765.84/2943: Telegram

The Chargé in Ethiopia (Engert) to the Secretary of State

208. I have so far purposely refrained from commenting on the military situation because in the first place the very sketchy information furnished by the Government has often proved unreliable; secondly, [Page 690] the different phases have been extremely puzzling even to the military experts; and thirdly, all readily available material as well as many flights of imagination have been cabled in great detail by the news agencies.

However after 2 months of warfare and considering that the campaigning season will be over in another 4 or 5 months at the most it may be useful to summarize the situation as far as can be ascertained here from personal observations and reasonably trustworthy sources.

(1) Despite Italian threats and obvious military preparations the Emperor, in order to avoid giving Italy any pretexts and to prove his good faith to the League, delayed general mobilization until the last possible moment. Although there had been minor troop musterings and movements since last May no large scale levies were made and hardly any arms and munitions were bought even in the few countries which permitted such exports to Ethiopia. This greatly retarded concentration of main armies especially in the North and accounts for the fact that the Italians have so far not come in contact with large forces. It is not that the latter have fallen back but that notwithstanding marches they are only now beginning to reach areas where a definite stand is expected to be made.

(2) Fortunately for the Abyssinians unusually late rain storms in October and November both in the North and in the South impedes Italian progress to a considerable extent while they had much less effect on native movements unhampered by elaborate transport and commissariat. Delay also favored Ethiopian plans of encouraging the Italians to advance far into the country without risking foolhardy attacks which massed troops might have been tempted to make if they had been near enough to the invading forces.

(3) Abyssinians have many natural advantages over the Italians. Their country is a mass of steep rocky mountains cleft by deep and narrow gorges, unbridged water courses, no roads and only precipitous mule tracks over high passes leading to rugged wind swept plateaux between seven and nine thousand feet high with freezing temperatures at night and no shelter. Approaches consist of exceedingly hot malaria [sic] in the waterless desert, remainder inhabited by treacherous nomad tribes.

(4) Second only to the formidable barrier of the terrain is the warlike spirit of the natives. Especially the Amharas and the Gallas actually enjoy fighting and all the inhabitants are so frugal and hardy that they can literally march several days without food. They are incredibly mobile, travel very light and can cover long distances at a trot. Proud and fearless by nature and even fond [of] military training they are instinctively quick to take advantage of natural defensible needs. During the past 2 months I have seen tens of [Page 691] thousands of the most magnificent specimens fresh from the provinces parade before the Emperor en route to the front. They remind me very much of the Pathans in Afghanistan whom they strongly resemble in physique and character.

(5) With such troops, guerrilla tactics are, of course, the logical kind of warfare against an enemy equipped with the most modern weapons, planes, tanks and armored cars, etc., but whose long and unwieldy lines of communication make him particularly vulnerable in the terrain just described. Until now the Abyssinians have only fought delaying actions and skirmishes to harry the flanks and rear of the advancing Italians and they will probably avoid fighting pitched battles before the proper time as long as the men can be held back.

(6) For the greatest danger to them consists in their eagerness, ill-equipped, ignorant and untrained as they are, to take chances by hurling themselves in swarms upon their opponents regardless of losses and attempting to overwhelm them by closing with them and using swords and spears. So far the Emperor and his feudal war lords have been remarkably successful in controlling the troops who have shown greater discipline than was expected after the strain of a whole year’s armed peace. But considering the lack of efficient central organization and proper staff work, and the fact that increasingly large units disinclined coming in contact with Italian forces, it remains to be seen how much longer they can be prevented from attacking prematurely en masse.

(7) On the other hand if kept inactive too long there is distinct danger of the armies gradually melting away in search of food. Question of supplies is undoubtedly one of the most serious problems as the troops have to live on the country often little cultivated where they happen to be. The Emperor realizes the danger and has made a beginning by providing troops which passed through Addis Ababa with supplies of barley flour mixed with dried meat which was to last them while on the march. He also issued strict instructions that enough men must remain in each province to harvest crops. Harvest is now all in and troops stationed outside their own provinces are to be fed from granaries said to have been established at important centers like Gondar, Debra Tabor, Lalibela, Dessie, etc. A certain amount of grain has also been imported from the Sudan and is kept in reserve. Commissary problem is much simplified by the fact that all natives are used to eating raw meat and raw vegetables.

(8) Assuming the population of Ethiopia to be about eight and a half million invite attention that if her entire manpower were on a fighting basis an army of at least a million men could be put in the [Page 692] field. But as that is for technical, financial and political reasons impossible, I doubt whether more than half that number are actually under arms today. And although the rifle is traditionally part of the ordinary stage property carried about by Abyssinians to impress their friends, most of them are so antiquated, Gras and Lebel models, that they are almost useless from a military point of view. There are probably less than 200,000 modern rifles mostly Mauser, Lee Metford and Mannlicher available and only comparatively small shipments have been received since the embargo was lifted. There is also serious scarcity of ammunition, probably under 100 rounds per modern rifle which incidentally prevents intensive target practice and accounts for notoriously poor marksmanship. Factory near Addis Ababa now turns out insignificant quantities of small arms ammunition.

(9) There are at most 800 machine guns, 700 automatic rifles, 2 dozen Swiss anti-aircraft guns and 3 batteries of German mountain guns. Total air force consists of 9 planes of which 1 American was only last month bought from a Frenchman who flew it here from Europe. One small tank, a few armored cars and some obsolete field guns complete the mechanical equipment except for some 400 trucks, mostly American, and field wireless sets for all large units. Recently an order is reported to have been placed in Czechoslovakia for 100,000 Mannlicher rifles and 120,000,000 cartridges. Arms and ammunition are arriving in small quantities via Djibouti, Berbera and Port Sudan.

(10) Regular troops armed with modern rifles, machine guns et cetera, and trained by Belgian and Swedish officers on European lines do not exceed 10,000. Known as the Imperial Guard. Then there are some 50,000 irregulars less well equipped but with a certain amount of training. Remainder are all merely feudal levies raised by the various Eases and lesser chiefs, unfamiliar with modern military tactics and technique and often poorly led but very brave and experts in guerrilla warfare.

(11) The following is roughly the present disposition of the Ethiopian armies, all being approximate:

(a) Northern Front.

Extreme left wing is held by Deazmatch Ayaleu, Governor of Semen [Semien] and Wolkait with 50,000 men. He is defending left bank of Takaze River and line of supply from the Sudan against Italian Second Army Corps under General Maravigna.

On his right is Ras Imru, Governor of Gojjam with 80,000.

Center is held by Ras Kassa, Governor of Gondar, with his two sons and Ras Mulugeta, Minister of War, who, between them, have 160,000 including most of the Imperial Guard.

They are opposite the Italian native army corps under General Biroli.

[Page 693]

Ras Seyum, Governor of Tigre, and father-in-law of the Crown Prince, commands right wing with 75,000 men, apparently in close cooperation with Ras Kassa and likewise astride Biroli’s line of advance.

Extreme right or Aussa front is held by Ras Getatcho, Governor of Kaffa, Kassa Sebahat, Governor of Agame, Deazmatch Mashasha, Governor of Kambata, and Ras Kabada with 40,000 men. Facing them is the Italian First Army Corps under General Santino and forces operating from Assab under General Mariotti.

Importance of this front is due to Danakil tribes and semi-independent Aussen Sultanate under the Moslem General Mohammed Yayo.

The latter has an irregular force of 20,000 and has so far remained loyal to the Emperor despite Italian attempts to bribe him. Also wild tribe of Assimeras has pratically prevented Italians from Assab to advance beyond Mount Mussa Ali [Mussalli]

(b) Southern Front.

Ethiopian left wing based on Harrar and Jigjiga under Deazmatch Nasibu with 80,000. His chief of staff is the Turkish General Vehib Pasha, veteran of the Balkan and World wars. He is to defend motor road to Berber a and railway to Djibouti against General Grazia’s [Graziani’s] right wing.

Center is held by Ras Desta Demtu, Governor of Sidamo and Borana, the Emperor’s son-in-law who visited Washington in 1933, supported by Deazesamdi, Governor of Arussi, with between them 75,000 men. They are to stop Italian advance up the river Webe Shebeli and if possible harass Italian right flank.

Ethiopian right wing commanded by Deazmatch Bayahamorid, Governor of Bale, with 25,000 men is important for the present as the mountains of Bale are practically inaccessible from the southeast. But if Harrar falls and the Italians advance along the railway, the Bale forces would help Ras Desta defend Addis Ababa.

(12) Even allowing for obstacles of topographic and communications, the Italian advance on both fronts has been extraordinarily slow considering for political and psychological reasons it should have been as fast as possible and considering also that Abyssinian resistance has so far been relatively negligible. It is obvious that the moral effect of a quick successful campaign would have been very great both in Ethiopia and abroad as was shown by the occupation of Adowa, Aksum and Adigrat early in October and the formal annexation of Tigre and Againe on October 19, even though the Emperor had never made the least effort to hold those regions. It had been expected here that Mussolini would attempt to face the League with a number of faits accomplis before his military operations would feel the effects of the sanctions.

(13) When Gorahai in the Ogaden was taken on November 7th and Makle [Macalle] in the north on the following day, it was thought [Page 694] that the Italians were about to undertake a number of bold thrusts to drive wedges between the various Ethiopian armies, leaving the consolidation and lateral extension of their lines till later. But a month has elapsed and all major operations appear again to be at a standstill. Abyssinians are reported strongly entrenched on the heights of Alapu some 40 miles south of Makle [Macalle] while in the Ogaden they even claim to have retaken some outposts abandoned by the Italians.

(14) Admitting that the memory of the disaster at Adowa 40 years ago doubtless deters the Italian military from taking any chances, an absolutely safe advance may be so slow and laborious as to defeat its own ends. Having every device of modern mechanical warfare at their disposal they are actually handicapped in this country because motorized troops and transport require elaborate preparations in the form of networks of roads which in turn make heavy demands on labor and commissary and military forces to protect them.

(15) Nor does it seem that the Italian air forces have so far been particularly successful in either intimidating or destroying Abyssinian troops. If at the very outset swift raids had been made on large troop concentrations or populous towns the nerve strain on primitive people might have been considerable. Instead of which haphazard and on the whole ineffectual air action has accustomed the natives at Addis Ababa being bombed and has made them adept at concealing themselves from aircraft. Troops move by quick night marches and hide in the daytime and those not clad in Khaki wet their clothes, roll in the dust, and remain absolutely immobile under rocks or trees. Many gallas are using a vegetable dye of ochre cinnamon instead of khaki.

(16) The appointment of Badoglio is naturally expected to signify a change in Italian tactics and the Ethopian leaders are quite prepared for more speedy and more energetic action on the part of the enemy. The Italians had evidently hoped for greater results from the intensive propaganda and expenditures of large sums to win over the natives without too much fighting. If they counted on an early collapse of the morale of their opponents they must be thoroughly undeceived by now for even in the minor engagements which have taken place the Abyssinians have admittedly nearly always put up a stiff fight before retiring. Badoglio probably realizes that he has a long and arduous campaign ahead of him comparable only to campaigning in the Riff or the Northwest frontier of India. For even if sanctions and world opinion should prove ineffective in putting a stop to the war it will take many years to round up a people of tough and elusive hill-men determined to fight to a finish and the effort may well ruin Italy by its enormous cost in men and treasure.

Engert
  1. Telegram in three sections.