760N.00/116
Memorandum by the Chargé in Latvia (Cole)50
I called this morning on Mr. Munters, Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in order to inquire of him about the [Page 297] present status of the various negotiations in Eastern Europe concerning the so-called Eastern Pacts. Mr. Munters stated flatly that in his opinion the original Soviet proposal for an Eastern Pact of Mutual Assistance is now dead. He stated that Soviet Russia has now obtained in the Franco-Soviet and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaties all that it can hope to accomplish without paying too high a price. Mr. Munters explained this by stating that the Soviet Government had at first desired to make, as he put it, “the western frontiers of the limitrophe states into Soviet frontiers by obtaining a French guarantee.” That is, the western frontiers of Poland and Lithuania and the seacoasts of Latvia and Estonia were to be guaranteed against possible German aggression in the same way that the eastern frontiers of France and Belgium are guaranteed under the Locarno Treaty. France had definitely refused at the beginning to undertake any such guarantee and had embodied this refusal in its insistence on the phrase “aggression against the territory proper of one of the contracting parties.” Soviet Russia had been obliged to accept this conclusion and that being so, Soviet Russia was not willing now to bind herself alone to guarantee the western frontiers of Poland and the Baltic States or even of Czechoslovakia. It was for this reason that the Czechoslovak Treaty contains the provision that Russia is only bound to assist Czechoslovakia if and when France comes to that country’s aid. Mr. Munters even went so far as to say that if Germany seized Memel Soviet Russia probably would not move.
Mr. Munters was not certain as to what the next moves will be in regard to pacts, not of mutual assistance, but of mutual non-aggression and non-assistance to an aggressor only. He pointed out that Germany had agreed to enter into such a pact or pacts in the message sent through the British Ambassador in Berlin to the Stresa Conference on April 14,51 but that Germany had apparently withdrawn this offer by the passages in Hitler’s May 21 speech52 in which the realm leader stated that Germany would only conclude such pacts with bordering states and not at the present time with Lithuania. Mr. Munters pointed out that this had very effectually stopped all movement towards such treaties since the only states which could possibly come into an eastern pact of this sort were Poland and Lithuania. Germany already had an agreement with one of these and the other was specifically excluded.
Mr. Munters went on to state that Latvian inquiries made recently in Berlin and the reports brought from there by the Latvian Minister indicate that Mr. Hitler is now more favorably inclined to such pacts [Page 298] than he was in May and might be willing to include both Latvia and Estonia in such a system, although neither have a common land boundary with Germany. Mr. Munters indicated that Latvia would be far more inclined to enter any agreement of this sort than to join in any mutual assistance agreement which did not include both Poland and Germany.
Mr. Munters went out of his way to state that in all the recent negotiations following the Soviet proposal of April 6, Lithuania had shown great loyalty to the Baltic Entente in agreeing, at the request of Latvia and Estonia, not to enter into a pact for mutual assistance with Soviet Russia. In doing this, Lithuania had made a very considerable sacrifice since, at the time Soviet Russia made the proposal, Lithuania was in great anxiety concerning German intentions toward the Memel territory and had been at that time very eager to close with Soviet Russia. In regard to Memel, Mr. Munters stated that he believed the question would be easily settled if both Lithuania and Germany would only show good will in the matter and come somewhere near to meeting each other halfway.
In regard to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, Mr. Munters stated that from what he could learn of the reaction in Sweden, the article in the London Times of July 6, 1935, entitled “Sea Power in the Baltic” contained no exaggerations. He believed that both Poland and Sweden would have to embark upon a naval building program. Latvia, however, would not on this account attempt to increase its existing naval forces. The accord showed that England was willing to see the Baltic closed in case of hostilities in Europe because it had lost all interest in the Russian economic field and did not any longer feel that it must at all times have a guaranteed access to Russia through the Baltic.
He stated that he believed that the accord was a mistake in the tactical play now going on among the Foreign Offices of the larger European powers and might cause England the loss of French support in the Abyssinian matter. However, the accord was of very great and beneficient importance as a step forward in the general pacification of Europe. He believes that now that Germany has willingly signed a treaty it will abide by it to the last possible minute. England was very wise in accepting the German offer as had it been refused Germany might later have demanded not 35% of the British strength but 50%. France had made a very serious blunder in not accepting Germany’s original offer to limit its army to about 3000,000 [300,000] men instead of the 500,000 that Germany was now arming.
In regard to the Abyssinian situation Mr. Munters feels that Italy is very ill-advised in her present policy and will be “bled white” by a War in East Africa. The diversion of Italian attention and [Page 299] strength away from Europe is very advantageous for Germany. He added that these developments were also very favorable for the Baltic States since it tended to canalize German effort towards the southeast and away from the Baltic.
Mr. Munters would make no statement concerning the merits of the Italian-Abyssinian dispute. He agreed, however, that Latvian sympathies are very strong indeed against Italy. This is understandable from the strong reliance which the Baltic States, Latvia and Estonia at least, place on the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Toward the close of the conversation it wandered rather far afield, touching even upon the possible loss of the independence of the Baltic States at the hands of either Soviet Russia or Germany. Here Mr. Munters made an interesting statement, namely, that were Germany “to come in again” the Letts could at least maintain the nationality, native culture, and their “status as human beings”. Under the Soviet Government, however, deportations only were to be expected since the Letts would “never accept the present Soviet Russian system.” He called attention to the wholesale deportations of Finns from Karelia—200,000 souls was the figure he mentioned, and asked what would become of the Lettish race if it were scattered, a few here and a few there, throughout the enormous Russian Empire?