765.84/2353: Telegram (part air)

The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State

576. I submit the following summary of elements in the present situation as viewed from Geneva:

1. The support of sanctions by the large majority of League states has been the marked feature of the Geneva procedures. The rapid response to the proposals was beyond any estimate even by the most sanguine. Furthermore, the sense of solidarity and the atmosphere of earnestness increased during the whole series of meetings.

2. On the other hand, it is to be noted that the effort during the recent meetings was at all times to avoid controversial issues, to consolidate the general ground gained and to leave the details of application to the governments. It was necessary, however, to deal with certain important questions raised chiefly by the replies of governments. Developments respecting these questions I am conveying in less current telegrams.

The date of November 18 was set for the putting into effect of the proposals; and the Committee of Eighteen was given a mandate to follow such application. The general tendency continues, however, to leave these matters chiefly to the governments, to see how the situation stands on November 18, and shortly thereafter to consider such measures as it may be desirable to take. Although no specific date has been set for the calling of the Coordination Committee for this purpose, the prevailing idea seems to be that it will reconvene the first week in December. Just how prompt and how efficient the application of sanctions will be still remains a question which cannot be answered from Geneva. Definitive decisions have not been taken concerning the manner of giving effect to proposal No. 5 which deals with mutual assistance. The theory is that losses cannot be considered in anticipation but can only be given consideration at the time of or after their occurrence. This may, however, become issue before November 18. In any event, the application of proposal 5 is expected to be a feature of the December meeting.

3. My 562, November 2, 11 a.m. From the situation as viewed here this widespread determination to apply sanctions is a development of the first magnitude in the European political situation which has brought about a reconsideration of the policies of all European states. As recently as a few weeks ago the British were to a degree predicating their policy on a possible relative failure to apply sanctions against Italy and were considering what move to make when such a failure had been demonstrated. The British believed then that it had already [Page 682] been shown that states would be willing to apply sanction[s] only when their immediate interests were involved and hence that any approximation of universality would be impossible. Thus the entire League principle in this respect seemed to be on the point of being discounted. Feeling then handicapped by being “prisoners of their word” to the present League they were giving consideration to the possibility of effecting a rapid evolution of the existing League into a new form which would be divorced from the Treaty of Versailles, would eliminate the rigid procedures of the Covenant and would be rather a body primarily of consultative powers. While these ideas were by no means crystalized they were, nevertheless, preoccupations which I encountered here in my conversations with members of the British delegation. The thought was that such a body might recapture the participation of Germany, perhaps that of Japan, and might attract the United States to its membership. Failing this, however, London felt that it might have to turn to the individualistic policies of pre-war day.

France was weighing the advantages of a system of alliances which would include Italy in preference to “alliances” through the League from which Italy might be absent and which might create at least a psychological alliance between Italy and Germany.

The speedy acceptance of sanctions by the European powers and even to a large extent by the Latin American powers has changed this picture. London perceives the present League as a working organization and one which from its present demonstrated efficiency would be difficult to change.

The reason why it would be difficult to change is that the small powers have by their unity of action created so to speak a bloc of policy which renders them a factor of great importance. This happened to a degree in the Sino-Japanese affair but in that instance only achieved the point of principle, material action being very limited. On this last occasion the small powers have entered by their action fully into the arena of European and, to a less extent, of world politics. Whether the great powers will later find this force of the small powers an inconvenience remains to be seen. It is a position, however, which the small powers here tell me they are determined to maintain and to maintain through the present League form, expressing themselves as being most suspicious of all proposed changes.

Reducing this to the particular in discussing with the British here the status of Franco-British relations, as suggested in paragraphs 1 to 5 of my telegram last referred to, while certain general staff plans for military support of France’s eastern frontier have undoubtedly been considered, any undertaking which Great Britain has given France in return for French naval support in the Mediterranean in so far as it is concrete apparently chiefly concerns British air cooperation [Page 683] on France’s Italian frontier should French support of Great Britain in the Mediterranean in case of hostile Italian action involve France’s Italian border. In short this change in the League situation which has been described is seen as having had a direct bearing on the long contentious element of bilateral mutual support in Franco-British relations. France’s and Great Britain’s common reliance on a stronger League has thus tended to obviate to a degree France granting Great Britain a separate undertaking for contingencies in the Mediterranean which might arise under paragraph 3 of article No. 16. By the same token the same necessity is not seen for London’s granting Paris a specific quid pro quo respecting France’s eastern frontier problems. However, lacking such a quid pro quo I have been given to understand that France’s naval undertaking[s] in the Mediterranean are not quite as inclusive as the British have desired. In this general connection it has been noted that the question of British guarantees respecting Central Europe apparently dropped from sight in private discussions here which in distinctly League circles is accounted for in part at least by Austria’s and Hungary’s defection from League action.

If, however, the apparently wide readiness on the part of League states to implement sanctions against Italy came as a surprise to London and Paris and suggested reconsideration of their policies, diplomatic information here indicates that it came to Rome in the form of a distinct shock the possible effects of which on Italy’s course of action it is too early to determine.

(Consulate’s 564, November 2, 2 p.m.4) While among the small power delegations preoccupations in line with those referred to are discussed and while these still take the form of expressing concern over League action constituting perhaps merely a transitional phase in European politics and part of a program in support of some more general policies envisaged by one or more of the great powers, I find a new concept respecting meeting the problems involved. The small powers perceive in the unity gained and the procedures established by their present action a method of nullifying such developments as might infringe their interests. In particular, although in the Portuguese delegation and to a lesser degree among the Belgians some apprehensions are expressed concerning possible future arrangements in which Germany is seen as entering the picture respecting colonies and mandates, they feel, nevertheless, that their security against such large power dispositions may best be found in their immediate support of League principles. Thus these states are watching with great anxiety the progress of the sanctions programme.

Gilbert
  1. Not printed.