765.84/1197: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 16—7:30 p.m.]
447. I called upon Foreign Secretary this afternoon who began by saying that he was supplementing previous conversations (my 411, August 28, 5 p.m. and 384, August 20, 8 p.m.) and that he wanted to give me his recent impressions of Geneva while still fresh in his mind: first, the tenseness of the situation there and, secondly, the increasing desire of the members of the League to meet the issue with a common policy. He added he still regarded Mussolini as mad but he was certain the Duce was not receiving any idea of the English attitude and opinion from the Italian Ambassador in London. The Foreign Minister said definitely that Grandi was only reporting the things he felt Mussolini wanted to hear and described him as “useless”. He then went on to say that Mussolini’s preparations were almost complete and he was inclined to agree with the Geneva view that Mussolini would take aggressive military action in early October. Thereafter, a council of the League would be held in compliance with article 16 and he foresaw a considerable period of delay in consulting not only the League members but non-League members as to their attitude. He pointed out that the policy of the League members was generally made clear in their statements at Geneva last week, but he particularly added that the Foreign Secretaries of Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia [Page 650] had assured him as to the solidarity of the Little Entente. He added, however, that the Yugoslav Minister had pointed out that Yugoslavia was ready to act “only in concert with other powers”.
The Foreign Secretary asked me what I thought of Laval’s speech and I gave him my impression, that he was attempting to go as far with the British position and the attitude of Messrs. Herriot and Boncour as possible, while not wishing to destroy the personal relations he had established with Mussolini last year. The Foreign Secretary said he thought the last was very important because frankly he had found Laval a loose talker and while there was nothing written between Mussolini and Laval, he did not doubt for a moment that Laval had left very decided impressions with the Italians as to French policy that the latter were more than willing to believe. However, Sir Samuel stated that the French had made this trip up with the British. France had definitely taken the side of the Covenant and while they were not very willing to define and specify future action, nevertheless, the French had committed themselves to uphold the Covenant. (I could not help but feel, however, from the conversation that the French had not yet committed themselves with the definiteness the British had sought.)
At the time of consulting League powers after an act of aggression non-League powders would also have to be consulted, and, while the Foreign Secretary “made no requests” in the present instance, he said that he was keeping me informed since the attitude of the American Government, as well as other non-League powers, would be asked. Sir Samuel reiterated that the imposition of sanctions would be a gradual one along the lines of the 1921 resolutions. The first question to be posed was whether League members and non-League members would refrain from selling arms and munitions and implements of war to Italy, and, secondly, since foreign exchange was vital to Italy, whether they would also agree to cease purchasing from Italy. The Foreign Secretary said Italy had, in his reckoning, sufficient gold now to carry on a war for 12 to 15 months, but at the end of that period Italian gold would be exhausted and the query arose would Mussolini want to face such a situation if he realized he would be unable to obtain foreign exchange in the meantime. The Foreign Secretary thought an immediate condemnation of Italy by world opinion upon an outbreak of hostilities would tend to shorten an Italian offensive, particularly if in the early stages Mussolini could claim a success sufficient to permit him making a compromise.
In the matter of non-League members and sanctions, in the Foreign Secretary’s opinion, Japan and Brazil would not count in the present situation; but the attitude of the United States and Germany was of paramount importance. The British felt the Germans were anxious [Page 651] not to mingle in the present situation at all, but to maintain as detached an attitude as possible, reserving for the future which way they would lean. Probably Germany would not formally agree to uphold League sanctions, nevertheless he did not believe Germany would adopt a contrary attitude. Besides the question of League and non-League members and sanctions, Sir Samuel said an early appeal to all the signatories of the Paris Pact for consultation must be envisaged as another decisive method of concentrating world opinion, including Germany, against Italian aggression.
He again stressed the fact that he was seeking no statement of policy from the American Government but was forecasting the trend of decisions which must in due course receive consideration generally.
Sir Samuel then stated that although the Italians had a “very mixed bag” of armed forces in Eritrea, an early success, even though it might not be sustained, was probable. He did not anticipate an English-Italian conflict unless Mussolini went completely wild and for example made a hostile demonstration possibly over Malta. The Foreign Secretary said the British Government was strengthening Gibraltar. They were also gradually strengthening the Mediterranean fleet as well as units more especially air units in Egypt. There had not been any increase of the air forces in Iraq. He regarded the recent despatch of Italian troops to Libya as an attempt to intimidate England. He repeated twice: “However, we are not impressed. With as little flourish as possible we shall continue to take those precautionary steps we deem necessary”.
The Foreign Secretary again stressed the importance of concentrating world opinion against Italy, not necessarily waiting for an aggressive act but continuously day by day. In this connection, he referred to the Secretary’s statement to the press of Friday last74a with warm appreciation, and also to the fact that it was issued with the approval of the President. He had knowledge of recent congressional legislation but was convinced that the attitude of the American Government would continue to be so effectively interpreted as to leave no doubt in the Italian mind of the administration’s determination to further peace.
At the conclusion of our interview he said that a certain number of British subjects were remaining in Abyssinia, as he supposed indeed American citizens were also. To protect these British subjects the British Government proposed to station a cruiser at Aden, and he could “think of no more efficient promise of security to American lives than if the American Government would adopt a similar policy and also station a cruiser at Aden”. (My 427, September 6, 5 p.m.75)