862.20/1023
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 28.]
Sir: In continuation of the Embassy’s despatch No. 1971 of May 9, 1935,35 and in summarizing the international situation from the German standpoint just prior to further pronouncements by the Chancellor36 which will quite likely definitely mark either increased European alignment against Germany to a point where peace cooperation is impossible or a conciliatory attitude on the part of Germany which will bring hope to a neurotic continent, I have the honor to report as follows:
Although one or two feeble attempts had previously been made by the other European powers to ascertain the Reich’s position by a concrete statement of foreign policy, the Franco-British communiqué of February 3, 1935,37 was the first definite acknowledgement by those powers of Germany’s armaments, and resulted in the crystallization of Germany’s foreign policy. Germany was not quite ready at that time to state a policy but the communiqué precipitated its formulation [Page 281] and after certain maneuvering, Germany proclaimed the establishment of general military conscription and an air force, in violation of treaty provisions, on March 16 and March 10, respectively, as forerunners to a policy announcement. Incidentally the discussions relative to an Eastern Pact, with its well-known “mutual assistance” clause, are not mentioned here in connection with the establishment of a policy in spite of the fact that such a pact later became an important part of the policy; it is only one of a large number of considerations. Just recently it has been stated in reliable quarters that regardless of any approaches or proposals made by any of the other powers, Germany would have announced conscription and a foreign policy in May or June of this year, and such a statement is given weight by the fact that conscription details are just now being completed, two months after the announcement. It is to be noted that military strength and foreign policy are regarded as inseparable.
When it was apparent that Germany had decided on a unilateral course of action, it became all the more necessary to obtain a statement of policy, and with this in view the Simon visit to Berlin was arranged. At that time, Hitler was at the peak of his power. Nazi theory had hitherto been largely nourishment for the spirit only; the bold assertions of equality were actual meat and drink, and although war may have been in the minds of many, there were but few who, unconsciously at least, did not feel that they had been freed of the humiliation of a defeat which they had never admitted.
With universal approval ringing in his ears, Hitler, ever the temperamental egoist whose background of newly acquired success did not develop long range foresight, approached the Simon conferences with colossal self-assurance, and while the difficulty of argument against his apparently sincere protestations of peace and good-will is admitted, it is not difficult to understand that the British delegation left Berlin with misgivings and no particular feeling of confidence. They did leave, however, with a fairly definite impression of the Nazi—or Hitler—foreign policy, and there then followed various movements towards alignment against Germany throughout Europe and a succession of unforeseen set-backs, both domestic and foreign, for Nazi policy. These may be set forth briefly:
- 1.
- The Stresa Conference resulted in a fairly definite alignment of England, upon whom Germany had counted to at least maintain an “understanding” attitude, with the other powers.
- 2.
- The Geneva resolution, unanimously adopted, against the unilateral action of Germany with regard to the Treaty of Versailles. Germany had counted on Poland, Spain, and some of the South American countries to vote against it.
- 3.
- The Danzig election returns gave National Socialism a bare 60 per cent, when up to 90 per cent and at least a constitution controlling two-thirds were fully expected.
- 4.
- The Franco-Russian pact agreed to May 2, which Germany hoped to the last would not be signed, and in which she sees an important encircling move against her. In this was seen further evidence of British alignment against her, as the latter do not envisage assistance to Germany under the Locarno treaty in case Germany were to be attacked by France.
- 5.
- The rapprochement of France and Poland following the visit of Laval to Warsaw where the Franco-Russian pact was apparently satisfactorily explained, and the death of Pilsudski which is feared will result in greater Polish leanings towards France.
- 6.
- The greater political and economic solidarity of the Baltic states following the conference in Riga which ended May 8.
- 7.
- The Russo-Czechoslovak pact signed May 16, along the same lines as the Franco-Russian pact which establishes an important point of operation for Russia in Czechoslovakia in case of conflict.
- 8.
- The disturbing internal conditions in Germany, as outlined in the Embassy’s despatch No. 1984, dated May 17, 1935.38
- 9.
- Attitude of Little Entente and Balkan States.
Since Hitler’s sharp rejoinder to the League’s resolution on April 20, not only have most of the above outlined developments taken place, but there has been time for reflection. Germany had counted very largely on British, and, to a great extent, Polish support. Now she finds it difficult to understand the British attitude in combining conciliation and firmness as outlined by MacDonald, and she grasps desperately at such innocuous pronouncements as were made in the House of Lords debate on May 6, condemning the League’s resolution against her. Her instinctive national aggressiveness is probably as much responsible for her attitude as Hitler and Naziism. Neither is entirely unreasonable, for Germany has never wholly accepted her international obligations and Hitler has consistently repudiated them.
However, her only foreign sources of solace, if they may be called such, are the Memel jurisdiction at which she rightfully points the finger of scorn, and the Italian-Abyssinian difficulty over which the League, and Italy’s two collaborators France and England, apparently have no control.
Since May 1, Labor Day, there has been a noticeable domestic reaction to the Nazi buoyance culminating in the conscription and foreign policy statements. Labor is restless, prices are going up with the resulting dissatisfaction, factions are increasing, and changes in the high ranks of the Party are rumored. Hitler made no constructive statements in his Labor Day speech, as apparently had been expected.
With all of these matters to reflect on, it is expected that Hitler will probably have a great deal to say in his Reichstag speech on May 21. This speech has had an interesting history. It grew out of a speech [Page 283] which was to have been made by Blohmberg39 on May 9, on the subject of the general conscription in which the detailed regulations were to have been announced. On May 2, the date the Franco-Russian pact was signed, Blohmberg’s speech was cancelled and it was announced that Hitler would make the announcement, May 17 being set later. With many of the events outlined above developing recently as a background for consideration, Pilsudski’s death was cause for a further postponement to May 21, and according to reliable information, Hitler wished to take into consideration also any developments arising out of a possible talk between Laval and Goring, who proceeded to Warsaw and Cracow as Germany’s representative at the funeral ceremonies. In fact, it has been stated that Laval was considering a conference in Berlin until the Polish dictator’s death seemed to provide another arrangement.
What the Chancellor will say is, of course, impossible to predict. It is a foregone conclusion, however, that he will cover a vast amount of ground and for that reason it can be judged that his foreign policy will be publicly outlined. High Nazi officials have stated that he will cover “everything” which will include not only foreign affairs, but the army and navy, internal affairs and the economic situation.
With all of the recent developments in mind, the Embassy believes that while he will explain at length his previous stand, he will be forced to adopt a certain conciliatory attitude; in fact it has been confidentially intimated that such will be the case.
There is transmitted herewith a summary of the German press view of international affairs40 covering the period since the last despatch.
Respectfully yours,