765.84/341: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 30—6:58 a.m.]
214. I had several conversations with Litvinov. He said he felt the agreement reached at Geneva with regard to the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia was not a real solution and that he believed Mussolini would evade arbitration and attack Abyssinia as soon as the rainy season was over about September 1.
He said that he, Laval, and Eden had suggested to Mussolini that he should not involve Italy deeply in Abyssinia as such involvement [Page 284] would make it impossible for Italy to intervene effectively in Austria. He alleged that Mussolini had replied that the independence of Austria was a European question and not one for Italy alone and that he had no intention of opposing Germany in Austria unless he should receive full support from France and England.
Litvinov added that France had as yet made no definite commitments to Italy. He said that Mussolini had further expressed the opinion that Germany would not be ready to attack anyone before the end of 1937 or the beginning of 1938 and that long before Germany should be in condition to attack Italy would have Abyssinia firmly in its hands. He added that he, Eden and Laval all agreed that there was no possibility of Germany attacking anyone until the end of 1937. Litvinov said that he, Laval and Eden had taken a very serious view of the present situation in Austria and had anticipated a Nazi outbreak this summer and had concluded that Mussolini had given up all hopes of keeping Austria out of the hands of the Nazis (the conversations I had in Vienna last week with Messersmith,41 Schuschnigg,42 Bergner Walldeck43 and scores of old friends including one of the secret leaders of the Nazi movement in Austria have convinced me that there is small danger of Austria going Nazi through internal pressure this summer).
Litvinov said that he had little hope that the Danubian Pact would be unopposed. He said that the Yugoslavs had indicated clearly that they would prefer to have Austria under German influence rather than under Italian and that they did not desire any real reconciliation with Italy. He said that the Turks and Rumanians were also making difficulties. He stated that Titulescu had taken the position that Rumania would not enter into any guarantees for the independence of Austria unless the Soviet Union should also guarantee Austrian independence. I asked Litvinov if he were prepared to do so and he replied evasively that the question had not yet been presented in serious form as there were still a vast number of other obstacles to the Danubian Pact.
Litvinov said that he now considered the situation of Czechoslovakia almost as dangerous as that of Austria and added that Beneš had told him that as soon as possible he would have the new camouflaged Nazi party of Henlein44 declared illegal and destroyed.
Litvinov said that he would continue to push the Eastern Pact but without much hope as he felt Poland was still determined to keep open the possibility of attacking the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia [Page 285] in case the Soviet Union should be attacked by Japan. He again expressed the opinion that there was no possibility of an early Japanese attack and repeated the statement which I reported in my telegram 177 of May 4, 10 p.m. that Japan would wait for a German attack on the Soviet Union and that Germany would wait for a Japanese attack and that in the end neither would dare attack.