765.84/832: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Marriner) to the Secretary of State
691. The interview between Eden, Vansittart and Laval yesterday is treated with complete discretion by the French press which stated that Laval might issue a communiqué on Friday after his conversation with Eden and Aloisi. The Embassy has learned however from a friendly and usually reliable British journalistic source that the British offer of purely economic concessions in Abyssinia to Italy (see Embassy’s 688, August 14, noon) was amplified yesterday morning by an added offer for Italian colonization in that sparsely populated area of Abyssinia which is northeast of Lake Tana. The sop to Abyssinia in this case would be the cession to that country of the port of Zeilah by Great Britain, a sop offered to Mussolini by Eden on the occasion of his last visit to Rome and refused.
The same source also stated to the Embassy that the pressure brought to bear on Laval by Eden was as follows:
First, either France aligned itself with Great Britain in protecting the sanctity and prestige of the League, or, second, Great Britain baffled in every attempt to seek a peaceful solution, would withdraw from cooperation on the Continent and seek to safeguard its Empire in the face of manifest dangers.
The dangers mentioned were a possible race riot from Cairo to the Cape; the threat to the headwaters of the Blue Nile; the threat to the routes to India; and particularly from the French point of view [Page 627] the danger of bolstering Nazi strength in Austria which might follow in the wake of Italian preoccupation in Abyssinia.
It was the opinion of the source quoted that France, faced by the British threat of retroceding from Continental affairs and now gradually realizing the implications involved in the pending conflict, particularly racial, was gradually swinging more and more toward the British thesis. At the same time it was agreed that the attitude of Abyssinia toward a solution arrived at without being previously consulted was problematical in the extreme.
During the time that the above information was being obtained I saw Vansittart and one of his closest associates both of whom confirmed without specific detail the general tenor of the above. Parenthetically in appearance and action Vansittart was profoundly discouraged. He indicated that the negotiations might be prolonged beyond the 3 days originally assigned them.
I learned that Vansittart took occasion to explain to Laval that, as a permanent official representing the continuity of British foreign policy friendly over a long period to France, and with no political fences to guard, he was convinced that it was absolutely necessary in order to preserve the peace of Europe for France and England to take a firm stand together.
Finally Vansittart felt that the dangers inherent in the present situation were greater than at any time since 1914, particularly as Germany is playing a waiting game and prepared to take advantage of the first false step by any party.
- Telegram in three sections.↩