765.84/1175: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8 p.m.]
299. At the end of this week of Assembly discussion and with only two more to come, Monday I shall attempt to present as lucid a picture as possible of a very confused situation.
Here in Geneva I have yet to meet the man who has any real hope that Mussolini will be or can be restrained from initiating hostilities. The French are impressed with Mussolini’s state of mind, as reported by de Chambrun, to the effect that in conversation with him Mussolini had damned the British for interference and stated that he was willing to take them on, if they wanted, and could defeat them in the Mediterranean. The only alternative I have heard to opinions of madness regarding Mussolini are ideas of his aims of such a megalomaniac [Page 648] character with regard to the reconstitution of the Roman Empire as to be, in effect, the same. If it is bluff on Mussolini’s part—and no one here now clings to this belief—then it is the most gigantic and expensive bluff in history. Certainly watching this Assembly day by day with the developing possibility of serious resistance on the part of the European states, one finds it difficult to believe that a sane man could continue to take the risk. Rather he would struggle to find the most advantageous way to back down.
Further, nobody in Geneva can escape the conviction that the pressure of a number of factors is bringing League collective action nearer than ever before. It is not so much in the speeches themselves, although they have been in two instances surprisingly clear cut, it is rather in the atmosphere of this past week. There has always been a group in Geneva desirous of effective collective action. Previously this group has been regarded somewhat patronizingly by the more practical minded. Today I have the impression that the former group are no longer to be considered radical. No one who listened to Hoare can escape the conclusion that Great Britain is determined that Italy shall not conquer Ethiopia and is prepared to take the initiative toward collective action when the time comes. It would be rash indeed to attempt to prophesy what will work out, but it is difficult to see what else can happen than a head-on collision.
There is one phase of future development of such possible interest to us that I venture to sketch it. I am, of course, unaware as to whether steps have been taken at Washington but here in Geneva at least no one has seriously raised the question of what America is willing to do in case of sanctions. Those who have talked with me have occasionally announced privately interest in the neutrality bill, particularly as to whether the embargo may include raw materials as well as munitions and in the relationship of the bill to a possible use by the President of some such step as was embodied in Mr. Davis’ speech of May 22, 1933.73 They are conscious that they are bound by contractual obligations in fulfillment of or in direct relationship to the Covenant; they are conscious that the case is one primarily interesting European powers and if force is to be used that they must use it; they are conscious that we neither have such contractual obligations nor such immediate interests. No one has suggested that the United States take the lead in declaring what it will do to facilitate sanctions.
You will remember Eden’s statement to me, as reported in my 297, September 13, 11 a.m.,74 that the British Government did not intend to take this up with us until they had a definite program worked out.
[Page 649]This does not mean, however, that at some stage of the proceedings and perhaps in the relatively near future, our position in this matter will not become one of the highest importance. According to our information where sanctions have been discussed at all, only those of an economic and financial nature have been considered. All apparently cling to the hope that military action can, even with sanctions, be avoided. In any form of economic or financial sanctions it will of course become important to know whether the United States will or can cooperate in any fashion since it is obvious that to be effective all possible holes must be plugged.
I am not requesting an opinion on the matter. Indeed it is probably preferable that I have no expression of your views at this moment. But since, in my judgment, there is a real possibility that such a situation as I have sketched above may develop, I consider it essential to bring this to your attention.
Cipher to London, Paris, Rome.
- See telegrams from the Chairman of the American delegation at Geneva, No. 644, May 19, 1933, 11 p.m. and No. 646, May 20, 1933, 1 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. i, pp. 154–159.↩
- Not printed.↩