500.A15A4 General Committee (Arms)/126
Memorandum by the American Delegate (Wilson)50
Mr. Wilson, accompanied by Mr. Mayer, called this morning on the Japanese Consul-General, Mr. Yokoyama, to discuss disarmament questions. Mr. Yokoyama had with him Mr. Yoshimura, who attends the committee work for the Japanese.
Mr. Wilson referred to his call on Ambassador Matsudaira last December when he was in London with regard to the Naval conversations.51 Mr. Wilson said that now that the “general discussion” was concluded, practically all the delegations had expressed their sentiments on the subject of the American Draft except the Japanese; that while he felt he knew pretty well what the Japanese point of view was, it was always useful to discuss questions with one’s colleagues and therefore he would be glad to learn what the Japanese attitude might be as of to-day, bearing in mind that should they prefer not to discuss the matter at all, he would understand perfectly.
Mr. Yokoyama said that he was glad Mr. Wilson had called; that the Japanese position had not changed since they had made it clear in the General Commission and Bureau last year, but that it was always useful to go over things in common. Mr. Yokoyama continued that the Japanese had not taken any part in the debates thus far because they felt they were in the position of observers on the one hand, waiting until the treaty should develop finally before taking any public stand, and furthermore, because they thought it more helpful at this stage—their attitude being what it was—not to speak. He said that to repeat the Japanese position, there were two principal points—one, [Page 28] the Japanese desire not to treat State and private manufacture of armament on the same basis; and the other, their opposition to inspection on the spot.
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Yokoyama then reviewed the present situation of the committee work, both agreeing that the primary divergencies of view had come down to two in number: (1) inspection on the spot, and (2) global returns versus specific returns. (Incidentally, Mr. Yokoyama seemed very well informed regarding the course of the discussions and gave evidence of following the matter rather closely.)
Dealing with the inspection features primarily, Mr. Yokoyama wondered whether their difficulties weren’t solvable by an application of the regional idea, with Japan and the United States—if we desired—in a different category from the European States who had their special problems and their particular reasons for supervision and control of a very special character. Reference was made to the fact that for more than twelve years the United States, Great Britain and Japan had carried out an agreement involving their most vital defense arm without any supervision or control or the slightest thought or desire for the same. Mr. Yokoyama indicated here the Japanese feeling that there was something dishonorable about subscribing to a supervision arrangement among countries of good faith. Mr. Wilson said that regional treatment of these “universal problems” was a sympathetic one to us and a method which we had often considered. In this case, however, there was the difficulty that Russia was both European and Asiatic. Mr. Yokoyama seemed to feel the force of this point and nodded his head several times during the course of Mr. Wilson’s remarks in this regard.
Mr. Wilson then discussed at some length the question of supervision and control. Assuming, for the sake of argument, the Japanese point of view, control was only a nuisance, and the Continental Powers were not concerned with Japan nor indeed with the United States and neither of these countries had anything to fear from an inspection of their execution of the treaty; nevertheless, wasn’t this nuisance well worth putting up with if it meant an agreement of this character in which all the States concerned could participate? Mr. Wilson also brought out the advantage which he felt the inspection feature held for a State whose treaty execution was unjustly attacked. He referred specifically to Article 27 where a State can ask for an inspection in such circumstances.
Mr. Wilson stressed the great value to the world in general of an agreement such as that now under negotiation. He also indicated the possibility that since this present draft treaty did not raise the point of “Equality”, Germany might be willing to join in, which would be an excellent start toward an improvement of conditions in [Page 29] Europe in particular and the world in general. Mr. Yokoyama seemed to recognize this point very clearly.
Although Mr. Yokoyama maintained the same position as his Government has held consistently with regard to the question of inspection and control, it did seem during the conversation that Mr. Yokoyama wished to indicate that the Japanese Government did not want to be any more difficult than could be helped in the circumstances; that while being present, it desired to stand aside until the whole picture was before it, when perhaps a final reconsideration might take place in the light of what had been thrashed out and determined and after seeing how general was the agreement.
- Transmitted to the Department in the delegation’s despatch No. 110, February 28, 1935; received March 9.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. i, pp. 299 ff.↩