862.20/1059
The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation to the Disarmament Conference (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 28.]
Sir: I have attempted during the past few days to assess in perspective the developments of the European situation as they have been revealed in Geneva since the beginning of the year 1935. Such a number of events of high significance rarely occur within so limited a period; one can only suppose that the pressure of events, both in [Page 292] Germany and the economic world, has produced a low boiling point for political incidents. One has only to list these incidents to recognize their significance, though to assess that significance is much more perplexing. To make a partial list only: the British send troops to the Saar Basin; there is a Franco-Italian rapprochement; the French and British make an agreement at London on February 3rd; the British White Paper is published; Hitler has a “cold in the head” and postpones the Simon-Eden visit; Hitler announces a conscript army for Germany; Simon and Eden pay a round of visits; the German Air Force; the meeting at Stresa and its pronouncement; the meeting of the Council of the League with its “condemnatory” resolution against Germany; Hitler’s announcement of submarine construction; the Franco-Russian Treaty and a similar agreement between Russia and Czechoslovakia; Pilsudski’s death; Hitler’s speech of May 21st; the resolution of the Council of the League in respect of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute; the threat of war between those nations; Anglo-German naval talks; and finally, the elimination of Mr. MacDonald’s48 personality as a principal factor in the European councils.
Concerning a number of the points, I have already written the Secretary and the Department from time to time. But in previous reports I have endeavored to set forth an idea of the immediate situation. In this despatch I shall try to combine the impressions of the various events into a report of what seems to be the general tendency. In other words, regarding all the events as indicative, what kind of a Europe do they indicate for the immediate future?
The rapid shift in relative power on the Continent brought about by Germany’s rearmament—and rearmament already of a formidable magnitude—in any consideration of the future of this Continent raises the first and mightiest question: will there be war? With due regard for the possibility of accident, with full recognition of the temptation to the dictator of military adventure as a diversion from political unrest and unsatisfactory conditions, I have come to feel that in spite of appearances and evidence of preparation, there will be no Continental war of serious proportions in the near future. The thought of “preventive war” has been definitely put aside; indeed if it is kept out of contemplation for a short further period, it will automatically cease to exist, as Germany’s force will be such that “preventive war” as a secondary effort will no longer be possible and only a full-sized trial of strength will face the Powers. That portion of Hitler’s speech which deals with Germany’s need for peace is so fully in accord with the facts that to me it is convincing—at least as to his [Page 293] present intention. Further, we must not forget that vivid recollections of less than twenty years ago are still present in the minds of the men who have the decision in Europe. They know the cost of war from personal experience; war to them is not an historical abstraction. The peoples themselves to a large extent know the cost of war, and no government can be so absolute at the present time as not to fear revolt if it embarks upon adventures against powerful neighbors. We can do nothing but guess. The situation is dangerous. The flame may burst by the careless dropping of a match in many spots in Europe. Nevertheless, it is my guess that the possibilities are against war for a considerable period.
Let us then treat the question of the development of Continental policy on the hypothesis of our having some years of peace in Europe before us. Since the Treaty of Versailles was signed, the population of Europe—that is to say, of the Allies and Neutrals—has been constantly faced with the choice between two policies: that of “encirclement”; and that envisaged by the Covenant of the League—a policy which might be called one of “moral suasion” with resort to force only if and when there has been aggression duly proved before the semi-judicial organs of the League.
When the most powerful and dangerous member of a gang is down, it is natural to argue that the others should stand around with sticks in their hands ready to fall upon the dangerous fellow simultaneously and automatically if he raises his head. The thought is engaging in its very simplicity. But I have just been reading the “Experiment in Autobiography” by Wells. In discussing the effect of Huxley’s teaching, Wells says: “It has left me that urgency for coherence and consistency, that repugnance from haphazard assumptions and arbitrary statements, which is the essential distinction of the educated from the uneducated mind.” It is fitting, therefore, that we should examine this assumption of the simple policy of “encirclement”. I shall not use the arguments of the sentimental, nor dwell upon the hatred, bitterness and longing for revenge that such a policy of encirclement engenders. I shall merely state that such a policy might be all right if it would work; but it won’t work, not against a nation potentially the mightiest of the Continent. In Poland there was real belief two years ago in the policy of “encirclement”, just as this still seems to be the view in Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Soviet Russia. In October, 1933, Hitler withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League and left no illusion as to his intentions to violate the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Poland expected “preventive action” as a logical result. France, however, for a variety of reasons, was unwilling to march at the time. The immediate effect [Page 294] in Poland was to drive her to protect herself as far as she could through friendly arrangements with Germany.
Another instance: for the past six months Mussolini had been increasingly hostile to Hitler and disturbed at Germany’s threat to Austrian autonomy, Mussolini organized the meeting at Stresa and sponsored, with France and England, the “condemnatory resolution” of the League Council. Six weeks later, Italian policy in respect to Abyssinia clashed with British policy at the latest Council meeting. Since that day there have been evidences of daily increasing warmth in Italo-German relations which will undoubtedly be carried on until such moment—if it comes—when Great Britain cedes to Italian desires through fear of Italo-German common purpose.
A further and more general observation: there is attraction, politically speaking, in power itself—an attraction akin to that in physics of the greater mass for the smaller. The very apprehension of the growing power of Germany may well persuade some of the other European States, geographically most closely associated to Germany, to make friends with her and even, perhaps, throw in their lot with her. Such may have been one of the reasons for the action of Poland, which I have just mentioned.
These facts seem to me sufficient to show that “encirclement” is not practical policy. For to be practical it must be absolute; the parties thereto must be animated by a common policy which will stand the test of the diversity and conflict of their interests in other directions; and, above all, it must be “automatic” in character. By using the word “automatic” I am borrowing from the French phrase déclenchment automatique de guerre—a thought and purpose which would bring it about that if any one of the States under a mutual assistance pact is engaged in hostility, the other parties to the pact must immediately come to the assistance of the first without examination of the rights and wrongs of the conflict. Without such an undertaking “encirclement” loses much of its terror to the encircled; hostilities would have to be prefaced by examination of the case, which obviously would entrain the difficulties of determining the aggressor, the local needs and fears of the parties—in short, the immediate expediency of engaging in hostilities.
The Soviet Government has long sought for the establishment of such “automatic” obligations in the mutual assistance pacts which it has been pushing. The principle finally was brought to a crisis in the recent negotiations at Geneva and Paris between Litvinoff and Laval. Laval, in spite of threats by Litvinoff to break off negotiations, insisted on the rejection of the “automatic” clause, and the Russians agreed to a pact which does not embody it.
[Page 295]There is considerable belief, based on the grounds of probability rather than on evidence, that Sir John Simon insisted with Laval that Great Britain would only sponsor the “condemnatory” resolution with France if the latter undertook to reject the “automatic” provisions of the Russian proposals. Be that as it may, the decision was taken—a decision which means that for a period of time “encirclement” is not to be set up by the States of Europe vis-à-vis Germany.
Real encirclement, predicated as I have tried to show upon its “automatic” character, being thus put aside, the States of Europe will presumably endeavor to show to Germany a unity of purpose as complete as possible for such deterrent effect as that may possess. They will go a long way to conciliate Italy, in the final analysis; they will continue to try to forge weapons of unity—witness the work of the Committee of Thirteen (my despatch No. 116 of June 4, 1935)—to multiply among themselves pacts of mutual assistance; but they will not bind their hands in advance of the fact, and will reserve the right to examine in the Council of the League whatever crisis may arise and will determine their action by the necessities of the moment.
I have indicated that the encirclement policy won’t work because of the selfish interests of the “encirclers.” There is a further factor of failure in what Bismarck called “imponderables.” Trying to express this as briefly as possible, let me say that the attempt to prolong indefinitely the subjugation of Germany has always seemed an effort to maintain the abnormal. In their policy the Foreign Offices were opposing the inevitable normal development of a powerful people. The imponderables have now asserted themselves and the fabric built up in opposition thereto is disappearing. Germany’s imminent return to power is a striking example of the fact that the normal tends to assert itself in international affairs. The British, with their uncanny instinct for reality, recognize this situation and are adapting their policy to meet it.
From all I have written above and from my several personal letters to the Secretary, it is perhaps unnecessary for me to conclude this report by saying that I feel we are now entering upon a tremendous period of political readjustment in Europe. This would normally have begun in 1918 at the conclusion of the War. But the treaty signed at Versailles was not a peace in the real sense of the word. It was rather a continuation, in another form, of conflict with Germany. We are now realizing that wars cannot be defined so simply as used to be the case, nor can they only be considered a clash of military forces. Nations can be involved in the bitterest of struggles without resort to declarations of war and, indeed, without actual military conflict. This has been the case certainly with regard to Germany [Page 296] since 1918, and has only come to the end of a phase with Germany’s public refusal to continue bound by the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany’s imminent return to former political might on the Continent has created an imperious necessity for political readjustment in Europe. During the period 1918–1935 there have been negotiations, machinations, intrigue against Germany, with sporadic efforts toward co-operation. Now, however, there must be discussion and decision of what is to be done with Germany as an equal at the board. Hitherto it has been a question of subordination; now it is a question of continental co-ordination.
Perhaps there can be no greater example of this than that recently furnished us by the British. On April 17th they joined the French in their resolution at Geneva condemning Germany’s breach of the Treaty of Versailles. This resolution condemned in the strongest terms any further breaches of international agreements and a Committee of Thirteen Powers was set up to deal with such a situation. Only a few weeks later the British agreed to discuss naval matters with the Germans,49 and now, two months after the solemn resolution against treaty violation, the British have reached an understanding with the Germans which involves a clear-cut, unilateral abandonment of Versailles-Treaty provisions. Thus the British threw overboard the pronouncement at the Council meeting in April and condoned the treaty-breaking they had there condemned. With the British adapting themselves to such contradictions, with Italy showing herself equally changeable when her particular interests are at stake, while Germany and France have given many examples of a similar attitude, we are justified in feeling that the States whose judgment is decisive in Europe have abandoned the idea of “encirclement” and are readjusting their policy to the changing conditions.
Let us hope that these readjustments will be of such a nature as to strengthen the belief which I expressed above—that the probabilities are against a Continental war in the near future.
Respectfully yours,