Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, General, The Near East and Africa, Volume I

862.20/1030

The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation to the Disarmament Conference (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, April 20, 1935.
[Received May 8.]

Dear Mr. Secretary: You already have before you, in the reports of the Consulate, the details and day-by-day development of the meeting of the Council which closed on April 17th. It seems to me that it would be appropriate, now that the session is over, to put before you certain thoughts which this debate has brought to me, certain shifting phases of the political combination of Europe, and certain possibilities which this altered arrangement in Europe may bring to the future. All these matters are not only of profound interest of themselves, but vitally affect the phase of the problem in which we are immediately concerned—that of disarmament.

The scene of the last few days has been that of a confused and violent struggle between a number of forces; many of them visible and easy to assess; others hidden and only appreciable through their indirect results. I need only enumerate the Russo-French negotiations for so-called mutual assistance pacts, the Russo-Czechoslovak negotiations in the same direction; the powerful but invisible influence of Titulesco;¹² the pressure of Italy, inspired by Mussolini’s recently adopted policy; the political necessity for Laval to bring home a victory on account of his shaken internal position; Poland’s desire to stay in the middle of the road. I say I need only enumerate these, as any attempt at complete analysis is rather the work of an historian than that of a diplomatic officer reporting on the results.

The one factor which stood out predominantly and on which I reported in my telegrams Nos. 1038¹³ and 1039¹⁴ was what would be the position of England in answer to Germany’s unilateral breach of the Treaty of Versailles and her decision, regardless of that treaty, to establish an army such as she wanted. It is hard to say that in this discussion Great Britain’s position was the decisive factor—it certainly was the essential factor. It is difficult indeed to assess motives at any time. It is peculiarly difficult now to give a clear-cut picture of alignments in a few words. Hence, with all reserve for possible exceptions, until the meeting at Stresa one could align the States of Europe outside of Germany into two separate camps.

First, there are those who have believed ever since Germany left the League of Nations that it was folly to deal with her; that Hitler was a man utterly without trust and scruple; that Germany was an increasing danger and lived for nothing but the day on which a new and overwhelming aggression could be launched. Those who believed this thesis not only deplored the endeavors to bring Germany back into the harmony of nations, but rejoiced that Germany had left the League, inasmuch as to them this simplified the problem of utilizing the League as a method of encirclement and coercion for Germany. This group firmly believed that war was inevitable; their concern was to meet that war in the most advantageous moment and posture. In this class of States I would unhesitatingly put Russia and the Little Entente. It may be that latterly Italy has joined the group. Certainly from public utterances it would seem so, and Ambassador Long’s reports appear to confirm the view. Turkey also would seem to have joined the group, though not one of the motivating forces. France has always, as I have many times reported, been torn between the desire to enter this group and the desire to remain in the other camp.

The second group is that represented by the policy of Great Britain. Great Britain has been the motivating force for neutral Powers of Europe and for those elements in France which still hope that there is a possibility of negotiation with Germany. The doctrine of this group is that peace in Europe is impossible unless Germany is a partner on an equal footing in the discussions with the other Powers. They not only deplore the idea of encirclement and isolation of Germany, but are firmly convinced that such methods will lead inevitably to war. They are apprehensive of the possibility of war, but determined to use every method to prevent it.

Thus it is clear that Great Britain’s attitude is, as I have said before, the essential factor, and this will explain why, in my telegrams above referred to and in this report, I concentrate on this aspect of the confused situation. This may perhaps seem to place too much emphasis upon the role played by England, and, by excluding other considerations, may seem to over-simplify the problem. It is, however, my considered opinion that the position which England took alone made possible the resolution and the unity of front against Germany. This is the major factor in Europe today. Furthermore, Great Britain’s attitude is the one of most essential concern to us, and upon it depends in large measure not only the fate of Europe, but very probably our own relationship to European affairs. This flows not only from our close relationship with the British people, but also because of their expert knowledge of the way to present their case before our public.

Now, however, the Council meeting is past and the edges of that alignment which I mentioned above have become blurred. Just where is Great Britain today? This is the point that not only interests us profoundly but probably is giving rise to more concern and speculation in Europe, and even in England itself, than any other factor.

It is difficult and sometimes dangerous to try to sum up anything as complex, as far-reaching and subject to as many influences as the foreign policy of a nation. Nevertheless, I believe it is correct to say that the guiding thought in British foreign policy today is that usually known as “the Foreign Office policy.” It has always been considered that in the vacillation of the Government policy, the Foreign Office has consistently maintained that Germany cannot be dealt with on a reasonable basis; that negotiation with Germany, or rather negotiation on an equal footing with Germany, will lead to no results; that hence it is imperative that solidarity with France be maintained at all costs in order, in their opinion, to bring Germany to a negotiable frame of mind. These gentlemen have assessed the German mentality and have convinced themselves that Germany will acquiesce in a settlement and be reasonable only if confronted with a unified Europe against her with its implication of eventual force to resist her. At the same time—and this I must emphasize—the Foreign Office representatives have invariably stated emphatically that their purpose in maintaining unity with France was to bring about such a negotiable frame of mind in Germany as to bring Germany into the concert of nations and to keep Germany in a state of mind in which it would be a good and useful neighbor. Here is the contrast between the Foreign Office conception and the conception which I have sketched above as typified by the Little Entente and Russia.

The French themselves say, and Massigli¹⁵ was definite on this point, that the Foreign Office conception won the day both at Stresa and at Geneva. Vansittart¹⁶ was present in both negotiations and even—according to Massigli—played the decisive role. In this connection, it is stated to me that only with the King’s permission can the Permanent Under-Secretary be absent from the country at the same time as the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and that, at the request of the Cabinet, who feared to let Simon go alone, the King in this instance gave his permission.

Great Britain, then, has adopted the policy of showing a united front to Germany. One may speculate on the results of this step both from an internal and an external point of view.

Internally there seems to be no question but that the predominant feeling in Great Britain is that it “will accept no new commitments on the Continent.” Immediately after Stresa and immediately after Geneva, Cabinet members thought it essential to reiterate with emphasis that no new commitment had been accepted. Every Britisher with whom I have talked is profoundly convinced that in a democracy such as Great Britain there can be no automatic and immediate entry into war. No formula, no matter how precise, can be found by which a great democracy can be brought to enter into a war without discussion, without assessment of its own public opinion and on the vote of the Council or any other body of “foreigners”. And yet, just such thoughts are stirring in the minds of practically every other State on the Council which played an active part in the acceptance of this resolution. Great Britain—for the moment at least—has thrown in its lot with those who believe, or profess to believe, that the only security lies in guarantees of swift, automatic, overwhelming response to an aggression. Not only are these thoughts stirring in the minds of Continental statesmen, but the fact that Great Britain has not only acquiesced in but sponsored the forming of a united front against Germany is feeding them raw meat. The French are already drafting proposals for the automatic embargo against a unilateral violator of a treaty of those raw materials which can be utilized in the manufacture of arms. It is interesting to speculate whether British public opinion realizes that the adoption of the resolution is the initial step in a direction along which they are reluctant to proceed.

Now what is to be British public opinion with respect to cooperation in economic or armed action if necessary on the Continent as a member of a coalition against Germany consisting of France, Russia, Italy, the Little Entente, Turkey, etc.? Can British public opinion be brought to this point even if Germany goes to the extent of a breach of the Rhineland demilitarized zone? I confess I do not know the answer to this—I can only say that on the answer must depend Britain’s decision of major policy.

From the external point of view, the fact that Great Britain has thrown in its lot with those who desire to form a united front and has sponsored a resolution to that effect cannot, in my judgment, fail to be an encouragement to the formulation of a mass of alliances directed against Germany. Whatever the names of these pacts, whatever the phraseology of these pacts, their purpose will be resistance if not coercion of Germany. The resolution itself and its very wording, to my mind, encourages and “legitimizes” such pacts.

After what I have written above, I don’t believe it will surprise you if I say that the atmosphere in Europe after the Stresa and Council meetings is very similar to that immediately following the Armistice. Germany is “the enemy” and the whole idea and trend in most of Europe today is how to deal with her. In seventeen years of peace we have never had a really peaceful atmosphere, with the possible exception of the few months following the signing of the Locarno Treaties. Nevertheless, the situation now is more definite than during the period since the signing of the Versailles Treaty. There is a cleavage which is sharp and evident.

You may remember that I said in my telegram No. 1039 that, at least in Great Britain’s action, the adoption of the resolution was a gamble on Hitler’s character. The British state that they believe that the united front will make Hitler reflect, after his first spasm of anger, at the condemnation; and they believe and hope that he will make some move eventually to show that he desires to come back into the club in view of the moral censure which the club has expressed upon him. Whether this is true or not history alone will show. You will remember, Mr. Secretary, that Munch, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressing the gravest doubts as to whether this resolution would serve its professed purpose or whether it would have exactly the contrary effect of destroying all hope of negotiation, closed with words which I can only echo. Here they are:

“I should like, however, to express the hope that events will prove that the three Great Powers who have put forward this proposal are right in their view of the effects which will follow from the adoption of this resolution, and I should like also to add the hope that they will succeed in bringing about an agreement between all the Great Powers of Europe, and thus give effect to the common aspiration entertained by all the peoples of Europe namely, an aspiration for their happiness which depends upon peace.”

Regarding the aspect of this matter which is known as disarmament, I shall report in a separate despatch.¹⁷

Respectfully yours,

Hugh R. Wilson

12. Nicolas Titulescu, Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
13. April 17, 6 p.m., not printed; see despatch No. 113, April 17, p. 248.
14. April 18, 6 p.m., p. 259.
15. René Massigli, French Assistant Director of Political and Commercial Affairs.
16. Robert Gilbert Vansittart, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
17. See despatch No. 114, April 20, p. 51.