765.84/2338: Telegram
The Chargé in Ethiopia (Engert) to the Secretary of State
154. Local official circles have for several weeks been manifesting deep anxiety over the intensive secret negotiations alleged to be in progress between Paris, Rome and even London regarding a possible settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict by compromise. This anxiety is caused chiefly by the attitude of France and the following summary is based on opinions expressed by the Emperor, the Minister for Foreign Affairs1 and Hawariat2 who returned from Paris October 29.
It is felt that France has only been rendering lip service to League principles and that without British firmness she would not have gone as far as she has. Laval is still suspected of having had a secret oral understanding with Mussolini since last January by which the latter was promised a free hand in Abyssinia in return for Italian support against the German menace. Hence Laval’s undue regard for Italian sensitiveness with respect to League action and his desperate efforts to avoid any steps likely to offend Mussolini. It is even believed that he has orally promised that France would never take part in military sanctions and that in any event his obscure and ambiguous tactics encouraged the Duce in his intransigence both vis-à-vis Ethiopia and the League. The Emperor is reported to have said that if France wished to avoid a European war that was hardly a good reason why Ethiopia should be calmly sacrificed in an African war. Laval had turned a cold shoulder to every suggestion for collective action and the French press except the left had not even expressed moral condemnation of Italy’s brutal assault.
The Abyssinians fear French fidelity to the League Covenant is so lukewarm and so evidently conditional upon Great Britain’s readiness to assume all the responsibilities of and the principal risks flowing from coercive measures, that the British, too, may balk at extreme action likely to cause war with Italy and may find it difficult to remain faithful to the commitments they have already undertaken (see also Legation’s telegram 102, September 26, 11 a.m.3). In fact Laval’s continued frantic search for a formula pleasing to Mussolini through diplomatic negotiations instead of the League even at this late hour has created such a painful impression here that the Ethiopian Government [Page 680] is beginning to lose faith in the sincerity of all [?] and in their capacity to achieve anything but ineffective gestures.
If the powers believe that the capture of Adowa and other minor Italian military successes have in any way rendered proposed territorial adjustments with Italy more acceptable to the Negus their hopes are doomed to severe disappointment. The Ethiopians are now in no mood to make any concessions and they resent Laval in the role of mediator after having shown that he is really not interested in the fate of Abyssinia but only in retaining Italian friendship as a bulwark against Germany.
In this general connection I had an interesting talk with the French Minister who is personally not very sympathetic toward Italian aspirations. He gave me to understand that Laval was facing the most serious dilemma since the great war and that he had by no means the unanimous support of the French people. But among the complex influences at work his desire to make France’s security the paramount issue was easily understood.
He argued that if he lost Italy’s friendship without securing definite guarantees from Great Britain the whole Stresa front would be gone and any reliance on the Covenant in the event of German aggression was largely illusory. Mussolini was already displeased with Germany whose man power was double that of France and with whom Great Britain had recently signed a naval accord without consulting France. Theoretically, Laval believed in security through the League but in practice he was afraid that so long as the United States, Japan and Germany were not members, Great Britain and France alone were not strong enough to carry the burden of a universal application of sanctions. Besides, he felt convinced that Mussolini would treat military sanctions as an act of war and thus start another general European conflagration.
From the above and a brief conversation with my British colleague, I gather that so long as Great Britain reserves the right to be the sole judge as to what constitutes, for example, “unprovoked aggression” France will mistrust British promises of support and will claim similar liberty to act as her own special interests may demand. The British have already gone further than ever before in giving assurances regarding future contingencies and if France is still not satisfied it is feared that London—notwithstanding Laval’s eleventh hour agreement to help the British Navy in the Mediterranean—will lose interest in League action and there will be nothing to prevent Italy from getting what she wants except Ethiopia’s firm determination to resist with all her might.