed too far. My soldiers down there could not be controlled. They would act on their own account, and what could I do with my army of a million?”
He then proceeded to elaborate upon the situation and to make a long historical review. He said that the Ethopians had a feeling of superiority as regards the Italians, which had started at the battle of Adowa and that the effects of it had been a source of irritation to Italy and had caused great difficulty in the Italian colonies, because the Ethopians thought they could act with something of contempt toward the Italians; that the celebration of the victory at Adowa was the national holiday of Ethopia and that each celebration was a matter of offense to Italy.
He then made a discourse of some length upon the nature of the people in that country and analyzed the component elements of the population, saying that of the ten million inhabitants seven million of them were subject races and slaves, and the subject races were subordinated to the ruling class and were similar to slaves in that they were not free; that the remaining three million of the population were the ruling element and were a very strong war-like race of mountaineers who were wonderful fighters and adversaries. They had subjugated all the surrounding tribes but they exercised no continuing influence or control over them from the point of view of political or [Page 757] governmental authority; that the people were illiterate, wild, barbarous, and in no way entitled to consideration by or respect of civilized nations, for Ethopia was not a nation but an aggregation of slaves under a barbaric control.
Mussolini then proceeded to the question of sanctions, and he showed every indication of strong, deep feeling and some anger. He mentioned one by one the activities of France in Morocco, where he said the natives had been murdered by the wholesale, and that within the last few years, and without any public outcry or expression of pity, and that there had been no mention of sanctions; the Chaco War, for which various efforts in settlement had been made but that there had been no conversation about the application of sanctions; that action of Germany in violating the Treaty of Versailles during the present calendar year, and about that there had been no talk of sanctions; the action of the English in Irak four years ago in the course of which by their ruthless methods the inhabitants had been literally massacred, and without a word of protest from the public, and without even a mention of sanctions; the matter of Japan and her operations in Manchuria and in other parts of China in which they had infringed upon the sovereignty of China which was not a disgraceful or a barbaric state and that there had been not one word of sanctions; and that today in northwest India England is shooting down natives who rebel at her methods, and not a single criticism is levelled at her and no mention of sanctions; but when Italy (and here he sat up in his chair, raised his voice, wrinkled up his forehead, tapped his breast with his fingers, and looked at me with a direct intensity), “But when Italy proceeds to rectify wrongs which have been committed against her and to secure the rights of her colonies and to proceed to a legitimate expansion—which even England has recognized—when I proceed, they talk about sanctions!”
He then calmed down again and proceeded slowly in a quiet voice but determined manner to say, “It is too late to talk of compromise. It is too late to withdraw any of my plans for operation in East Africa. I will proceed. I will not interfere with anyone. I do not expect anyone will interfere with me. But I will not permit interference. I have one million men under arms in Italy. I have a competent navy. I have an air force with a certain superiority. I will not permit interference from any source.”
He then followed this line of conversation: he said it is too late to talk of the things I had suggested and it is not timely as they involve European questions. This is purely a colonial matter for Italy. It must continue as a colonial and local matter. If it is continued that way, just as was the action of France in Morocco, there is no need for it to involve anybody. As soon as it ceases to be a colonial matter it becomes a European matter, and as soon as there are European [Page 758] developments in a colonial matter it assumes a very complicated character. So that the only thing to do is to keep it a purely colonial matter, and if nobody interfered with him, he will interfere with nobody, but will proceed along the ways that he had planned and arranged.
He then referred to American history. He said that we had no very bad neighbors but that we had had from time to time, and that our history proved that we would insist upon and secure proper treatment of our nationals near the border and protect them from raids and molestations. He recalled the war with Spain over Cuba and remarked how roundly we had beaten Spain, who was at that time a bad neighbor. He mentioned the Civil War and said that the north had given a supreme effort and had beaten the south. He referred to our difficulties with Mexico and said that when that bad neighbor had harassed our borders, we had not hesitated to show our superiority and protect our interests. And he said that he thought that if America was troubled with neighbors like Abyssinia, who maltreated American citizens and disturbed the Government, America would feel the same way. The fact was that Italy had a very bad neighbor and had tried for a long time to live in amicable relations with her but that it was no longer possible to do so. He was proceeding to take care of Italian interests in the Italian colonies in East Africa and would render them secure from any further attacks and from any further indignities at the hands of the Ethiopians.
He added that Abyssinia would be civilized and opened up to commerce of all the nations after order had been restored. European and American capital and cooperation would be welcomed and business relations rendered secure.
I then referred to the reflection on the League and the diminished influence of that organization in the future if Italy proceeded in spite of its objections. He denied the League would suffer. He said he would not withdraw from it. That the League would continue and Italy with it. He then referred sarcastically to Egypt and asked, “Why is Egypt not a member of the League of Nations?” and answered the question by saying “Because England will not permit her to be.” He said that he had no criticism to make of the British Empire or the way it was built up. He said that that was done in former times but that many of its peoples were still held in subjugation. While he had no desire to criticise England, he did not want England to pass judgment on him and would not admit her right to criticise him or his methods in Abyssinia.
Several times during the conversation I interrupted his remarks at pertinent points and reverted to one phase or another of the suggestion I had made, making arguments designed to appeal to the opportunity [Page 759] which presented itself to him to settle not only the African question but all the important elements of the complicated European situation.
His responses were always reasonable and well considered but invariably negative as regards conciliation and definitely opposed to any compromise of any kind. His principal reactions to my suggestions were that it was a colonial matter and must be kept as such and that it was now too late, because of the advanced stage of his military preparations, to consider any compromise. As regards his remark that it was “too late” I must comment that it has always been “too late.” He determined on this venture several years ago. In the summer of 1934 factories were working three shifts on war material, orders had been placed for cloth for uniforms for a large army and half a million sun-helmets were in process of manufacture, all of which I reported at the time. So that it was “too late” in 1934—and, of course, it is “too late” in 1935 to stop a war which had been conceived two years or more in advance, prepared for in the intervening time, and which is now ready to proceed.
His antagonism to England was marked. His sarcastic ejaculation that England would give up nothing in the way of colonies, when I projected the release of the former German colonies; his ironic reference to Egypt and her non-membership in the League of Nations, are indicative of his entire mental attitude toward England. There was apparent an ill-subdued hostility toward Great Britain as such, not only as regards her opposition to his plans in Ethiopia. He seemed to personify that marked hatred of England in all its manifestations which is a distinct feature of all Italy today. The reflections of that sentiment in the press are mild in comparison to the outspoken hatred one meets everywhere in Italy and in every walk of life—though it is to be remarked that that feeling is not universal, for some of the upper class are fearful of the impending clash and express great respect for England’s power. But the Duce this afternoon was the epitome of a national antagonism.
He finally rose, and we walked slowly to the door. As I left him I impressed upon him again and asked him to remember that I was not this afternoon the spokesman of my Government and that I had broached the subject to him purely out of my understanding of European politics and out of my personal desire to be of service if possible in avoiding what had many characteristics of being a very great complication in Europe. He said that he understood and that he would consider it as such. He shook hands warmly, smiled genially, thanked me for my interest—and I left.
During this interview there were lacking any indications of the histrionic which have characterized some of my other interviews with him in the past. There was no play-acting at all. He was suave, [Page 760] courteous, quiet, simple, direct, from time to time forceful, very expressive. Occasionally he gave evidences of temper, but never lost perfect self-control. Throughout it all he gave the definite impression of a calm, quiet, determined man who had made an irrevocable decision. There is no turning back nor turning aside. Mussolini intends to proceed in Abyssinia, insofar as the physical possibilities of his army, navy, and air force will permit, over any obstacles and in spite of any interference. If he is to be prevented, it will be by force of arms, and not by persuasion. His manner in speaking of his army, his navy, and his air force, left no doubt that the man is supremely confident of his ability to handle the situation and to handle England too in case she should attempt to prevent his actions.
In holding this conversation I realize that I engaged upon an undertaking which was dangerous in that it might have been used—might still be used—as a pretext for involving the American Government. I realized that when I decided to talk to him on the matter. However, I was prepared to act immediately in an effective way to disconnect the American Government from any complicity whatsoever, and I will be ready to conduct myself in a convincing manner in case the necessity develops. However, I do not expect any such contingency to arise. In the first place, I obtained Mussolini’s consent to proceed in my individual capacity. In the second place, I doubt if he could use the incident to any advantage to himself or to his Government for the simple reason it would be additional evidence he had refused to consider another proposal for peaceful settlement.
However, I report the matter fully to you but do not ask you to approve my action or anything I may have said. I report simply as a matter of which you should be advised.
If I need to invoke any justification for my unauthorized action I will simply say that in the situation which exists I feel that any person with a full comprehension of the dangerous possibilities to European peace with contacts with persons in authority would be neglectful of his highest duties if he failed to do what he could to contribute to an understanding. I only regret that I have failed to achieve anything.
In closing I desire to call your attention to two phases of this interview which have singular political significance.
First. This proposal I made to Mussolini offered him a perfect road of escape. Instead of accepting an offer of compromise from the League I proposed to him the thought of an alternative which would have improved his diplomatic position, which could have been used to gain him credit in the world, which would have given him the offensive in the “battle for peace”. It would have permitted him to shift his entire position and have enabled him to sit back and watch [Page 761] others accept or refuse to compromise. Their refusal would have helped to justify him in the light of world opinion. It offered him a perfect “out”.
He does not want an “out”. He does not want a way of escape. He proposes to go straight ahead, in spite of everybody and against anybody.
His refusal to accept a suggestion which could, in those circumstances, be put to very great use in bolstering his esteem in world opinion, is very significant.
He is adamant. He is irrevocably determined and serenely calm and is riding into the face of a storm which will either ruin him and bring disaster to his country, or raise him actually to that pedestal where he is sentimentally placed by his fanatic adherents.
Second. One of his first remarks when I had finished speaking was, “What would I do with my army of a million?” And what would he do? To disband them would create merely a million unemployed. To stop war orders at the factory would throw others out of work and increase the number of idle, add possibilities for local discontent, and foment trouble. He now has no unemployed, everybody is busy, and the entire country organized. Economic necessity is driving him forward. Hope of fame and riches in Africa is lighting the way. The grandeur of Empire and the dream of glory buoy him up. His determination to fight his way through the encirclement of economic poverty and his fear of facing the social, economic and political phases of a volte-face have lined the road of his advance.
Respectfully yours,