751.6111/71: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:40 p.m.]
177. I discussed with Litvinov this afternoon the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance agreement.18 He was obviously delighted by the extent of the negotiations but even more so by the statement of Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on May 2nd.
If Germany attacked the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and if in accordance with the Soviet-French agreement, France assisted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by attacking Germany the Locarno Treaty19 does not impose the obligations on Britain to render aid to Germany.
Litvinov said that he considered this the most important development of recent months; that it indicated that the relationship of France and England was closer today than at any time in this century. He said that the final difficulties in drafting the treaty of Mutual Assistance had sprung from the unwillingness of France to do anything which might subject her to sanctions by England under the Locarno agreement. He added that he had discussed this question with Eden in Moscow; that Eden had adopted a favorable attitude, and that ever since the French and Soviet Governments had been attempting to obtain a public or written declaration from Great Britain. “At last we got it.”
Litvinov added that the French had insisted on including article 2 of the protocol in the new Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance to cover this point and that the Soviet Government had refused until the last minute to permit the inclusion of this article of the protocol. He said that the obligations undertaken by France to come to the support of the Soviet Union had been without binding character until the declaration of Sir John Simon, but that Sir John’s statement made French support of the Soviet Union in case of an attack by Germany absolutely certain.
Litvinov added that he felt especially sure of this because of the Baltic States barrier between Germany and the Soviet Union. It would be impossible for a frontier incident to occur between Germany and the Soviet Union which each side could blame on the other. German aggression against the Soviet Union would have to pass over the Baltic States and would, therefore, be clear aggression.
[Page 271]Litvinov went on to say that he did not consider that this treaty gave the Soviet Union full security; that the only final security of the Soviet Union lay in the Red Army, but he did feel that it would make it impossible for Germany to initiate an attack on the Soviet Union. The situation had become somewhat comic he commented. Japan was waiting for Germany and Poland to attack the Soviet Union and those countries were waiting for a Japanese attack. Neither the enemies of the Soviet Union to the East nor those to the West dared to initiate such an attack. “They are waiting, let them wait”, he chuckled.
Litvinov said he felt the Treaty between France and the Soviet Union would compel Hitler to concentrate his line of advance on Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Balkans. He said that he considered the situation in Austria extremely dangerous. He added that Russia had taken no commitments whatsoever with regard to Austria and would take none. Parenthetically he remarked that Russia had taken no commitments for the defense of Belgium just as France had taken none for the defense of Lithuania.
Litvinov said that the most interesting thing to watch now would be the action of Poland. He said that until a few days ago Beck had continued to scoff at the idea that the Franco-Soviet Agreement for Mutual Assistance would finally be concluded. He said that Poland’s relations with Germany had, however, become much worse in the past few weeks and that he had some hope that Laval’s visit to Warsaw might swing Poland into the Franco-Soviet orbit. He added that the Polish Government had now stated officially that it was prepared to adhere to the proposed Danubian Pact20 provided that Hungary should join the pact. No similar reservation had been made with regard to Germany’s joining. He commented that relations between Poland and Hungary were now extremely intimate and that Poland had refused to give any guarantees whatsoever with regard to its actions if Czechoslovakia should be the object of attack (Titulescu’s similar remarks to me on this subject were, I believe, transmitted to you by Ambassador Straus).
Litvinov went on to say that he considered the situation of Czechoslovakia scarcely less dangerous than that of Austria. I asked him if it was still the intention of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to sign an agreement for Mutual Assistance similar to the Franco-Soviet agreement and if so, when such an agreement would be signed. He replied that his discussions with the Czechoslovaks had not yet assumed [Page 272] any definite form but that some such agreement would probably be signed.21
I asked Litvinov if conversations between the general staffs of the French and Soviet Armies would be begun at once. He replied with a broad smile that that was a military matter beyond the competence of his Commissariat. (Radek22 in discussing the Franco-Soviet agreement with me last night said that in his opinion its only real importance was that it would permit the staffs of the French and Soviet Armies to begin such conversations immediately and that he knew the conversations were to be begun at once).
Litvinov then said that the United States seemed to be much less excited than Great Britain about Germany’s naval rearmament and asked me if our Government intended to make any protest against the reconstruction of the German Navy and if our Government would insist on the calling of a naval conference. I replied that I had no information on these points. (I should be obliged if I might receive in confidence a statement of our attitude with regard to the naval conference.)23
In conclusion Litvinov said that he felt the signature of the Mutual Assistance Agreement with France had produced a new constellation in European politics and constituted a clear warning to Germany that aggression would be met by force.
The diplomatic corps in Moscow is engaged in commenting skeptically on the tortuous wording of the Franco-Soviet Pact which is held to indicate an abundance of mutual suspicion and attention is called to the fact that it does not affect the chief danger points in Europe: Austria and Lithuania.
Repeated to Riga, Warsaw, Berlin, Paris, Rome, London.
- Signed May 2, 1935, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxvii, p. 395.↩
- Signed October 16, 1925, ibid., vol. liv, p. 289.↩
- See report No. 14215 by the Acting Military Attaché in Italy, January 10, 1935, p. 170.↩
- Agreement signed at Prague, May 16, 1935, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clix, p. 347.↩
- Karl Radek, editorial writer on the Soviet newspapers Izvestia and Pravda. ↩
- See Department’s telegram No. 95, May 7, 6 p.m., p. 162.↩